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GRÜNEWALD'S CHRISTIANITY

By Stephen S. Kayser

In 1519 Luther wrote a booklet of consolation for "those who are heavy-laden," dedicated to his sovereign, the Elector of Saxony, who was seriously ill at the time.[1] It consisted of fourteen meditations which were to replace the "fourteen helpers in time of need" of the old Church. These "delegates of the deity"[2] had the privilege of rendering help to everyone who called upon them in immediate danger. Luther's substitution of biblical meditations for those medieval auxiliaries is characteristic of the attitude of the early Reformation towards the veneration of saints. On the other hand, the fourteen helpers, whose mass was finally prohibited by the Church after the Council of Trent, testify to the importance of images during the later Middle Ages. Each one of these saints had his or her visible attribute, thus to be kept in mind easily by the layman.

The turning from images to abstractions marks the relation between art and the Reformation, finally expressed in the important role of music in Protestantism, which, though not hostile to painting and sculpture, made no use of them.[3] However, the early Reformation was accompanied by a series of great artists who reacted individually to the revolutionary events of the period. Holbein entered into the ecclesiastical controversies with the anti-Roman battle cry of his Apocalypse illustrations. Cranach, Luther's friend, mirrored the spirit of the epoch in his portraiture. Dürer attached himself to the Reformation in the famous confession of his Netherlandish Diary (May 17, 1521), but he never attacked the Church as such. His Apostles in Munich became the purest reflection of the new evangelical creed in art. The sculptor, Riemenschneider, was put to the rack for his active participation in the rebellion known as the Peasants' War.

While the attitude of these artists towards their time is as well known as their lives and works, there is, up to the present, much speculation about the religious position of their contemporary, Mathis

1. *Trostbüchlein für Mühselige und Beladene*, ed. Karl Kindt (Göttingen, 1939).
2. J. Huizinga, *Herbst des Mittelalters* (Leipzig, 1930) p. 246.
3. Cf. Ernst Tröltsch, *Renaissance und Reformation*, in *Gesammelte Schriften* (Tübingen, 1925) IV.

Gothardt-Neithardt, better known as Mathias Grünewald.[4] He died in 1528; the date of his birth is still unknown. Melanchthon mentions him in the same breath with Dürer and Cranach[5] and the seventeenth century still knew him as a highly famed painter. His work is of utmost significance in the religious art of the early sixteenth century, for two main reasons. First, he painted exclusively religious subjects; those of his works which we must consider as lost were like those extant, without exception, so far as we know, of religious character. This seems remarkable at a time when painters more and more were turning to worldly subjects. Secondly, Grünewald's work seems to be more than the individual expression of an artist. The Nestor of Grünewald research, Heinrich A. Schmid, expressed this assumption in these words: "Everyone . . . will be under the impression that behind his works stood, not only a single man unknown to us up to the present, but a very great movement of which we divine nothing and learn only a little from the usual descriptions of history."[6]

An appreciation of the artist, as such, is given in the words of Frank Jewett Mather, Jr.: "He seems to me the greatest artist that the North produced before Rubens and Rembrandt. And here I am not thinking in terms of technical greatness, in which the North ever abounded, but in terms of greatness of the imagination."[7] For the American Grünewald scholar, Arthur Burkhard, the artist's work sums up the entire artistic development of the German past at the end of the Middle Ages. Of Grünewald's principal work Burkhard says: ". . . the Isenheim Altar (was) the masterpiece not only of Grünewald himself but of German art in general," and he ranks it with Rembrandt's "Nightwatch."[8]

The growing understanding of Grünewald's art during the last

4. We retain the historically incorrect name, Grünewald, which, for still unexplained reasons, was introduced a hundred and fifty years after the painter's death.

5. "Durerus enim pingebat omnia grandiosa et frequentissimis lineis variata. Lucae (Cranach) picturae graciles sunt, quae etsi blendae sunt, tamen quantum distent a Dureri operibus collatio ostendit. Matthias (Grünewald) quasi mediocritatem servebat." Melanchthon, "*Elementorum rhetorices libri duo*" (1531), quoted in Margarete Hausenberg, *Matthias Grünewald im Wandel der deutschen Kunstgeschichte* (Leipzig, 1927) p. 24.

6. *Die Gemälde und Zeichnungen von Matthias Grünewald* (Strasbourg, 1911) II, p. 46.

7. *Western European painting of the Renaissance* (New York, 1939) p. 261.

8. *Matthias Grünewald: Personality and Accomplishment* (Cambridge, Mass. 1936) pp. 42, 76. Burkhard's book is the first work in English on Grünewald. It contains a bibliography up to 1936.

thirty years was accompanied by many attempts to analyze the theological background of his creations. But neither the art historian, nor the theologian has been able to give an individual portrait of this artist and his personality. Though more and more documents have been discovered which throw light upon many details of his development, Grünewald still escapes our categories of "great" individualities, while his paintings surpass more and more those of his contemporaries.[9]

We are not in a position to ask the artist directly about his religious convictions; neither have we a clear statement such as the personal confession of Dürer, nor can we observe a distinct position such as that expressed in Holbein's pictorial polemic. In order to approach Grünewald's attitude we must examine his work, especially the Isenheim Altar, the greatest religious monument of its period north of the Alps.

GRÜNEWALD'S IMAGE OF CHRIST

Of the twenty paintings by Grünewald that we know, ten represent Christ. Five of these are renderings of the Crucifixion, a motif that accompanied the artist to his death, for he left an unfinished altar-piece representing Christ on the cross, with St. John and the Mother of God. Christ's crucified body recurs perpetually in Grünewald's work with the horror of painful death increasingly portrayed. It seems that these crucifixion paintings represent a compulsion in the painter's mind. They express a tremendous force of fantasy, working out the details of a cruel imagination under pressure from within.[10]

9. At the beginning of the Grünewald research stands the monumental work of H. A. Schmid (*op. cit.*). Since this work was published, various other scholars have succeeded in finding out more details, which enabled the most successful among them, Walter Karl Zülch, to publish his monograph, *Der historische Grünewald* (Munich, 1938). This work will be the basis for all future writing on this subject. It makes a revised edition of Burkhard's book necessary. Zülch's comprehensive investigations enable us to re-examine the works of Grünewald from the standpoint of religious history of the Reformation. Three other monographs may be mentioned here: Oskar Hagen's book, *Matthias Grünewald* (Fourth Edition, Munich, 1924) is still a valuable contribution to the appreciation of Grünewald's art; Wilhelm Fränger's *Matthias Grünewald* (Berlin, 1936) is called "Ein physiognomischer Versuch," and traces the physical and spiritual features of the artist in his works by a physiognomical and analytical method which has aroused much discussion; Heinrich Feurstein, *Matthias Grünewald* (Bonn, 1930) summarizes his investigations of the religious content and the literary sources of the painter's creations.

10. How far a certain kind of modern psychological writer can go may be proved by the following quotation from Joan Evans, *Taste and Temperament* (London,

Such a psychological viewpoint, however, sees this amazing Christ-image only from one point of view, whereas it must be understood as a not merely subjective expression of the central Christian idea.

In early Christian times, we find two main trends in the imagining of Christ's appearance, according to the theological distinction between *forma servi* and *forma Dei.*[11] The latter idea was rooted in the Hellenistic tradition of Apollonian beauty. The former, the passion-type, was mainly influenced by the idea of the Servant of God, in Isaiah 53.[12] To this source Grünewald expressively refers in a large inscription, dominating the scene of his painting "Christ bearing the cross" (Gemälde-Gallerie, Karlsruhe i. B.). The humiliation of the Lord is the basic theme of this tradition, which culminates pictorially in Grünewald's Crucifixions. "It is insupportable that man bears upon himself the human form in which God died. In Grünewald's pictures it really happens that the forms of man rebel; they burst asunder, for they cannot endure to remain with man, having been with Christ at his death. They do not want to be connected any more with man; they are about to leave him."[13] With these words, characterizing Grünewald's art, Max Picard summarizes his ideas on the limits of physiognomy, the critical problem of which he sees in the redemption of mankind by the Lord's adoption of human form for his self-sacrifice. Seen from this metaphysical angle, Grünewald's Christ demonstrates the abysmal questionableness of the human body as the frame of the Word that was made flesh.

This spiritual pathology of the Passion reaches its climax among Grünewald's Crucifixions in the Isenheim Altar, which was intended for the diseased people cared for by the monks of the Monastery of St. Anthony at Isenheim, near Colmar.[14] These miserable human beings, the "martyrs of God" were led to the altar and the relics of the saint. Skin-diseases of the kind treated by the Antonine monks were considered in the Middle Ages as outward signs of an inward corrup-

1939). There we read: "In certain examples of the work of slow extravert artists a paranoid sadism is evident. A terrible example is the crucified body of Our Lord in the Isenheim Altar-piece by Matthias Grünewald" (p. 96).

11. Cf. G. de Jerphanion, "L'Image de Jésus-Christ dans l'art chrétien," *Nouvelle revue théologique* (1938) III, p. 263.

12. Cf. Georg Bertram, "Die Vorstellung von Christus," *Die Christliche Welt* (1939) XXII, p. 805.

13. *Die Grenzen der Physiognomik* (Erlenbach-Zürich and Leipzig, 1927) p. 110.

14. The altar was executed between 1512 and 1515. It was pulled down in the French Revolution; since then, the original arrangement has never been re-established. Its pictorial part consisted of nine paintings (now in the Museum Unterlinden, Col-

tion and sin. The saint was a powerful intercessor, but in those cases only one healer could finally re-establish the desired kinship, the Redeemer himself who appeals, according to Matthew 11:4 ("the lepers are cleansed"), to his healing of those diseases as proof of his Divinity. This he does in his message to John the Baptist, whose important role in the Isenheim Crucifixion will be explained later.

Only Christ could cure diseases caused by sin, for he suffered for all sufferings. In this respect, Christ was neither a martyr nor a stoic, neither anxiously longing for suffering nor indifferent towards it. He had, rather, to suffer as the *man* of Gethsemane, fearing misery and death. Stoicism, in its Christian version of indifference towards all temptations from the outside, and martyrdom also, are represented in the altar-wings at either side of the Isenheim Crucifixion. St. Anthony, characterized by the T-cross he holds, which originally was a walking-staff, stands quietly at the left side. A female imp fastens her claws into the splintering bull's-eye glass. At the other side, St. Sebastian calmly presents his body to the arrows, while angels bring the crown of martyrdom down to him. The two figures were originally painted as grisailles and therefore put on a socle. The intensive white, red, and dark colors of the Crucifixion may have finally forced the artist to color these figures as well. Their difference in size is caused by the composition in relation to the human proportions in the Crucifixion panel. In Sebastian's five wounds we may find a symbolic hint.

These two saints and those of the Crucifixion panel taken together, make four saints appearing in the first view of the altar. In this

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mar), which were arranged in three series, according to the shifting of the altar-scenes:

	Left side-wing	Central panel	Right side-wing
First view:	St. Anthony	Crucifixion	St. Sebastian
	Predella: Lamentation		
Second view:	Annunciation	Incarnation	Resurrection
	Predella: Lamentation		
Third view:	St. Anthony visiting St. Paul	Sculpture-group with St. Anthony	Temptation of St. Anthony
	Predella: Sculpture-group of Christ and the Apostles		

The changing of the scenes was performed by opening the central panels which were cut in the middle. The sculptured wooden figures in the center of the third series were made in 1505.

frontal position, they were obviously meant as patrons of the sick in the monastery hospital. St. Anthony was invoked against St. Anthony's fire (erysipelas), St. Sebastian against pestilence; St. John the Apostle and St. John the Baptist were patrons of the falling sickness. These saints embody the common medieval faith in their power as protectors against all sorts of illness, so bitterly criticized by men like Erasmus, who turned his sarcasm against those representatives of a dying epoch. In his criticism he happens to mention St. Anthony and John the Baptist in one breath.[15]

However, it would be a mistake to call Grünewald an antiquated painter of medieval saints who were about to become empty shapes. It is true that he painted the fourteen helpers in time of need on the so-called Lindenhardt Altar, around 1503. But four years later, Lucas Cranach, the future prototype of a Lutheran painter, took up the same motif for the Marian Church at Torgau. Those subjects were still alive, while the spirit of a new epoch could be felt everywhere. The saints in the first scene of the Isenheim Altar had not only the task of being patrons of the sick before the altar, they were also related to the Healer of all healers in the center. More and more, they became protagonists of the central tragedy. St. Anthony, in his stoical attitude, shows no concern at all; in his gesture, St. Sebastian refers to the martyrdom in the central panel; St. John the Disciple is indirectly connected with the death on the cross by his action; John the Baptist points directly at the mystery.

The Isenheim Crucifixion depicts the instant when Mary is falling back unconscious, supported by St. John, to whom, according to the Fourth Gospel, Christ recommended his mother as his (St. John's) own (Plate I). The enlarged arm of the disciple, with which he embraces the Mother of the Lord illustrates the words of the scripture: ". . . and from that hour that disciple took her unto his own home" (John 19:27). The action of the picture is focused in the breakdown of Mary Magdalene, stretching up her clasped hands to the Redeemer who bends his head down to her. The actors them-

15. "It is so: The Saints, now they are in Heaven, will take no Affront. Was ever any man gentler than Cornelius, milder than Anthony, or more patient than John the Baptist, while they liv'd upon Earth? But now they are in Heaven, what dreadful Diseases do they send among us, if we do not worship them as we should do?" *The Colloquies of Erasmus.* Translated by N. Bailey, ed. E. Johnson (London, 1878) II, p. 288.

selves are diminishing, which is indicated by the pronouncement of John the Baptist in his words: "He must increase but I must decrease" (John 3:30). This diminution is proved by the figural length of the actors. The Magdalene is only half the length of the Christ figure, though she is closest of all to the spectator. The other figures mediate between her and the gigantic Christ. Her body and hands show the highest degree of action, and, at the same time, she is the weakest of all in her overwhelming despair. Though the Virgin is sinking back unconscious, she expresses with her tightly clasped hands a more restrained mind. St. John, supporting her, must have some composure in this triad of grief at the right side of the cross.

At the other side stands the Baptist as a prophetic announcer. His importance as the indicator consists in the saying above mentioned, which is written on the painting in the angle formed by his right arm: ILLUM OPORTET CRESCERE ME AUTEM MINUI. This quotation did not connect the *crucified* Christ with John the Baptist who was already dead when Jesus was crucified. It is St. Augustine's interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, which brings the decapitated John the Baptist to the cross. "This is a great mystery! . . . That is he must be glorified, but I must confess. Let man know his own condition, and confess to God. . . . Let him decrease in himself, that he may be increased in God. These testimonies and this truth, Christ and John signified by their deaths. For John was lessened by the Head: Christ was exalted on the cross; so that even there is appeared what this is, 'He must increase but I must decrease.' Again, Christ was born when the days were just beginning to lengthen; John was born when they began to shorten. Thus their very creation and deaths testify to the words of John. . . ."[16]

Referring to this source, we may state that in Grünewald's picture Christ is already dead, and not dying. That is also indicated by the side wound of Jesus which, according to Holy Writ, confirms his death (John 19:34). The main purpose of the painting was to comfort and strengthen these diseased people. The ideal spectator in this sense could say with St. Paul: "I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the son of God, who loved

16. *The Works of Aurelius Augustine, A New Translation*, ed. Marcus Dods (Edinburgh, 1873) X, 1, pp. 200 f.

me, and gave himself for me" (Gal. 2:20). This Christ who died for the suffering of man arouses compassion rather than contemplation, though both were themes of the Crucifixion pictures of the Johannine tradition. Grünewald's last rendering of the Crucifixion motif, the Crucifixion in Karlsruhe, seems closer to the contemplative type, in the quiet sorrow of Mary. Here, Christ has not the open mouth of his Isenheim forerunner, though the marks of the blows on his body are rather more cruelly represented. Crown of thorns and loin-cloth are enlarged. Here Grünewald enhances these details and, at the same time, deadens the momentous excitement of the Isenheim Crucifixion. In the latter, the body of Christ is shown in the very moment after he has expired. It is bent on the cross as on a crossbow; the feet, enlarged and animal-like, are cramped together, emphasizing the distortion of the nailed body. The hands are open in the last convulsion of agony. The body, already in a greenish-gray color of decay, is covered all over with the marks of the scourge. H. A. Schmid, the most careful investigator of details in Grünewald's paintings, describes how the procedure of crucifying is to be realized: first, the hands were fastened, then the body was torn downward, finally the feet were nailed to the cross which threatened to split them in bending.[17]

Was such a detailed realism indeed the way of Grünewald's imagination? It can be asked, with the same right, whether an execution as it is represented here stands the tests of physiology at all. Thinking in terms of the so-called realism in late medieval art, we overlook the fact that even the repellent details of Christ's crucified body in Grünewald's work are far from reality as we understand it. They only became "real" as symbolic incitement. "L'intention originale de cet artiste a toujours été de chercher à ce que les rapports, éléments physiques à spirituels, soient si bien combinés, que ses œuvres ne se réduisent ni à la vision mystique ni à l'existence avouées des choses."[18] With this subtle characterization, Zervos points at a decisive feature of Grünewald's art—its combining force which unites various religious trends traditional as well as contemporary. The cruelty in the representation of Christ's body goes to the utmost limit of the evangelical tradition which knows that ". . . these things were done, that the

17. Schmid, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

18. Christian Zervos, *Matthias Grünewald, Le retable d'Isenheim* (Paris, 1938) p. 8.

Scripture should be fulfilled, A bone of him shall not be broken" (John 19:36).

This extremeness is combined with other traditions leading beyond the evangelical source. The tree of the cross in the Isenheim Crucifixion appears all the more dominating when we compare it with the cross in Grünewald's other renderings of the same theme. It looks recently planed, which points to its origin in Paradise as a cutting from the Tree of Life. Another tradition, going back to the *Legenda Aurea* (De Inventione Crucis), understood the cross to be composed of four kinds of wood: cedar, cypress, olive, and palm. The significance of these was interpreted in various ways. One is of special interest in connection with the destination of the Isenheim Altar. The main support of the cross was said to be of cedar, the consecrated wood chosen by Moses as one of the symbolical ingredients in the offering for leprosy and defilement originating in contact with death (Leviticus 14:4, 49 ff.). Leprosy, the kind of disease especially treated by the Antonine monks, was in a certain sense the sacrament of death. Only the Hebrew priests who were *not* physicians were entitled to care for that illness in the cure of which cedar wood played an important role.[19] Seen from the angle of these symbolic relations, the tree of the cross in the Isenheim Crucifixion might appear in a different light.

We have also literary evidence of the feeling for the cross in Grünewald's time. In Strasbourg, a few leagues from Isenheim, the famous and popular preacher, Geiler von Keisersberg (1445-1510), gave his sermon on the glory of the tree of the cross on Passion Sunday, 1495. This sermon which was printed and published in the time when Grünewald painted the Isenheim Altar, sounds like an accompanying text to the mighty chord of the cross in the Isenheim Crucifixion. The tree of the cross, Geiler said, stands in the middle of the earth; it towers above all things, because the Highest hangs on it; *its magnitude is that of disgrace and of mystery at the same time;* it is strong, because it vanquishes the powers of darkness; like the ladder

19. William Word Seymour, *The Cross in Tradition, History and Art* (New York and London, 1898) pp. 98 ff. It is to be remarked that leprosy as described in Leviticus 13 was of white color. The translation of the Hebrew "zora'ath" by "leprosy" seems to be inadequate. Concerning cross symbolism see also Oscar Doering, *Christliche Symbole* (Freiburg, 1933) p. 48; Heinrich Otte, *Handbuch der kirchlichen Kunstarchaeologie des deutschen Mittelalters* (Leipzig, 1883) p. 538, n. 4.

that Jacob saw, it rises up to heaven; it expands as wide as the love of Christ is extended all over the world from the cross.[20] In the fifteenth century, longing for Christ's love was not only a pious feeling; it also had its social and political implications. In the *Reformation of Sigmund*, a body of reform measures of unknown authorship, compiled about 1439, we read that by his cruel death Christ has freed mankind from all ties; no more is anyone lifted above the other, because we are altogether free in Christ who suffered for us.[21] In this period, revolutionary thinking is centered on the Redeemer and communion with him in the Eucharist.

Historically, Grünewald's Christ image stands before such a background, and we shall return once more to this relation. Here, we have to realize that the echo of contemporary feeling was harmonized with the oldest notes of Christian symbolism. In the Isenheim Crucifixion, between Christ and John the Baptist stands the Holy Lamb with the banner of victory; his blood is flowing into a chalice. It is the same blood that comes out of Christ's body, the symbol of the most holy sacrament. Upon this the Church bases its existence, as well as upon rebirth in the holy water, which means regeneration in the Holy Spirit. Therefore, not only blood, but also water, pours forth from Christ's side-wound. The river in the dark background of the picture can be understood, according to the interpretation of Ezekiel 47:9, as the blessing of baptism.

Baptism and death are two sides of the same symbolic substance: "Know ye not that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into his death?" (Romans, 6:3). This, too, is the reason for the appearance of John the Baptist in the Isenheim Crucifixion. He was also regarded as the representative of the Old Testament. The book he holds emphasizes his biblical message based on the Old Covenant and the Prophets. Like them, he appears girded up in his loins. "The law and the prophets were until John: since that time the Kingdom of God is preached, and every man presseth into it" (Luke 16:16).

Below the Crucifixion in the Isenheim Altar, the Lamentation in

20. Geiler von Keisersberg, *Ars Moriendi*, Strassburger Theologische Studien, IV, 4 (Freiburg, 1901) pp. 8-10.

21. Heinrich Werner, "Die Reformation des Kaisers Sigmund," *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, III (1908) p. 11. About the same period: Preserved Smith, *The Age of the Reformation* (New York, 1920), pp. 62-145; Henry Lucas, *The Renaissance and the Reformation* (New York and London, 1934) pp. 419-559.

the predella calms down the excitement of the horrifying death on the cross (Plate I). Here, Mary Magdalene again is the chief bearer of expressed grief. The body of Christ reclines calmly, supported by the Beloved Disciple. The Madonna, whose eyes are hidden, still keeps her hands clasped, but is more relaxed than in the Crucifixion. At the left side the open grave is to be seen, the crown of thorns before it. The river landscape in quiet daylight pervades the scene with a peaceful atmosphere. The body of Christ shows the same marks as the body on the cross, but having been washed and anointed, it has lost the repellency of the Passion. The nails became black over night.

Originally, the predella played an important role in the shifting of the altar-scenes, for it remained after the opening of the Crucifixion panel, and so mediated between this and the second view of the paintings, changing its meaning in the progress of the pictorial drama. When the Crucifixion panel was opened, the resurrecting Christ appeared on the right wing of the altar. Thus, the Lamentation became the promise of the Resurrection, and Christ, taken down from the cross, now seemed just to sleep.

The Resurrection panel unites the Resurrection and the Ascension. The Italian conception of the theme, with the resurrected Christ hovering in the air, attains its apotheosis north of the Alps in this painting. Grünewald, for the first time, interprets the Easter wonder in a nocturnal world.[22] In earlier centuries, the risen Redeemer was represented standing firmly in the air, a convincing witness for the immediate neighborhood of Heaven and Earth. The Ascension was sometimes illustrated in the Churches by hoisting up a picture until it disappeared into the ceiling.

Grünewald's Resurrection reveals a complete change of feeling. Christ does not stand any more in the air; he is really ascending to Heaven. The aureole around him looks like a luminous gas. In its spectral radiance the Redeemer seems to overcome the force of gravity. In an outburst of dynamic power, his dematerialized appearance gives a new rendition of the old miracle. The whirling pall, not drawn out, but gushing out of the grave and rising in a spiral movement, accentuates the transition from this world into the other.[23]

22. Hubert Schrade, *Ikonographie der christlichen Kunst*, I (Berlin, 1932) pp. 287 ff.

23. It may be remarked that the figure is not only moving upward but also forward towards the spectator, as if it intends to hover over his head on its way to heaven.

Thus, the spirit and the feeling of a new age comes into the world of this altar. The mightiness of light reflects, not only the celestial glory, but also a new enlightenment of mankind. The transfiguration which Grünewald's resurrected Christ represents marks the sphere in which the laws of nature become evident. Whereas the transition from Earth to Heaven in medieval art shows a simple passing through from one region into another, Grünewald's transfigured Christ leaves an earth that is about to become conscious anew of its relations to the celestial bodies.

Because of a new feeling for nature is to be felt in this picture, the event of breaking through the physical laws is the more convincing as a miracle. But this miracle leaves the medieval world far behind it and gives a new pictorial interpretation of the supernatural. In this painting, Grünewald's brush matches the great revolution in the concept of the universe which began in his days.[24] The pictorial transfiguration of the rising Christ in the Isenheim Altar stands at the beginning of a struggle between belief and science which became fateful for religious art as well. Grünewald had the power of opening a new pictorial dimension for the representation of the miraculous event which modern man can see only in a spiritual light. Here, the latest possibilities of Western artistic expression join the basic religious problems at a moment when the history of Christianity underwent its greatest revolution in the old world.

MARIAN SYMBOLISM

In the Isenheim Crucifixion, Mary is clad as a Cistercian nun. The Cistercians were among the orders which had devoted themselves particularly to Mariolatry; all their Churches were dedicated to the Blessed Virgin.

The worship of the Blessed Virgin came to a climax in the fifteenth century. Pope Sixtus IV introduced the festival of the "Conceptio Immaculatae" into the calendar of the Roman Church in 1477. Mariolatry and the tendencies toward mysticism and symbolism during the fifteenth century, in which the *Marienlied* became most popularly known, characterized the period. It was this trend in Catholic belief

24. Though the subversive work of Copernicus was not published until 1543, his conceptions had been formed since 1500. Cf. Johann Armbruster, "Die Auferstehung, gemalt von Grünewald," *Frankfurter Zeitung* (March 26, 1937).

PLATE I



ISENHEIM ALTAR

Crucifixion
Lamentation

PLATE II

Annunciation | Incarnation | Resurrection

ISENHEIM ALTAR

PLATE III

STUPPACH MADONNA

Fig. 1. Drawing, Berlin

Fig. 2. Detail, Karlsruhe Crucifixion

ST. JOHN THE EVANGELIST

against which the changing of the lay mind began to be directed. The worldly spirit of the urban population showed an increasingly polemical attitude against the symbolistic movement, while in conventicles of women the mystical tradition still persisted. In this respect, Mary represents the medieval mind and the persistence of an ideology which decisively formed Occidental Christendom. It is true that in the apology of the Augsburg Confession (1530) Mary still is called "dignissima amplissimis honoribus," but the reaction against the Mariolatry of the fifteenth century cannot be overlooked in the religious strife of the sixteenth century.[25]

The Madonna is the dominant figure in the second series of the Isenheim altar-panels, where she appears three times: in the Annunciation of the left side-wing, in the small temple on the left part of the central panel, and on its right, holding the Holy Child. The resurrection in the right side-wing is linked with the idea of the Annunciation, which is the presupposition of the Resurrection. There seems to be one more connection of the painting in the right side-wing with the Marian content of the series. In might be possible that the whole arrangement resounds with the remembrance of Mary's five joys. They were: the Annunciation, Christ's birth, the Adoration of the Kings, Christ's Resurrection, and Christ's Ascension. In the tradition of the Netherlands and of Southern Germany, the Adoration of the Kings was dropped. Considering the fusion of Resurrection and Ascension in the right side-wing, the series would indeed represent the remaining four joys of Mary.

The Annunciation is the most elaborated painting that Grünewald left (Plate II). The spatial organization and the instantaneous action of the two figures in the foreground form an almost dramatic scene. The event of the Annunciation was represented in churches by two young acolytes. While the "Gloria" was sung, one of them, disguised as the angel Gabriel, pulled the curtain of the choir away and rose,

25. A translation of the Augsburg Confession is given in H. E. Jacobs, *The Book of Concord* (Philadelphia, 1912). The passage mentioned reads as follows: "Although she (Mary) is most worthy of the most ample honors, nevertheless she does not wish to be made equal to Christ, but rather wishes us to consider and follow her example (the example of her faith and humility)" (p. 239). Luther, in 1516, called Mary the only pure drop in the ocean (Mirjam = stilla maris) of human perdition (*Works* Weimar Edition I, p. 107); in his exposition of the Magnificat (*op. cit.* VII, pp. 568, 573 ff.) he dwelt on the humility of Mary, who is no helping goddess, who gives us nothing, in whom rather God as the only giver of all things is to be praised.

lifting his sceptre, before the other youth, who played the role of the Blessed Virgin.[26] The two curtains in Grünewald's painting in green and red, are just drawn to the side. In the angel's sudden arrival, his red cloak whirls. Mary, having just read the Immanuel verse in the book of Isaiah, while the prophet himself appears in the cross vaulting above, is bending backward, for "she was troubled at his saying" (Luke 1:29). But this shyness alone can scarcely justify the movement of her head. Her left ear is turned towards the angel, lying in a direct line with his mouth and forefinger. According to a tradition going back to patristic writers of the fourth century, Mary conceived through the ear. It might be that Grünewald painted the Annunciation with reference to this idea, which indicates the analogy of Eve who sinned in lending her ear to the snake's whispering. The name "Eva" changed itself into "Ave." These concatenations are expressed in St. Bernard's pentecostal sermon: "Verbum patris per aurem Virginis in ventrem et mentem ipsius eructaret, ut eadem via intraret antidotum, quae venenum (Evae) intraverat."[27]

The central panel (Plate II) justifies the mentioning of Eve's name in this connection, because the first mother of mankind (*mater naturae*) appears therein, to witness the glory of her who gave birth to the Son of Man (*mater graciae*). There is a small temple on the left side of the central painting; above the second angel playing the alto viola are poised angels in an aureole on the left side of which—at an obvious distance from the angels—a feminine figure emerges from the darkness. She has no wings. The Seraph without a halo on the utmost left of the temple, the representative of the Old Testament in the angelic trio, is looking at her. This woman, according to almost unanimous opinion, is to be regarded as mother Eve.

The central panel is usually called a "Christmas picture." We follow Burkhard in calling it the Incarnation, which comes much closer to its content. Up to the present, it has found manifold interpretations. Among them, one given by Wilhelm Fränger seems to be the most plausible.[28] He divides the picture into three regions, according to

26. Stephan Beissel, *Geschichte der Verehrung Marias in Deutschland während des Mittelalters* (Freiburg, 1919) pp. 167 ff.

27. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, Vol. 182, 327. The idea of fertilization through the ear was still alive in late medieval poetry. Cf. Yrjö Hirn, *The Sacred Shrine* (London, 1912) pp. 297 ff.

28. W. Fränger, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-144. Cf. also Friedrich Schneider, "Mathias Grünewald und die Mystik," *Kunstwissenschaftliche Studien* 1 (Wiesbaden, 1913) p. 148 ff.

the three different times: night, dawn, and morning, to which the liturgy attributes the three masses of the Christmas festival. The first High Mass takes place at midnight and symbolizes the emergence of the Son from the father. In the heavenly region of the background in Grünewald's painting, there is a bank of clouds below the throne of God who sits in the impenetrability of night. From there radiating lines go down to the depth, indicating the mysterious birth of light. Behind the chapel-like temple we see a black wall and a long curtain. The inner temple is dark, but it opens into the light, where the Blessed Virgin kneels in spiritual expectancy of her Holy Motherhood. She wears a crown with flaming edges. Angels bring a second crown down to her, for she will become Queen of Heaven. The halo around her has the same coloring as the aureole of the resurrected Christ.

The mass, to which this part of the panel refers, is celebrated at dawn, between darkness and daylight, as birth is partly comprehensible and party incomprehensible. The third mass is sung in clear daylight and glorifies the merciful birth of the Lord. That might be the meaning of the Madonna with the Child in the light of dawn, surrounded by Marian symbols—the *hortus conclusus,* the roses, the fig-tree, the water-mirror, the gate, and the transparent vessel. There is also a still-life of objects from the lying-in room: the cradle, the wooden bath tub, and the *vaso di notte,* as Burkhard calls the earthen implement.[29] Now, we read in the Second Epistle of St. Paul to Timothy: "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also *of wood and earth;* and some to honor, and some to dishonor. If a man therefore purges himself from these, he will be a vessel unto honor, sanctified, and meet for the master's use, and prepared unto every good work" (2:20-21). The Timothy Epistles were directed against the danger of heresy, and urged righteousness on the early Church. Referring to the biblical admonition quoted, the objects demonstrating the humanness of the Son of Man might be connected with Grünewald's Church symbolism, in which his Marian ideas reach a climax.

According to St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians (5:24-33), the Church is the bride of Christ. The sentences concerned are based on the second chapter of Genesis, which tells the story of Eve's creation out of Adam's side. The creation of the first woman that brought sin into

29. A. Burkhard, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

the world corresponds to the redeeming creation of the Church out of Christ's side-wound. Émile Mâle summarizes these ideas of Marian symbolism in the Middle Ages as follows: "Mary, they thought, symbolized the Church in almost all the circumstances of her life, but especially at the moment when she stood at the foot of the cross."[30]

Church symbolism and Marian symbolism reveal their interrelation in a diptych of the early fifteenth century, now in Lugano (Tyssen-Collection). On its left wing, the Madonna is sitting in a meadow surrounded by the symbols of virginity. The right wing represents the crucified Christ with the Church, symbols of the Redemption, and of the Old and New Covenant, among them Adam and Eve.[31] The fact that these two paintings formed a local and ideological unit is important for the understanding of the symbolic relations between the Isenheim Crucifixation and Incarnation.

Mary represents the Church as the *bride* of Christ. But she is also the *mother* of Christ. Mary as Christ's bride personifies the *eternity* of the Church. As Christ's mother, Mary becomes the *defender* of the Church. This is particularly evident in a later rendering of the Madonna motif by Grünewald, in the so-called Stuppach Madonna (Plate III), now in the parish church of Stuppach, near Mergentheim (Frankonia). Regarding the poetic beauty of this idyll, Burkhard is justified in writing: "In the Stuppach Madonna we accept the roses, the lilies, the beehives, the fig tree, the rainbow, not as mystic reminiscences of the Song of Songs or the revelations of some saint, but as the proper surroundings of a simple, domestic, motherly German Madonna."[32]

30. *Religious Art in France, Thirteenth Century* (London and New York, 1913) p. 191. On p. 187, n. 4, Mâle quotes Augustine (*Tract. in Joan.*, 9, 10): "Dormit Adam ut fiat Eva, moritur Christus ut fiat Ecclesia. Dormienti Adae fit Eva de latere; mortuo Christo lancea percutitur latus, ut prufluant sacramenta quibus formetur Ecclesia." On p. 190, Mâle refers to Isidore of Seville, who says in the *Allegoriae:* "Mary is the figure of the Church."

31. Among the Marian symbols on the Madonna panel are Gideon's fleece (Judges 6:36-40) and the gate of Ezekiel (Ezekiel 44:2). The representation of the Synagogue, in the Crucifixion panel, as a Jewish man is rare. The stick of the banner of the Synagogue hits the figure of the Jew like a flash of lightning. This detail might refer to the lightning which strikes the Synagogue at the left side of the cross in earlier representations, especially in book illustrations. The stick is always broken regularly. If that is not a pictorial formula for disintegration, it seems likely that this detail can be explained in the indicated direction. The details of Church and Synagogue symbolism are still to be investigated. See Margaret Schlauch, "The Allegory of Church and Synagogue," *Speculum* (1939) XIV, 4, M. De Ozzola, "Ecclesia und Synagoge in der bildenden Kunst," *L'Illustrazione Vaticana* (1937) VIII, 1.

32. A. Burkhard, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

However, investigations which try to trace the pictorial details to their original meaning, are forced to see through the various lyricisms, or what we may take as such.

The key to this painting is given by the church building in the background. There we see a Madonna statue standing in a tabernacle between double ogives. The sceptre of the Lord, appearing in the clouds, directly points at this statue, demonstrating that the Madonna and the Church are identical. The source of these pictorial ideas is to be found in the Revelations of Birgitta, the Swedish saint (1303-1373), who addressed her apocalyptic writings to princes, kings, and even popes.[33] Written during the Schism and the Babylonian Exile of the Church, they became particularly relevant at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The unique conjuncture of Madonna and rainbow, as represented in Grünewald's painting can be explained by one of Birgitta's revelations which occurs twice. In it, Mary compares herself with the rainbow; the ends of it touch the good as well as the bad for whom Mary prays; for the good in order to strengthen their church loyalty, for the bad to end wickedness.[34]

The Madonna under the rainbow refers to the Church which is in greatest danger. Menacing clouds appear in the sky. One inscription above the altar-frame emphasizes the dangerous situation of the Church: MARIA MATER GRACIAE, MATER MISERICORDIAE, TU NOS AB HOSTE PROTEGE. Only one enemy could be meant by these words when this picture was painted in 1519—the depravity of the Church and demoralization of Papacy. Birgitta foretold its immediate destruction if there was no help or renewal in the last hour. Apocalyptic writings of that kind became the expression of reform tendencies and the mask of anti-Papal manifestations. But al-

33. Birgitta, or Brighitta (Irish, Brighid), may be connected with *brigh* (virtue, strength). Cf. William Patterson Cumming, *The Revelations of Saint Birgitta* (London, 1933) p. 23, n. 3, where he says: "Birgitta is her correct name." There is a new biography of the saint by Edith Peacy, *Saint Birgitta of Sweden* (London, 1933).

34. *Revelationes S. Birgittae* (Cologne, 1628) III, 10; IV, 78. The wording of the latter is: "Ego itaque iam sto super mundum cum oratione mea assidue ad meum charissimum Filium sicut arcus super nubes coeli, qui ad terram inclinari videtur, et ambobus finibus suis eam tangere. Per arcum enim meipsam intelligo. Nam ad habitatores mundi me inclino, scilicet tangendo utrosque, bonos et malos continua oratione mea; ad bonos namque me inclino; ut ipsi in his quae sancta Mater Ecclesia praecipit, stabiles efficiantur. Ad malos vero, ne in malitia sua habeant processum, et deriores fiant." Cf. Heinrich Feurstein, "Zur Deutung de Bildgehalts bei Grünewald," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Kunst* (1924) I, p. 137.

though the Stuppach Madonna was painted two years after Luther had posted his 95 theses on the doors of the Wittenberg court church, the call for reform expressed in the picture is not pro-Lutheran, but anti-curial which at that time was in no way identical with non-Catholic. The beehives behind the Madonna in Grünewald's painting are also a symbol of the Church: they stand for the organization of the Church and, in the constant renewal of the queen, the unbroken succession of popes. Like the bees under the queen bee, the members of the visible Church shall live under the Pope as one family.[35] In this painting, such an allusion could only mean the longing for a united Church under a purified pontificate.

The altar of which the Madonna panel originally was a part stood in the collegiate church at Aschaffenburg. It was dedicated to St. Mary of the Snows by a canon named Heinrich Reitzmann, an outspoken protagonist of the defense of the Church in word and writings. The only other painting of this altar still preserved (now in Freiburg i. Br.) represents the snow miracle which happened to Pope Liberius on August 5, 352,[36] an event which led to the consecration of the Roman basilica, later called Santa Maria Maggiore. It was in this main Marian church that the rainbow vision of Birgitta occurred. The cathedral in the Stuppach Madonna, however, does not refer to the Roman Church alone, but to the Church in general.

H. A. Schmid recognized the church building in Grünewald's painting as the south transept of the Cathedral in Strasbourg.[37] The question remains, why Grünewald painted the Cathedral of Strasbourg having in mind the renewal of the entire Church. One reason may be found in the fact that the Blessed Virgin was the city-patron of Strasbourg.

35. Carl van Treeck and Aloysius Croft, *Symbols of the Church* (Milwaukee, 1936) p. 67. O. Doering, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

36. The biblical connection of rainbow and snow miracle is to be found in Ecclesiasticus 43:12-15: "Look upon the rainbow, and bless him that made it: it is very beautiful in its brightness. It encompasseth the heaven about with the circle of its glory, the hands of the most High have displayed it. By his commandment he maketh the snow fall apace, and sendeth forth swiftly the lightnings of his judgment." The day for the celebration of the snow miracle is called "Dedicatio B.M.V. ad nives"; it goes back to the ancient Roman custom of strewing flowers on dedication festivals, which was no longer understood in the Middle Ages. See Hartmann Grisar, *Das Missale im Lichte der römischen Stadtgeschichte* (Freiburg, 1925) p. 114.

37. *Op. cit.*, pp. 212 ff. With the exception of the Madonna, none of the statues in the present arrangement correspond to those in Grünewald's painting, in which the figure in the place where now the statue of Ecclesia stands is indiscernible, and the present place of the statue of the Synagogue is covered by a salient pillar.

We are also reminded of the strong influence of the already mentioned preacher, Geiler von Keisersberg, in his demands for ecclesiastical reform.[38] He was active at Strasbourg, where the monks of St. Anthony had a hospital and a chapel. There they attended syphilitic patients whom no one in Strasbourg had cared for until Geiler urged help for them. Geiler's doctrines, which he propagated in his powerful sermons, harmonized with the aims of a man like Heinrich Reitzmann, who ordered the altar of St. Mary of the Snows. The influence of Brigitta's Revelations upon the content of this altar, of which the Stuppach Madonna was an important part, seems beyond doubt. Comparing the Stuppach Madonna with her sister on the Isenheim Altar, we observe that the former has the miraculous veil, whereas the latter holds the child with a tattered swaddle. This reveals its identity with the loin cloth of the Crucifixion, a minor chord in the harmony of Mary's bliss of motherhood and the rejoicing concert of the music playing angels. This linen becomes a visible link joining the Crucifixion and Incarnation panels, of which the latter seems more removed from the fight for the living Church of the time. However, H. Feurstein and W. Zülch point out that the Incarnation in Isenheim also shows the marked influence of Birgitta's Revelations in the whole conception and in details.[39]

Birgitta herself appears on the Isenheim Incarnation panel, according to Wilhelm Rügamer.[40] He brings the three angelic figures above the crowned Madonna in the temple into connection with the Emperor, Maximilian I, who gave his consent to the publication of Birgitta's Revelations. The right one of the two figures bringing the second crown down to Mary is, according to Rügamer, Birgitta. The left figure, holding the sceptre, is Mary of Burgundy, the Emperor's beloved consort, who died at the age of 25. In the smaller figure by the side of these two Rügamer sees the martyr bishop, Maximilian,

38. Geiler was mainly influenced by Johannes Gerson (1363-1429), whose works were published in Strasbourg. The fourth volume (printed 1502) was decorated by a woodcut, "The pilgrim Gerson," made by Dürer. See Th. Musper, "Ein Strassburger Holzschnitt Dürers," *Jahrbuch der Preussischen Kunstsammlungen* (1927), Ergänzungshefte zum 28. Band, pp. 124 ff.

39. Of these details, we mention the glass receptacle at the feet of the Madonna, which might refer to Birgitta who writes: "Quia sicut sol vitrum ingrediendo non laedit, sic nec virginitas Virginis in assumptione humanitatis meae (Iesu Christi) corrupta est." *Revelationes S. Birgittae*, I, 1.

40. P. Wilhelm Rügamer, "Der Isenheimer Altar im Lichte der Liturgie und kirchlichen Reformbewegung," *Theologische Quartalsschrift* (1939) IV, pp. 442-460.

name-saint of the Emperor, and he accordingly relates the earthen and wooden implements below to baptism. For him, Mary in *this* part of the picture is the personified Church, praying the Magnificat at the end of Saturday before Easter, but standing and not kneeling. Among the other angelic heads and figures in the temple, Rügamer tries to identify not only Adam and Abel, but also the Dominicans, Alanus de Rupe, promoter of the rosary-devotion, and Vincentius Ferrerius, who was working for Church reforms; further, St. Catherine of Sienna, who urged Pope Gregory's return to his "deserted bride," Rome. Though some of these intepretations may lead too far, Rügamer's statements about the sculptural figures of the temple in the Incarnation panel are even more remarkable. From left to right he recognizes: Moses, Ezekiel, Jeremiah, and Daniel; at the corner, below Ezekiel and Jeremiah, Micah. He agrees that the two tympanum figures are Melchizedek and Abraham, the latter kneeling. As the upper bearded angel in the background above the two shepherds, Rügamer plausibly suggests Malachi who, according to the Hebrew meaning of his name, was also called "Angelus."

The Isenheim Altar was painted between 1512 and 1515. The altar of St. Mary of the Snows followed, at the time when Luther began his public activity. In 1520 the reformer published the three works which contained the elements of his new doctrine, declaring the Papacy as it existed incompatible with the groundwork of Christianity. At the same time, Grünewald painted a large altar at Mainz, carried away by the Swedes in 1632 and lost since then. The altar represented the Madonna in the clouds above female martyrs such as St. Catherine and St. Dorothy. A drawing in the Koenigs-Collection at Haarlem shows the probable appearance of the Mainz Madonna.[41] Mary holds a sceptre in her left hand, and on her right arm the Holy Child, who bears the heavy imperial orb. There is a ball below Mary's feet, evidently a celestial body. The Mother of Christ seems to be surrounded by beams emanating from an upper region. The reference to the beginning of the twelfth chapter of the Revelation of St. John the Divine is obvious: "And there appeared a great wonder in heaven; a woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve stars. . . ." In Grünewald's drawing, Mary

41. This drawing was on display in the "Masterpieces of Art" exhibition at the New York World's Fair, 1939.

wears the imperial crown, which may indicate some reference to the Holy Roman Empire. The Madonna in Heaven hovered as a comforter over a people frightened by the confusion of the early Reformation, lovingly bending down to the crowd and offering her son as a consolation to man.

Here we have the culmination of Grünewald's feeling for the Madonna. From the pains of the crucified Christ he turned to Mary's maternal delights in the Marian panels of Isenheim and in the Stuppach Madonna. But the former also showed signs of apprehension. The Isenheim Mary, holding her son in the torn loin cloth of the Passion, "knew" already of his suffering to come. So Grünewald turned to the loving Madonna in heaven (described above), who offers her child for the redemption of a troubled world. From Christ's Passion to Mary's sorrowful delight, and from there to the compassion of the Queen of Heaven willing to make the highest sacrifice, marks the circle of the Christ-Mary relation in Grünewald's work.

This relation proves to be a flight from the cross into mother-principle, and back to the cross. On this way through Grünewald's work we again and again meet a woman, full of pain and pity—the Magdalene. In a copy (now in Donaueschingen) of a lost Grünewald painting, we see the Magdalene alone with the crucified Christ. The original once belonged to a Magdalene-altar also painted for Isenheim. Grünewald's earliest biographer, Joachim von Sandrart (1606-1688), tells us among his few personal remarks, that Grünewald was "badly married" ("übel verheuratet").[42] That can hardly mean that Grünewald was unhappily married in the modern sense; it may rather indicate that he was married to a bad woman, not unlike the prophet Hosea who, under the doom hanging over his people, felt himself driven to marry a prostitute. The Hebrew prophet intended to stir up the mind of his people by his scandalous deed. The painter's mésalliance, if interpreted aright, would disclose the psychological background of his work as a private Christian counterpart to the queer marriage of the ancient prophet.[43]

Living in a sinful world, Grünewald married a sinner (Magdalene), while his eyes were directed towards Mary. He joined the maculate,

42. Joachim von Sandrart, *Teutsche Academie der Edlen Bau-, Bild-, und Mahlerey-Künste* (Nürnberg, 1675) I, 2, pp. 236 ff.

43. O. Hagen (*op. cit.*, pp. 46 ff.) compares Grünewald with Van Gogh in his relations with a girl in Arles.

but he loved the immaculate, whom he found endangered as the holy body of the Church. Then, Grünewald's Mary, as the gracious Mother of the Lord, rose to Heaven in order to rescue suffering mankind. She presented her son to redeem the sinful world which should be forgiven, just as the Lord pardoned Magdalene's sins. To her Grünewald's crucified Christ turns his head, when all things are accomplished.

Within the framework of this symbolic circle there is not much space for the development of individuality, so far as the basic themes are concerned. The intensity, however, with which they are represented, tells of a strong feeling. It increases in the direction of the Passion, thus reaching a super-historic region, beyond the social and political meaning of the Crucifixion at that time. Grünewald's Blessed Virgin, who at first seems so far removed from every relation to the contemporary world, proved to be the inspiration and protectress in the struggle for purification of the Church. But in combining early medieval ideas of Mariolatry with the devices of the reform movement, Grünewald's Madonna was much more than a symbolic representative of the period. The question remains whether there was such a representative in Grünewald's work.

ST. JOHN THE EVANGELIST

Grünewald's drawings—he left no engravings or woodcuts—are the prelude to his paintings, a clue to his pictorial conception. There is a drawing of an upward-looking man folding his hands (now in the Kupferstich-Kabinett, Berlin) (Plate IV, fig. 1). The face expresses a grief which might almost be called "sweet"—a perfect representation of the religious sentiment in the late medieval period. While the man seems to mumble a prayer he looks obliquely upward. His half-open eyes express a high degree of piety. The tired softness of the features finds its correspondence in the fleshy hands.

The sketch represents St. John the Evangelist looking up to the cross. It is regarded as a preliminary study for the figure of St. John in the Crucifixion at Karlsruhe, which was painted in 1523 or 1524 (Plate IV, fig. 2). A comparison testifies that the hands in the drawing are almost the same as those in the painting. That is all the more surprising, since the arms in the painting, especially the right, are quite different from the drawing.

The difference between drawing and painting becomes even more

evident when we compare the head of the saint with the hands of the panel at Karlsruhe. Those hands can hardly belong to the rustic type expressed in the face. While they fit harmoniously into the drawing, they seem to play a role by themselves in the painting. No other figure in Grünewald's work shows such a discrepancy. On the contrary, St. John in the Crucifixion at Basle (1505) is an almost ideal example of unity in the parts of the body. The emphasized gesture of St. John in the Crucifixion of the Koenigs-Collection in Haarlem (1511?) harmonizes the predominant feature of the hands with the haggard figure of the disciple.

There is one more difference between the St. John figures in the paintings at Basle and Haarlem and the saint in the Karlsruhe panel. While the first two stand still in compassion, the last is approaching the cross. The large left foot emphasizes this movement of marching.[44] Burkhard writes that St. John "is portrayed in the very act of rapidly approaching the cross, almost in motion, to judge from the stormy folds of his mantle . . . his features are disturbed, there is discernible no deep, silent mourning as in the passive figure in the painting at Basle, instead a protesting complaint, violent and loud."[45]

With the word "protesting" Burkhard gives the right hint. It really is an act of protest that this figure expresses. In order to show its temporal significance, Zülch holds the opinion that the spectator who marches with this St. John towards the cross cannot help saying that he steps forward under the stress of a disturbing emotion.[46] Thus, St. John in the picture at Karlsruhe is to be understood as the spiritual representative of the rebellion called the Peasants' War. Burkhard speaks of the sudden and uncomfortable clasping of the hands. The inconsistency of this gesture with the revolutionary emotion is only too evident. The clasped hands bring the calm melody of mystic devotion into a panel which echoes the rumbling of contemporary conflicts.

44. The more active and outward type of St. John, as opposed to the more contemplative and inward Mary, is characterized by showing his left foot, or sometimes both feet, in the great majority of Crucifixion paintings after the second half of the fifteenth century, whereas Mary's feet are always covered by her garment. It is still to be discovered whether this detail was a general rule in Western art. If this turns out to be true, the reason for it may lie in an unconscious tendency pointing at old religious conceptions. Concerning the relations of foot, sense of shame, and fertility-superstition, see Jakob Nacht, "Der Fuss, eine folkloristische Studie," *Jahrbuch für jüdische Volkskunde* (1923) pp. 139 ff., 154 ff.

45. *Op. cit.*, p. 51.

46. *Op. cit.*, p. 265.

In the dissonance between these two sounds, we find the discrepancy of the piety in Grünewald's mind and the martial mood of the Reformation period. It seems obvious that this St. John could not approach the cross with a pike in his hand. But the peasant crowds carried before them the banner with the crucified Christ, Mary and St. John. The reference to the death on the cross was the battle cry against feudal suppression. The last rendering of the Crucifixion in Grünewald's work shows that he expressed the movements of his time in the figure of St. John. Grünewald was somehow involved in the events of the revolutionary year 1525. Referring to the documents concerned, Zülch, who discovered them, goes so far to call Grünewald "a rebel."[47] But Grünewald's attitude towards the revolution of the Peasants' War is far from being as clear as Dürer's standpoint against it. Many people were drawn into the rebellion against their will. The dualism we observed in the figure of St. John cannot be overlooked in this connection. It indicates, at least, an inner disquietude which points more at the religious emotion in the spirit of the age than at its outbursts in bloody sedition.

GRÜNEWALD'S CREED

The third view of the Isenheim Altar showed a theme not repeated in Grünewald's later period—monasticism. He framed the central sculptures with two scenes of the St. Anthony legend: the saint visiting St. Paul the Hermit (left), and the Temptation (right). When the Incarnation panel was opened on the Saint's festival, the enthroned father of monachism appeared in golden splendor as the central figure of the sculptures, St. Augustine at his right, and at his left, St. Jerome. Between the saints one saw a peasant and a burgher offering animals, as St. Anthony was the protector of man and domestic animals as well. The donor of these woodfigures was John de Orliac, whose portrait statuette completed the group, finished in 1505. In the predella, Christ as Salvator Mundi and the Twelve Apostles represented the Christian doctrine upon which monasticism is based. These sculptures, surrounded by evangelical symbols, Grünewald found on his arrival in Isenheim. The altar-paintings were arranged to harmonize with the sculptures. The figure of St. Anthony, at the left outer wing by the

47. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

side of the Crucifixion, prepared for the visit-picture, the conversational spirit of which is introduced by the meeting of the Annunciation. On the right side, St. Sebastian's martyrdom corresponds to the temptation of St. Anthony. The Resurrection, showing the Savior freed from all ties of this earth, mediated between martyrdom and temptation.

St. Anthony's *Life* was one of the books most frequently read in the Middle Ages. The temptation of the saint who became the father of monachism constantly stimulated the imaginations of the faithful. Grünewald's evil spirits, pouncing upon the aged anchorite, were not without pictorial antecedents. But in comparison with other demons of that kind, even with Hieronymus Bosch's phantasmal creations, Grünewald's pictorial demonology proves to be unrivalled. Comparing the extremeness in his representation of the crucified Christ, we find the power of his imagination as strong in the demonic realm as in the sphere of Christ's Passion. The nearness of these two domains is proved by a comparison of the face of St. John in the Karlsruhe Crucifixion and the drawing belonging to it, with the head of the birdlike foe lifting a club in the Temptation panel. But whereas the upward looking Evangelist faces the dead Christ, the evil spirit avoids looking at the helpless saint. Looking closer at the ugly faces of the demons, we perceive that not one of the phantoms really faces the crying patriarch. Even the goggle-eye of the bird demon is directed towards a vague goal. It is a dream world which the artist conjures up in these creatures. St. Anthony remains entirely uninjured. Somewhere between dream and frightening reality, the reclining leprosy-demon in the left corner wrests away the Bible from the saint, while the basilisk (a syphilis-demon), picking at St. Anthony's right hand, is stopped by the five beads of the rosary. A small parchment in the right corner tells the saint's cry for help, which was the prayer of the sick people in the Isenheim monastery hospital: UBI ERAS IESU BONE, UBI ERAS, UT SANARES VULNERA MEA. Help is already approaching; far above in the clouds, God the Father has just sent the archangel Michael. The fight is about to begin.

Opposite to this phantasmagoria, Grünewald painted St. Anthony visiting the old hermit St. Paul, who, according to the legend, died that very day, after long and weighty talks with his visitor. The demonstrating movement of St. Paul's right hand shows the discussion in full

swing, while the eyes of the hermit observe the raven who this time brings down a double loaf of bread instead of the daily half-loaf he has brought for sixty years. The discussion is concerned with the question as to who should break the bread.[48] The raven in this scene must at first be regarded in relation to the dove, the oldest Christian symbol, which appears at the same side of the altar in the Annunciation panel of the preceding series. In the Christian idea, the evil spirit symbolized by the raven is driven out in baptism by the dove.[49] But the raven is also a bringer of heavenly food and salvation. As such he appears in the St. Paul legend, which refers to the Elijah story in I Kings, 17; here, Elijah is fed by a raven at the brook *K'rith,* which means the border between upper and under worlds.[50] The Bible remarks that this brook flows "before" the Jordan. As the Jordan is the river of baptism, the relation between the brook *K'rith* meaning death and the Jordan, meaning baptism, corresponds to the relation of Elijah and John the Baptist. Thus the raven motif in connection with the dove symbol and the meaning of baptism—death and rebirth in Christ—appears no longer isolated in the Isenheim Altar in which John the Baptist plays an important role.

The scene of St. Anthony visiting St. Paul is often found in churches and monasteries of the Augustinian order, particularly in Italy, the homeland of Guido Guersi, who endowed the painting of the Isenheim Altar. He was the successor of John de Orliac as preceptor of the Order. Of Guido Guersi we know only a few insignificant dates, but a man under whom a work like the Isenheim Altar, the largest of its kind north of the Alps at that time, was painted in a monastery church aside from the common highway, must have been an unusual personality. He can be identified as the St. Anthony of the visitation picture by his blazon, which leans against the rock on which the saint is sitting. Evidently, Grünewald disguised himself as the aged St. Paul, whose

48. Finally the saints compromise by the two breaking it together. This iconography goes back to Egypt. See Arthur Kingsley Porter, *The Crosses and Culture of Ireland* (New Haven, 1931) pp. 85 ff. The legend of St. Paul and St. Anthony was printed with woodcuts at Strasbourg in 1498 and 1517.

49. Cf. Friedrich Sühling, *Die Taube als religiöses Symbol im christlichen Altertum* (Freiburg, 1930) p. 138.

50. Cf. Alfred Jeremias, *Das alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients* (Leipzig, 1930) p. 603. The devil under the form of a raven who appears carrying off a saint's bread appears with St. Amatus the Abbot. See F. C. Husenbeth, *Emblems of Saints* (Norwich, 1882) p. 11.

thin and worn body is clothed in palm leaves.[51] The flowering palm-tree behind him (Psalm 92:13) contrasts with the leafless trees at the side of St. Anthony. Besides the religious complexity of the raven motif there is in it, also, a fine wit, for the raven who brings the bread is known to be the most thievish of all animals. Also the painter here gives a faint allusion to his relation to the preceptor; it seems as if the donor of the altar and the painter are continuing their certainly frequent controversies, while Heaven sends food for both of them. The two men probably did not eat the same bread of tradition and doctrine, while they were discussing the arrangement of the altar, but the miraculous world which the brush of the painter created apparently became more and more satisfactory to the preceptor.

Apparently, the altar reveals Birgittan influence. The book of Birgitta in the German translation had been especially propagated in the valley of the Main, where Grünewald lived before he was called to Isenheim.[52] Since the original sculptures of the altar do not show the apocalyptic spirit of the Birgittan Revelations, the supposition might be justified that Grünewald himself brought Birgitta's symbolism into the altar, combining it with the monastic ideas of Guido Guersi. Revolutionary movements became dangerous in Alsace, the country in which Isenheim lies, particularly at the time when Grünewald painted the altar. Since they were also directed against monachism, Guido Guersi might have been more on the side of tradition, rather shunning the twilight of apocalyptic ideas. That would still include the possibility that he was not averse to reformatory efforts on the basis of the Church and monasticism. The Reformation itself arose from controversies of Dominican and Augustinian friars concerning indulgences.

The Visitation picture tells us that the relation between Guido Guersi and Grünewald was not that of principal and executor, but of two, at least spiritually, equal partners. The gesture of St. Paul, leading

51. W. Fränger devotes the second chapter of his book to a detailed discussion of Grünewald's self-portraits (*op. cit.*, pp. 24-86). He eliminates the possibility of the Isenheim St. Sebastian being a self-portrait and discloses the self-characterizing intention of the figure of St. Paul. We do not believe that the portrait of a young man, added to the collection of Mr. and Mrs. Charles H. Worcester of Chicago in 1937, is a self-portrait of Grünewald. (Cf. D. C. Rich, "German fifteenth century portrait for Chicago" *Art News* [1937] XXXV, pp. 13 ff.) Neither the stylistic characteristics nor the content points at the possibility that this young man could be identical with the painter of the Lindenhardt and Isenheim Altars. This statement, however, does not minimize the great value of the painting now in Chicago.

52. Zülch, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

the discussion, might be taken as a sign that Grünewald felt somewhat superior to the abbot. There are three significant hand-gestures in the paintings of the altar: John the Baptist, in the Crucifixion, points towards the Savior; Gabriel, in the Annunciation, hints at the mysterious event of the Conception, from which the occurances of the adjacent panels start; the third gesture is that of the hermit. It shows Grünewald putting himself into his painting in a specific action.

There are other works in which he appears personally. In the "Mocking of Christ" (1503), he paints himself as a man who tries to calm down one of the catchpoles. In the Crucifixion at Basle (1505), he appears in the guise of the Centurion raising his hand as the first believer under the cross. Finally, in the painting of St. Mary of the Snows (1517-1519), Grünewald represents himself as the kneeling patrician who looks faithfully up to the Pope; he is the man who wanted the new Marian Church founded.

In these five instances, when we are entitled to speak of a more or less disguised self-portrait of Grünewald, we find him in personal action or reaction. According to that emotional attitude towards the content of the work, Grünewald also transforms the pictorial description of a scene into an expression of the subjectivity of the actors, thereby attaining an immediate effect on the modern spectator. But his mode of expression is beyond individualism and subjectivism in a modern sense. Burkhard says: "He remains medieval."[53] That is true, in so far as he takes up all kinds of medieval symbolical ideas with which he not only adorns the mysterious spectacle of his altar-stage, but also inspires the figures of the spiritual drama themselves. The meaning of his figures goes far beyond their pictorial existence, and this meaning joins the creative force of Grünewald's expression; it becomes the motor of his "expressionism." The revealing study by Edgar Wind of one of Grünewald's works, hitherto unexplained, St. Erasmus and St. Maurice (Munich, Alte Pinakothek), comes to this conclusion: "The 'technique' of the picture is one with the 'story': *a unique blending of medievalism with a striking sense of modernity.*"[54] In these words we have a characterization of Grünewald's art in general. In his work, the ancient symbol of the Holy Lamb appears

53. *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

54. "Studies in Allegorical Portraiture, II: Albrecht von Brandenburg as St. Erasmus," *Journal of the Warburg Institute* (1937-38) I, p. 160.

side by side with the pictorial representations of Birgittan ideas. He paints the fourteen helpers in time of need, the typical assembly of medieval saints, and he gives the miracle of the Resurrection in the dawn of a new feeling for nature. Those different trends reveal the wide extent of his work.[55]

Medieval symbolism and modern sensitiveness are the two main features of Grünewald's art. Living in a time when such symbolism was rapidly declining and sentiments of later times were not even divined, he seems to have worked in a world both of yesterday and tomorrow, rather than as a man of his own time. However, those characterizations of great artists as "unzeitgemäss" rather romanticize than explain them. Medievalism and modernism are two trends in Grünewald's art for *our* eyes; with the painter himself they form a unit which reveals a high degree of excitability in the period of the last great religious revolution. The most intimate of Grünewald's self-portraits, the chalk-drawing in the University Library at Erlangen, proves this capacity for spiritual emotion, fed by inspiration from above. Here one can see the artist waiting, nay, longing for inspiration and illumination.[56]

Sandrart reports that Grünewald lived "a secluded melancholy life."[57] In the time of Dürer, melancholy meant valuation of creative human power combined with desire for religious peace of mind.[58]

55. Two more characteristics of Grünewald's art may be quoted here. Maurice Denis, *Histoire de l'art religieux* (Paris, 1939), writes: "Par sa conception réaliste et mystique de la nature et de la peinture, Matthias Grünewald . . . et un primitif exaspéré et un maître de temps nouveaux" (p. 117). Christian Zervos, *op. cit.*, says: "Cette manière d'envisager l'art dans son entière universalité, ainsi que l'exacte conscience de la réalité et du rêve, leur fusion sans que le moindre dualisme puisse s'y observer, l'action prolongué sur la sensibilité, la concentration dans un image de l'émotion spirituelle, de la curiosité sans terme, de l'ardeur sensuelle, toutes ces qualitiés que se lisent dans les œuvres de Grünewald et les rendent si actives sont également visibles et reconnaissables dans les nôtres" (pp. 1 ff.).

56. It has been objected to the claim that this drawing is a self-portrait that the artist could not have portrayed himself looking obliquely upwards while using a mirror. Whereas artists do not always need mirrors in order to portray themselves, being able to do so out of their imagination, it seems plausible that Grünewald for the drawing in Erlangen used two mirrors, which enabled him easily to approach himself from the particular angle shown in the drawing. H. H. Naumann, "Um Grünewald's Bildnis," *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* (December 28, 1937) repeats the objection above mentioned.

57. J. von Sandrart, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

58. Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl, *Dürers "Melencolia I," eine quellen- und typengeschichtliche Untersuchung* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1923) pp. 46 ff., 53 ff. Zülch furnished proof of the fact that Grünewald worked also as a hydraulic engineer.

Sandrart's "secluded" might be interpreted as explaining Grünewald's melancholy and should not mislead us into seeing in him an isolated and eccentric person. If there was an isolated one among the great artists of that period, it was Dürer. Though he was better known than any of his contemporaries, his theoretical approach, his representation of the human figure through geometric analysis *without* losing awareness of the godlike creation of man, led him into a new realm of artistic endeavor. Here, in the cool air of theory, he experienced the loneliness of every forerunner. Not to lose his confidence, was Dürer's religion. Grünewald never found himself concerned with the problem of artistic reconciliation between science and belief. His rising Christ proves sufficiently that he was able to interpret a miracle under a new idea of nature. The active participation of the figures which represent him in his works, his consistency in repeating the same significant subjects, and his highly probable influence on the content of the Isenheim Altar, disclose his emotional involvement in the religious conflicts of his time. That is the reason why one can think of a great movement hidden behind his work. It mirrors the excitement of an epoch bewildered by religious antagonisms. Among the things Grünewald left when he died in 1528, there is listed a rosary scented with musk, and also Lutheran writings. The latter, and the probability that he was somehow involved in the quarrels of the Peasants' War, cannot, however, entitle us to seek him at Luther's side.

As his work shows, Grünewald was rather connected with the reform movements as represented by Geiler von Keisersberg, who urged renovations in the spirit of medieval loyalty to the Church. The Catholic reformation came to a climax in the Council of Trent (1545-1563), which was also concerned with the adornment of the churches by pictures. It turned against iconolatry, but in the writings, based on the

(W. K. Zülch, "Grünewald als Ingenieur." *Nachrichtenzeitung vom Verein Deutscher Ingenieure* (1928) VIII, 23.) W. Fränger's profound characterization may follow here in translation: "Strange as it may seem that he (Grünewald) was master of the practice of mining engineering, one must admit from now on that Matthias Grünewald not only was quite at home with the light of the color-prism and the figures in the world of shapes; he also mastered professionally the work of a pitman in the dark depths of the earth, as if he wanted to join the two poles of the Melancolia. For Albrecht Dürer's engraving teaches that not only the strong pinion for soaring up, but also the sullen mood of stepping down into the watery underground belongs to melancholy, wherein the knowledge of the pair of compasses which artist and craftsman have in common, becomes the instrument for the control of both regions" (*op. cit.*, p. 20).

consequences of the Tridentine, the greatest effect was expected from the representations of Christ's sufferings and those of the saints. Grünewald's saints do not satisfy such a demand, but his Christ figure realized in advance what was asked from the image of the Redeemer half a century later.[59] It was considered an abuse when Christ was not represented as he really was, covered all over with blood. It is, of course, the expression of baroque art which is mirrored in those requests. In pointing at these relations, we do not claim Grünewald as a forerunner of the baroque style; we only want him to be seen in line with a Catholicism longing for reforms, which passed through the Church's most critical time keeping its immediate contact with the sources of faith.

The meaning of Grünewald's symbolism, and the hidden allusions in his work, became lost to the spectator, but not the power of his expression. Whatever aesthetic valuation may say about his marvellous coloring (possibly originating in the impression of stained glass) and his stupendous imagination, we should not forget that all this served the religious feeling of a man whose personality was hidden for almost four centuries. This anonymity, partly caused by a mistaken nomination, is also medieval, just as was the way of his pursuits; for Grünewald did not only work exclusively for ecclesiastics, he worked ecclesiastically.

The medieval world, seen from the outside, manifests the predominance of the Church, from the inside the security and safety of man within the pale of the Church. As everyone participated in the *Persona Dei*, there could be no place for the display of individuality. That does not mean that in the Middle Ages strong individualities did not exist; but the self-conscious development of the individual under the idea of personality and individuality is post-medieval. The only feeling which separated Grünewald from the steadiness of the medieval mind was his religious restlessness, expressed in efforts not only to impress but also to persuade the spectator. He repeatedly follows the old custom of putting biblical inscriptions in his pictures.

Grünewald's attitude towards the Old Testament corresponds to his main concept of Church-symbolism. The Old Covenant is com-

59. For the latest bibliography of the art and art doctrines during and after the Tridentine, see *Reallexikon zur deutschen Kunstgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 1939) 563-569. For the theme of the Crucifixion, see Émile Mâle, *L'art religieux après le Concile de Trente* (Paris, 1932) pp. 279 ff.

pletely absorbed in the mystery of the Son of Man, whereas the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel by Michelangelo, painted at the same time as the Isenheim Altar, proves to be the absorption of the Christ-idea in the arrangement and surroundings of the figures of the Old Testament and the Sybils. Grünewald painted only one figure of the Old Testament clearly, the sculpture of the prophet Isaiah in the archivolt-corner of the Annunciation. The prophet appears at the very moment when Holy Writ for the first time proclaims that a Son has been added to the God of the Old Covenant. This merging of the Old Testament in Grünewald's work is opposed to Luther's biblical conception, which led to a new feeling for the powerful figures of the Hebrew Bible.

Grünewald, in the twilight of the Middle Ages, transformed the evangelical world into a pictorial revelation. In its center, as the most exciting vision, stands the image of Christ. Four decades after it was created as the pictorial and ideal axis of the Isenheim Altar, another Crucifixion, in which John the Baptist also appears as indicator, was made for the parish church at Weimar. It has been ascribed to Lucas Cranach the Elder, but is to be regarded as the work of his son.[60] In it the Baptist, pointing at Christ with almost the same gesture as the Isenheim figure, is placed between the crucified Lord and Lucas Cranach the Elder, at whom he looks. The painter stands between the Baptist and Luther. A spurt of blood pouring from Christ's side-wound strikes the head of the praying Cranach. In this painting, Christ's self-sacrifice is personally related to the individual believer, Lucas Cranach. There is no mediation, though the symbol of the Holy Lamb also appears. This panel is the Protestant allegory of the Crucifixion, an intellectual paraphrase of the central theme of Christianity as one single man's belief in God's grace, secured by Christ's sacrifice, and proved by the word of Holy Writ.

Referring to this Protestant confession as a contrast to Grünewald's *mysterium crucis*, we do not claim the latter as a Catholic rendering of the eucharistic theme. The Grünewald painting and Cranach's panel do not represent the medieval and modern worlds, as there are many medieval remainders in the allgorical details of the Weimar picture, depicting death and devil, as well as redemption and Christ's victory, in the manifest shapes of the late Middle Ages. The two works rather

60. Cf. Max J. Friedländer and Jakob Rosenberg, *Die Gemälde von Lucas Cranach* (Berlin, 1932) p. 26.

embody the contrast between a universal Christianity and a particular creed. Though the Middle Ages were formed and determined by Christian tradition and spirit, Christendom itself is not of medieval substance alone. It has its eternal value which the great works of Christian art approach. There is no eternal art as such; the works themselves have to pay tribute to perishableness, and their creators cannot detach themselves from the times in which they live. But they rise above its surface. The figures of Grünewald's Karlsruhe Crucifixion indicate this way of rising. St. John expresses the revolutionary spirit of the epoch, thus becoming the historic representative among Grünewald's protagonists. Mary, the focus of medieval symbolism, embodies the feminine principle of the Church longing for regeneration, the struggle of a timeless Catholicism against a particular condition of Papacy. The inexorable image of Christ marks the highest step in Grünewald's approach to eternal Christianity. In Isenheim, the body of the crucified Christ is over lifesize, John the Baptist just below lifesize. The *mensura hominis* lies between them, and also the measure of time. Grünewald's Christ image, the most convincing pictorial witness of the anti-docetic spirit of Western Christianity, verifies what the Baptist, as indicator, urges upon himself and upon those participating in this mystery:

ILLUM OPORTET CRESCERE, ME AUTEM MINUI

THE BASIS FOR THE HINDU ACT OF TRUTH*

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There exists in India belief in a magical use of truth as basis for an oath to accomplish purposes quite beyond the power of ordinary means, which we, with our own manner of describing religious notions, would be likely to denominate miracle-working. The theme was well exploited by the late Dr. E. W. Burlingame,[1] who gives as definition, "An Act of Truth is a formal declaration of fact, accompanied by a command or resolution or prayer that the purpose of the agent shall be accomplished."[2] He showed a widespread use of the notion in Buddhism and a less prolific use in Jainism and Hinduism and gave an accurate descriptive analysis and classification of the many instances which he knew. He called especial attention to the formulaic manner in which the Truth Act is employed, and the technical value attached to the word for "Truth" or "Truth Act" (*satya* in Sanskrit; *sacca, saccakiriyā* in Pali), generally construed with a verb of saying or doing.

A few of his stories may be cited here to show how the motif is employed.

In a previous existence as a blind skipper, the Future Buddha puts to sea with a company of traders, and the ship approaches a whirlpool. The Future Buddha reflects, "There is none other that can save these traders from death, but only I. I will save them by an Act of Truth." He says to them, "Quickly bathe me in perfumed water, clothe me in new garments, prepare me a full bowl, and place me in the bow of the ship." They do so. The Future Buddha, taking the full bowl in both hands, and standing in the bow of the ship, makes the following Act of Truth: "So long as my memory serves me, since I reached the age of reason, I am not conscious of ever having deliberately injured a single living creature. If these words be true, may the ship return in

* Paper read at the annual meetings of the American Oriental Society, New York, March 28, 1940.

1. JRAS for 1917 (pp. 429-467).

2. An Act of Truth is to be distinguished from an ordeal, which employs the truth within a person to disprove the charge of a crime.

safety." The ship immediately returns to port, making a four months' journey in a single day.[3]

In another story, King Sibi, the pattern of generosity, gives his two eyes to a blind beggar, really the god Sakka in disguise. At a later time, depressed because of his lack of sight, he longs for death. But he is advised to make an Act of Truth, and does so. He says: "Whatsoever sort or kind of beggar comes to me is dear to my heart. If this be true, let one of my eyes be restored." Immediately it is restored. To restore his other eye, he recites: "A Brahman asked me for one of my eyes; unto him I gave two. Great joy and delight filled me. If this be true, let my other eye be restored." Immediately the other eye is restored.[4]

One of the most striking stories is that which tells how the courtesan Bindumatī made the river Ganges flow back upstream. King Asoka had inquired in his capital city if anyone had an Act of Truth, and none had one except her. After she had performed the feat, King Asoka said to her, "You possess the Power of Truth! You, a thief, a cheat, corrupt, cleft in twain, vicious, a wicked old sinner, who have broken the bonds of morality and live on the plunder of fools." "It is true, your Majesty," she answered, "I am what you say. But even I, wicked woman that I am, possess an Act of Truth by means of which, should I so desire, I could turn the world of men and the worlds of the gods upside down." Said the king, "But what is this Act of Truth? Pray enlighten me." "Your Majesty, whosoever gives me money, be he a noble (*khattiya*) or a Brahman or a merchant (*vessa*) or a serf (*sudda*) or of any other caste soever, I treat them all exactly alike. If he be a noble, I make no distinction in his favor. If he be a serf, I despise him not. Free alike from fawning and contempt, I serve the owner of the money. This, your Majesty, is the Act of Truth by which I caused the mighty Ganges to flow back upstream."[5]

Burlingame made little investigation into the pre-Buddhist history of the theme, although he identified a celebrated passage about the heated axe ordeal in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.16 as an illustration of the potency of truth.[6] Nor did he deal with the underlying philos-

3. Burlingame, *op. cit.*, p. 454.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 430.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 440.
6. It seems that this passage needs even more interpretation than that given it by Burlingame. A man accused of theft (*steya*) is tried by the heated axe. *Steya* seems to

ophy of the motif: for example, he did not explain why it was not possible for any and every sort of true statement to be used for such a magic end; nor, even more puzzling, how it was possible for anti-social or unethical conduct to be the basis of an Act of Truth, as in the case of the prostitute, whose story I have just told.

In a small book of my own, *The Indian and Christian Miracles of Walking on the Water* (Chicago, 1928), I spoke of the Truth Act as used for crossing water magically, and I remarked that the truth has many magical (or religious) uses in the Brāhmaṇas. The most striking instance there is its employment in the confession ritual performed at the Varuṇapraghāsas, when the priest asks the sacrificer's wife with whom she consorts other than her husband. It is essential for her to speak, not because speaking lessens the sin, but because it brings exactitude, that is truth, into the rite. And it is significant that she speaks out before Varuṇa, who is the Vedic custodian of the *ṛta*, cosmic truth or order.

But I had no material from the earlier Vedic literature to illustrate the performance of an Act of Truth, nor could I explain why only certain truths could be used in this miraculous manner. I believe that I am now in a position to speak to both points. Let me first consider the underlying philosophy of the Act of Truth.

If we examine the instances recorded in the various texts, we see that in every case the basis of the Truth Act is the singleness with which the performer, or some other person used by the performer as a dynamic reference, fulfills his personal duty. The very stories I have quoted illustrate this fact. The blind skipper was actually basing his charm upon the perfection of his life as a Future Buddha; King Sibi was resorting to the completeness with which he practised that most ideal of royal virtues in India, selfless generosity; the prostitute was citing the integrity of her prostitution. Duty, in India, is not standardized, but varies for different people, most conspicuously in Hinduism as it has developed under the system of caste. Showing a realistic attitude toward life, India does not expect all human beings to be or act alike. Each is expected to do only that which pertains to his station, and different stations of life have different codes. The

be the characteristic crime of sorcerers (*yātudhāna*) in the Veda (RV 10.87.15), against whom heat is the antidote (RV 10.87; 7.104); cf. also in RV 3.53.22 the use of axe, silk-cotton blossom, and boiling pot against an enemy (Vasiṣṭha conceived of as a *yātudhāna*?).

universe is a gigantic blend, with the pleasant and the unpleasant mingled in a confusion which tacitly indicates that ethics is a relative, not an absolute, subject. The ideal of individual conduct is, therefore, that of one's own segment of society, and very literally the cobbler must stick to his last. Says the Bhagavad Gītā (3.35) "Better to do one's own duty poorly than another's well." Carrying the idea further, to the benefit of the anti-social, that same work has God say (9.30), "Even if a man of most wicked conduct worships Me without worshipping any other, he must be considered actually to be good, for he is rightly resolved." In some future existence the lowly man may hope for a chance to attempt the duties of some higher stratum. Hence the religious teacher has one set of duties; the thief, or a member of some criminal caste, has quite another; but each should live up to the best traditions of his profession. So we have for human guidance not only the ritualistic manuals for priests or treatises on government and statecraft, but also such—to us—anomalous anti-social works as a "Scientific Handbook for Thieves" (Steyaśāstra) or "The Prostitutes' Vade Mecum" (Kuṭṭanīmata) all alike claiming to be taught from on high and to be written down and promulgated under divine patronage. Whether priest, king, thief, or prostitute, a person should be scientific and efficient. In this way the individual achieves personal integrity and fits the cosmic purpose. Life then becomes a sacrificial act, a rite (*kriyā*), and as such, when perfectly executed, it can accomplish any wish, compelling even the gods, as we are taught in the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas is possible through the sacrifice.

We can see now why a Buddha or a Future Buddha makes his Truth Act by the perfection of his Buddahood or the basic qualities of it; a king by the completeness of his royal generosity; and a prostitute by the purity of her prostitution, where in India the ideal for her is to have no affection, any more than loathing, for a customer. From the Indian point of view, any one of us might also have a Truth Act, if he were a one hundred percent perfect professor of Sanskrit or Semitics, or a fully devoted clergyman; and with that Truth Act he might be the equal of the prostitute and be able to make the Hudson roll back upstream.

A corollary of this general proposition is that the range of occupations which may provide the basis for a Truth Act is very wide for men, but narrow for women. Men in India may be called to be saints,

warriors, merchants, artisans, thieves, or to a thousand other vocations. But women, in that man's land, traditionally have only two possible careers: wifehood or prostitution. The usual formula for a woman, therefore, is by the fulness of her devotion to her husband. In the Mahābhārata story (III. 52-79), when the maiden princess Damayantī is sought in marriage by the four great gods, Indra, Varuṇa, Agni, and Yama, as well as by the mortal king, Nala, whom she has said she means to take in preference to them, and at her Ceremony of Self-Choice sees all five appearing exactly alike so that she cannot distinguish Nala from the others, she makes a solemn asseveration, a Truth Act: "As it is true that Nala is destined to be my husband, as it is true that from the first moment when I heard his name I took him for my lord, as it is true that I have never strayed from him even in thought, as it is true that I have instituted this ceremony to win him—by that Truth the gods must reveal him to me." The verb is in the imperative mood; the gods have no alternative; they leave their disguise and stand in their true forms—eyes unwinking, garlands unfaded, bodies free of sweat, clothes without dust, their feet not touching the earth, shadowless. Beside them is Nala, human and inferior, but Damayantī's choice, discovered through the completeness of her chastity, which is virginal and pre-nuptial, mental as well as physical.

The associations of the Truth Act with other Indo-Aryan beliefs in the magic power of truth, and the presence of the Truth Act in Zoroastrian texts, warrant the presumption that it was known to the Vedic Aryans and is, at least, implicit somewhere in the Rig Veda. If the basis for the Truth Act is the integrity with which one fulfills his personal function, then only a slight modulation in the interpretation of familiar Rig Vedic passages will produce similar ideas. In the opening hymn of that work, addressed to Agni, god of the sacrifice, whose primary duty is to summon the deities to the ceremony and convey men's offerings to them, is the reminder to him (RV I.1.6): "Precisely the kindness (blessing) which you do the pious worshipper, Agni, precisely that, O Añgiras, is your Truth (*satyám*)." Too frequently in the Rig Veda to justify repetition here, the word *satya*, "true, truth," appears in association with *ṛta* "cosmic law, order." Truth is life or conduct in accordance with the *ṛta*, that is *ṛtena*, and the opposite of *satya* is regularly *anṛta*, "what is against the *ṛta*, that

is, against the cosmic order." Sorcerers (*yātudhāna*), intensely feared by Vedic men, attack the *ṛta* with the *anṛta* (RV 10.87.11), even using Vedic charms for anti-social ends (RV 10.87.14 *vācāstena;* RV 7.104.8 *anṛtebhir vacobhiḥ*). But all that is good moves according to the *ṛta*, as does the sun, and is true (*satya*) to its functions, as is said of the various gods in many different passages. Devotion to one's personal function according to the *ṛta* appears to be contained among the meanings of the word *vrata*. A pious and perfectly devoted person is *anuvrata*, "living according to duty or function" (RV 1.34.4; 8.13.19). The idea of *vrata* is extended for mortals beyond the actual immediate service of the gods. In RV 9.112 this point seems clear:

> In many ways are the pious thoughts and vocational acts of us folk differentiated. The carpenter wishes for a break, the surgeon for one maimed, the Brāhmaṇa for a soma-presser—flow, drop, for Indra! (1). With seasoned wood (fuel), the wings of birds (fan), stones (tools?), and flames [of the smithy], the [gold-]smith seeks one with gold [to be worked]. Flow, drop, for Indra! (2). A poet am I; father's a surgeon; mother turns the mill stone. With different thoughts, as we seek wealth, we follow [our vratas,[7] like herdsmen following] cows. Flow, drop, for Indra! (3). A draft horse desires an easy-going chariot; those issuing invitations desire merriment; the phallus desires a hairy cleft;[8] the frog desires the water. Flow, drop, for Indra. (4).

Here in the Rig Veda, as we saw was the case in later Indo-Aryan literature, men have many occupations open to them, but the woman's is only that of the home. The word *anuvrata* "devoted" (from *anu-*[*sthā*] with *vrata*[9]) is applied in connection with women to their devotion to their husbands (RV 10.34.2); and a woman may be lauded as "devoted to her husband," *patívratā*, "having her husband as her *vrata* (function)," as was Damayantī in the Mahābhārata story.[10]

7. The word occurs first in a vedic text of not very good authenticity (published in Aufrecht, *Die Hymnen des Ṛigveda*, Appendix, p. 682), and the accentuation of the text is highly questionable (see Aufrecht's note, and PW s. v.), but the word may not unreasonably be construed as a bahuvrīhi compound, and translated as above in my text.

8. Lack of hair on the genitals is a defect in a woman—see story of Apālā (RV 8.91.5,6; cf. H. Oertel, in JAOS, 18.26ff.).

9. For *anu sthā* with *vrata*, cf. RV 3.30.4, *táva dyāvāpṛthivī párvatāsó 'nu vratấya nímiteva tasthuḥ.*

10. Kindred Vedic ideas of the character of Truth could be cited in great number. For example, in the Rig Veda the word *satyádharman* is applied to various deities, apparently in the sense of "having the truth as basic principle": twice of Savitṛ (10.34.8; 10.139.3); Agni once (5.63.1); the gods once (5.51.2); Mitra-Varuṇa

Stories in the Rig Veda illustrating the use of a Truth Act are rare, or else well concealed. It has seemed to me that there is probably one concerning the Ṛbhus, an obscure group of three divinities, originally men, who by their skill in sacrifice won the gods' favor and were admitted to a share in the soma offering and so got immortality. They are celebrated as artificers without equal, and a number of their feats are mentioned. Even the god Tvaṣṭṛ, the divine carpenter himself, a kind of Hephaistos, is their inferior. He made a wooden bowl or sacrificial ladle for the gods to use in drinking the soma. When the Ṛbhus saw this, they made some kind of slighting comment on it, and then converted it into four, thereby surpassing Tvaṣṭṛ and arousing his jealousy. He tried to have them killed for sacrilege in tampering with the holy vessel, but his own daughter sheltered them until the danger was past, and afterwards seems to have become their common wife, although on this last point the allusions are too imperfect to guarantee the myth.

The Ṛbhus appear to have won their elevation from human estate

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once (5.63.1); and Prajāpati once (10.121.9); and in the Atharva Veda it is applied twice to Savitṛ (7.24.1; 10.8.42), and once to Varuṇa (1.10.3). Truth (*satya*) is the individual controlling principle of the gods, that is, it is their *svadharman*, as of Agni (3.21.2). Truth is "made" for help against sorcerers in the Atharva Veda 4.181: *kṛṇomi satyam ūtaye.*

At various places in the Upaniṣads (Īśā 15-16, Bṛhad Āraṇyaka 5.15.1, and partly in Maitri 6.35) a dying person's prayer is given: "With a golden vessel (the Sun) the Truth is covered in front. That, O Pūṣan, uncover so that one who has truth as his principle may see. O Pūṣan, Sole Ṛṣi, Controller, Sun, Offspring of Prajāpati, spread apart thy rays and draw [me] to it (cf. AV 6.48, 1-3 *svasti mā sáṃ vahāsya*). Your brilliance, which is your most auspicious form, that I see of you. That Person there, Puruṣa, I am He." The sun as a covering over the hole into heaven appears in the Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa 1.3-6, and there, to pass through the sun, which is compared to an axle-hole and is covered by rays (1.3.6), the dying person must invoke Truth, calling attention to his own true life. Thereupon he is admitted, the rays of the sun being parted for his entrance (1.6.2; cf. Maitri Up. 6.30).

The idea develops still further, and gradations of truth are indicated, which are the lower, empirical, truth, and the higher, metaphysical, truth, as in the Vedānta. Immortality is covered by the lower truth: *tad etad amṛtaṃ satyena channam, prāṇo vā amṛtaṃ, nāmarūpe satyaṃ, tābhyām ayam prāṇaś channaḥ* "this immortality is covered by truth; life (Ātman) is immortality, name and form (individuality) are truth; with these two life is covered" (Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Up. 1.6.3). It is not surprising to find mention here of truth which is only relative, for Brahman became both truth (*satya*) and untruth (*anṛta*), according to Taittirīya Up. 2.6. Absolute truth, the Ātman, is in that connection called Truth of the Truth (*satyasya satyam*, Maitri Up. 6.32; Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Up. 2.3.6), that is, the Higher Truth (cf. H. Oertel, "satyasya satyam," *Sitzb. d. Bayer. Akad. d. Wissen.*, philosoph.-histor. Abt., 1937, Heft 3, pp. 28-29 of the reprint), that which is also called *satyadharma* (Maitri Up. 6.35).

to divine by stages, determined by their achievements. First they made a marvellous three-wheeled chariot that could move without horses,[11] and in this way they came to the gods' favorable attention. Then, by restoring their aged parents' youth, they received the gods' high esteem. Finally, by multiplying Tvaṣṭṛ's one bowl into four they attained to the company itself of the gods and immortality.[12]

In the case of most of their feats we have no statement of the manner in which they were accomplished. But concerning the most important, the multiplication of the one cup into four, we have hints. In the hymn RV 4.33.5-6 we have an account:

jyeṣṭhá āha camasá dvá karéti/kánīyān trín kṛṇavāméty āha/
kaniṣṭhá āha catúras karéti/tváṣṭha ṛbhavas tát panayad váco vaḥ. (5).
satyám ūcur nára evá hí cakrúr/ánu svadhắm ṛbhávo jagmur etắm/
vibhrájamānāñ camasắñ áheva/ávenat tváṣṭhā catúro dadṛśvắn. (6).

The translators all have substantially the same rendering, which is in general as follows:

The eldest said, "Make two cups!"[13] The younger said, "We must make three!" The youngest said, "Make four!" Tvaṣṭṛ, O Ṛbhus, challenged (*panayat* [approved?]) this speech of yours. The heroes spoke truly, and precisely so they acted. The Ṛbhus followed their true nature. When Tvaṣṭṛ saw the four gleaming cups, he was envious.

The translation, I believe, can properly be modified slightly. The critical word is *satyam*, rendered above as an adverb "truly," so that the phrase *satyam ūcus* is made to mean "spoke truly." I suggest that it be taken as a noun, and the passage then be translated:

The eldest said, "Let me make two cups!" The younger said, "We must make three!" The youngest said, "Make four!" Tvaṣṭṛ, O Ṛbhus, challenged this spell (*vacas*) of yours. The heroes spoke Truth; precisely so they did.

In an allusion to the same miracle in RV 1.161.9 the corresponding phraseology is *ṛtá vadantas camasắñ apiṅśata* "speaking by the *ṛta* they shaped the cups."[14]

11. This is perhaps the Aśvins' chariot; cf. RV 10.85.15,16, where the wise (*addhātayas* = Ṛbhus?) knew the third wheel belonging to this chariot.

12. See, for this progression RV 4.36.1-4.

13. Or, "let me make two cups," taking *kareti* to contain a subjunctive *karā iti* (see Oldenberg, *Rig Veda Noten* 1.296).

14. In RV 1.20.4 the Ṛbhus are described as *satyámantra*, which might merely mean "having true mantras," or might mean "having Truth as a mantra." Else-

If the Ṛbhus actually did make a Truth utterance, its character remains unstated. We might suppose that they based it upon their skill as artificers, but that skill would, after all, appear to have been only their skill as sacrificers; for the impression conveyed by the Rig Vedic passages is that their miracles were performed by the use of the sacrifice as a magic charm, as is the general use of the sacrifice throughout the Veda. The point in their case would be that they were the most competent of mortal sacrificers, hence capable of obtaining the most astonishing results. It is no surprise to have the Rig Veda give no explicit statement about the means they used. That work throughout treats mythic material by allusion; its aim is not exposition, but rather application of familiar matter toward some persuasive or coercive purpose with the gods or upon the order of the universe. Sometimes, again, the Veda intentionally speaks in riddle (*brahmodya*), heightening the magic effect of the charm by speaking in terms obscure and esoteric; but we need not suppose that this latter sort of obfuscation has beclouded the true character of the Ṛbhu myth. The priests and the audience knew what its content was; they did not need explicit statement. The formula of their Truth Act—and it would be only a guess to indicate how much of the later formulaic character was actually present—would perhaps have been somewhat as follows: "As so and so—perhaps, our perfection in the character of sacrificers—is true, let this one cup become two; as so and so is true, let these two cups become three; as so and so is true, let these three cups become four." Perhaps the Veda somewhere conceals a hint, which may yet make the myth certain.[15]

If the Act of Truth appears in the Rig Veda, then we have in the earliest Indo-Aryan literature a belief in the magic, or religious, efficacy of truth not unlike that which Gandhi holds in our own day. He calls his method of employing non-violent non-co-operation that of *satyāgraha,* a Sanskrit word which he translates loosely as "Soul

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where the same word is used of the *pitaras* (RV 7.76.4). In RV 1.67.5 Agni, it is stated, supported the earth and propped up the sky by true mantras (*mantrebhiḥ satyaiḥ*).

15. Other Truth Acts in the Rig Veda may possibly exist; for example, in RV 10.34.12, the gambler may be swearing (*tád ṛtáṃ vadāmi*) by the completeness of his gambling character; in RV 10.117.6 personal generosity may be the efficient basis of the curse heaped upon the niggard through the asseveration "Truth I speak" (*satyám bravīmi*).

Force." It is actually a compound of *satya* "truth" and *āgraha* "steadfast grasping," and means literally "strict adherence to Truth." By holding to a true and justified end, he teaches, and by not deviating to untruth, as one would do if he had an unjust purpose or resorted to violence, but instead by relying upon the personal integrity that comes from knowing and practising the truth, a person may compel redress of a grievance, or a group may secure the alleviation of political or social injustice. The force of Truth is to work mystically upon an oppressor to make him yield. This is today, for a believing Hindu permeated by his country's tradition, a logical and specific way of saying that Truth will prevail, a bit of mystic cosmogony lineally and legitimately descended from the Vedic *satyénóttabhitā bhúmih* (RV 10.85.1) "by Truth is the earth made firm."

RUDOLF OTTO'S INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION

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The theological leadership of Germany in Protestant circles has been well established since the time of the Reformation, and Rudolf Otto stands out among those men in our day who have helped perpetuate it. There are, of course, unmistakable indications at present that this intellectual pre-eminence of Germany has been, at least temporarily, brought to an end. The crisis in the German Church itself, the policies of the present German government, and the conflict in which Germany is now engaged, make a continued German leadership in the theological thought of the Western World highly improbable.

In his discerning study of *Contemporary English Theology*, Walter Horton suggests that the intellectual leadership of Western Christendom is now passing to England. It may well be, as critics of Horton's study insist, that American theology is rather prepared to assert its independence of all foreign domination and develop an original and characteristic theological position of its own. But certainly as yet, no British or American influence has been exerted upon contemporary religious thought comparable in significance and permanence to that emanating from Germany. Indeed Horton himself hastens to point out this fact in his own later work on *Contemporary Continental Theology*.

During the past two decades, the viewpoint of Protestant Christianity has been largely shaped by the theology of Karl Barth and by Rudolf Otto's interpretation of religion—in America, it is true, to a limited but increasing extent, in Europe to a much more marked degree. Whatever the theoretical validity of their positions may prove to be, both these men have apprehended and formulated in striking fashion something of the inner spirit of the present age. The thought of both must be ranked among the formative influences in the theological development of our generation. Numerous studies of the Barthian theology have appeared in English, but Otto's books, although widely commented upon, have been left in the main to speak for themselves.

I

Few books, as a matter of fact, have made such large and immediate impact upon the religious world as Otto's major work, *Das Heilige*. Published in 1917, its appeal was unquestionably enhanced by the widespread spirit of disillusion engendered by the World War. Acute need was felt for some interpretation of man's life and destiny more satisfying than the secular and purely rational outlook prevalent in the years preceding the war. Otto's *Idea of the Holy*, as definitely as Barth's *Commentary on Romans*, provided reorientation of life upon a distinctly religious basis, emphasizing a "dimension of depth" in experience of which "liberal" Protestant theology had too largely lost sight. As a result, both Otto and Barth at once commanded general attention.

The significance of Otto's book is not merely due, however, to its timeliness. Not only its discerning portrayal of the religious experience, but also its truly remarkable synthesis of the major tendencies of modern German theology, mark it as one of the great books of our day. A typical comment is that of Charles A. Bennett: "In recent years the most striking and original attempt to distill the essence of religion is, beyond all question, that of Professor Otto in his book, *Das Heilige*."[1]

An indication of the appeal and, to some extent, the importance of Otto's thought is to be found in the attention his book attracted. In Germany *Das Heilige* has gone through twenty-five editions (the last in 1936), and has been published also in cheaper form for student use during a period hardly favorable for the wide circulation of scholarly studies. Within twelve years of its initial appearance it was translated into seven other languages (into English in 1923, Swedish in 1924, Spanish in 1925, Italian in 1926, Japanese in 1927, Dutch in 1928 and French in 1929). The English translation, *The Idea of the Holy*, has itself been reprinted six times and was included recently (1936) in a cheaper edition on the Oxford Bookshelf. Otto's position has occasioned comment in almost every important theological work in Germany since the date of its publication and in Great Britain since its translation. To the widespread interest aroused by *The Idea of the Holy* may likewise be attributed the rapid translation into English of

1. "Religion and the Idea of the Holy." *Journal of Philosophy*, August 19, 1926, p. 461.

Otto's later works, which in the main are but historical or theological amplifications of its cardinal tenets.

The publication of *Das Heilige* established Otto almost immediately as one of Germany's foremost theologians. Prior to that time he had been professor of systematic theology at Göttingen (1904-1914) and at Breslau (1914-1917). In 1917 he was appointed to the same position at Marburg. The influence of his *Hauptwerk* was so great, indeed, that he was later offered the highly esteemed chairs in this field at the University of Halle and the University of Berlin. And he was soon invited, largely for the same reason, to important lectureships throughout the English-speaking world. In 1924 he visited the United States, giving the Haskell Lectures at Oberlin College and speaking at other leading American Universities. Some years thereafter he was chosen to give the University of Calcutta Lectures on Comparative Religion, and also selected to deliver the Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen. Unfortunately, however, because of failing health, he was not able finally to fill either of the latter appointments.

Otto's fame as a theologian, the inspirational quality of his teaching, and more perhaps than anything else, the mystical depths of his own spiritual life, drew students from all the world to the beautiful university town of Marburg, where he chose to remain until his death in 1937, despite tempting offers of other posts. In increasing numbers during the nineteen-twenties, aspiring young theologians from England and America met with those of Germany to find deepened insight and enlarged appreciation of religion in his Marburg seminars. A common path led visitors from the Orient and from the Occident to his study door. All were deeply impressed by the catholicity of his spirit and understanding, as well as by the genuineness of his welcome and interest in the issues discussed with him.[2]

The breadth of Otto's interest and the depth of his spiritual insight are well evidenced by his important contributions to the devotional life of the Lutheran Church. In addition to numerous articles and a volume devoted directly to discussion of improved method in public worship (*Zur Erneuerung und Ausgestaltung des Gottesdienstes*, 1925), he collaborated for a number of years in the publication of

2. See the article by J. S. Bixler, "Rudolf Otto as a Religious Teacher." *The Christian Century*, July 17, 1929.

such devotional materials as orders of service for special occasions, prayers for use in church, school and home, and general liturgical aids for ministers.

Nor was he content to write of worship simply from the viewpoint of a theological professor. Instead, in more concrete experimental fashion, he attempted in a chapel near Marburg to develop a more effective service of worship, by this means infusing into institutional religion something of the mystical spirit and insight that his theological studies manifest so clearly.[3] Combining a practical with an historical purpose, Otto also established and promoted zealously the *Marburger religionskundliche Sammlung*, a fine collection of ritualistic symbols of all sorts, primitive, Oriental and Christian.

In the same practical fashion he gave enthusiastic support to the missionary activity of his own Communion, taking a place of leadership in that endeavor without endorsing a narrow or sectarian evangelistic program. Indeed, he united with this missionary interest not only a wholehearted advocacy of the more effective unity of Protestantism throughout the world, but likewise a deep and genuine appreciation of the great non-Christian faiths. From such breadth of vision the missionary enterprise itself could not but profit. It is no exaggeration to say that throughout his life Otto was concerned primarily with religion that was effective rather than with a theory of religion that was logical and consistent. This concern brought a richness and penetration to his own interpretation of religion not to be found in many positions that perhaps exhibit greater theoretical and systematic precision.

II

Every tendency of importance in recent German theology left its impress upon Otto's thought, and he made the spirit and the enduring insight of each, in a very real sense, his own. The Lutheran piety and faith quite naturally conditioned his approach to religion and his point of view in general. Nurtured in the Lutheran Communion and in the theology of Luther, he never seriously questioned its position that religion is essentially a matter of inner spiritual experience. The first work he published was a study of Luther's idea of the Holy Spirit (*Die Anschauung vom heiligen Geiste bei Luther*, 1898). With such

3. An interesting description of Otto's chapel and the work there is given by B. E. Meland, *Modern Man's Worship* (Harper's, 1934) Ch. IV.

a background it was inevitable that certain dominant aspects of Luther's religious life and thought would force themselves upon Otto's attention and shape his own conception of vital religion. He remained an enthusiastic disciple of Luther as long as he lived, reinforcing his own position again and again by appeal to the authority of the Great Reformer.

At the Universities of Erlangen and Göttingen, where he was educated during the last decade of the nineteenth century, Otto was likewise greatly impressed by the then-dominant Ritschlian theology and the Kantian critical philosophy. His mature interpretation of religion rests largely upon this early Kantian-Ritschlian foundation. But further studies of Schleiermacher, and a growing interest in the Neo-Friesian movement initiated by Leonard Nelson at Göttingen, soon modified both his Ritschlian and his Kantian outlook. A centennial edition of Schleiermacher's *Addresses on Religion* which he brought out in 1899, together with several articles published immediately thereafter, reveal clearly the extent of Schleiermacher's influence. Nor was the allegiance professed therein to the methodology and general viewpoint of the *Addresses* ever relinquished. Something of Schleiermacher's spirit is to be found in all of Otto's later work.

During the next ten years, however, he was increasingly attracted by the philosophy of Jakob Fr. Fries, an early nineteenth century disciple of Kant, who sought to develop the Kantian critique of reason along more definitely idealistic lines. Much less important in the conventional histories of modern philosophy than such idealists of his own day as Hegel, Fichte, or Schelling, Fries was again given a place of prominence in German philosophical circles by Leonard Nelson's able advocacy of his position. Otto, a colleague of Nelson's at Göttingen during the first decade of the present century, became a leading member of the Neo-Friesian school established there. His *Kantisch-Friessche Religionsphilosophie*, written in 1909 and translated as *The Philosophy of Religion* (1931), was one of the more important publications of the Neo-Friesian movement. In that work Otto undertook to do for the philosophy of religion what Nelson had already done so forcefully in the realm of epistemology; that is, to present in effective fashion the position outlined by Fries, removing any defects or inconsistencies in its original statement and developing constructively the valid insight contained therein.

Yet a systematic philosophy of religion was never of primary interest to Otto. The empirical approach to theology adopted by Ernst Troeltsch and the German "religio-historical" school exerted quite as much influence upon him during his years at Göttingen as did the Neo-Friesian philosophy. Indeed, one of his former students there has recently maintained that the Friesian idealism was merely a "foil" for Otto's religio-historical method of interpretation.[4] Such an assertion fails to recognize the important contribution made by Fries to Otto's thought, but it well suggests his greater concern with empirical religion than with philosophical theory. And it reveals clearly the sort of impression his teaching was making at that time. The idealism of Fries interested him, Otto himself points out, largely because it afforded sound philosophical foundation for a more concrete "science of religion" (*Religionswissenschaft*).[5] With the religio-historical school he accepted as the task of theology an accurate psychological and historical ("scientific") analysis of the religious consciousness, and this concept of theology shaped his *Idea of the Holy* as definitely as his other later studies of religion.

Actually it was Wm. Wundt's influential work on *Folk Psychology* that stirred Otto to undertake the formulation of his mature theory of religion. He was impelled to this by the very persuasiveness of Wundt's statement of a position so completely antithetical to that gradually taking shape in his own mind. In 1910, he published an article attacking Wundt's position in detail ("Mythus und Religion in Wundts Völkerpsychologie"), and this controversy launched him upon a careful analysis of religious experience which eventually paved the way for his *Idea of the Holy* (1917). Otto himself, in a later study, attributes the origin of his masterpiece to a more specific theological concern—the desire to provide an adequate interpretation of the doctrine of the atonement.[6] But the historico-psychological portrayal of religion that has occasioned general interest in *The Idea of the Holy* is a direct development of the viewpoint adopted in his article on Wundt.

The controversy with Wundt likewise fixed Otto's attention upon "primitive" religion. A trip to North Africa, India and Japan in 1911-

4. Fr. Delekat, "Rudolf Otto und das Methodenproblem in der heutigen systematischen Theologie." *Die Christliche Welt*, Nr. 1, 1930.
5. *Kantisch-Friessche Religionsphilosophie*, p. 2.
6. *India's Religion of Grace and Christianity*, p. 105 n.

12 offered opportunity for direct observation of religion in its cruder stages; it also gave him a new and abiding appreciation of the great Oriental faiths. Numerous studies and translations from the complex religious thought of India grew out of that trip, and these studies established Otto as one of the most discerning Western interpreters of Hinduism. Indeed, the last monographs completed prior to his death were German translations and analyses of the Bhagavad-Gita and the Katha-Upanishad (1934-36). As a result of this contact with the East, something of the mystical spirit of India permeated Otto's own religious life, deepening and broadening his Lutheran heritage. Its effect is already to be seen in *The Idea of the Holy*, is much more apparent in two later volumes, *Mysticism East and West* (1926) and *India's Religion of Grace and Christianity* (1930), and definitely colors his final major work, *The Kingdom of God and the Son of Man* (1934).

Christian theology, however, was Otto's principal and enduring interest. History, psychology and philosophy were for him simply "handmaidens of theology." That such was the case in his masterpiece, he himself several times went out of his way to point out.

> Our line of inquiry in *The Idea of the Holy*, was directed toward Christian theology and not towards religious history or the psychology of religion.[7] This book had its origin in efforts to provide in my lectures for myself and my pupils an approach to the profoundest of all Christian intuitions which I perceived to be both indicated and concealed in the Orthodox constructions of the doctrines of "reconciliation," and which did not seem to me to have been found in the essays of Ritschl on *Justification and Reconciliation*.[8]

Theological issues are equally basic in all of Otto's other important studies and translations of religious thought. Of the large number of essays that were added to later German editions of *Das Heilige* the more significant were selected and published separately in 1932 under the title, *Sin and Original Guilt*. (Most of these are included in the English volume of Otto's *Religious Essays*.) His volume on mysticism and his comparison of Christianity with India's religion of grace are devoted primarily to a consideration of the meaning of salvation. And even his earlier work on the philosophy

7. *Religious Essays*, p. 30.
8. *India's Religion of Grace*, p. 105 n.

of Fries is motivated, as already suggested, by a predominantly theological purpose. This is quite explicitly indicated in the second half of its title and in its subtitle, neither of which are included in the English translation.[9]

In every instance, however, theology for Otto is primarily an historico-psychological "science of religion," designed to provide understanding of concrete religious experience; it is not a dogmatic or systematic exposition of Christian faith. As a result, there is large similarity between his approach and that adopted by the contemporary phenomenological school in Germany. Indeed, his own significant contribution to modern theology may well be described as a penetrating and highly suggestive "phenomenology of religion."

III

Otto's work as a whole, whether practical or theoretical, devotional or theological, historical or philosophical, is dominated by one unifying principle—an almost passionate insistence upon the autonomy of religion. The notion of religious autonomy, as he develops it, contains three essential elements: (1) the psychological uniqueness of religion in immediate personal experience, by which the specifically religious is unmistakably set apart from all man's moral, aesthetic or intellectual interests; (2) an autonomous religious valuation and interpretation of human life and destiny, similar to our moral and aesthetic judgments of value, and equally ultimate and objective in human consciousness; and (3) an intuitive awareness in religious experience of the eternal nature of things, independent of and more basic than the rational scientific description of the universe. In this interpretation of religion Otto draws together and reformulates in original terms the cardinal insights of the greatest figures in modern German theology. Luther and Kant, Schleiermacher and Ritschl, Fries and Troeltsch; all contribute to his mature concept of religious autonomy.

Already in Otto's early study of Luther, *Die Anschauung vom heiligen Geiste bei Luther*, there is clear recognition of a specific type of experience, characteristically religious in nature, existing in its own right alongside moral and aesthetic experience, and possessing

9. *Kantisch-Friessche Religionsphilosophie und ihre Anwendung auf die Theologie.* Zur Einleitung in die Glaubenslehre für Studenten der Theologie.

its own claim to validity over against the rational, scientific interpretation of reality.

> Whether one account for the religious experience as one aspect of feeling in general, or as a special capacity for the supersensible, in any case that which we call religious experience comes into being as soon as the religious object is consciously perceived, in accord with exactly the same compulsion of psychological motivation through which our moral or aesthetic experience arises when a corresponding object comes into consciousness. . . . The religious feeling has rightful claim to its own scope, unimpaired and unobstructed. It should not allow itself to be curtailed or eliminated in favor of other plausible trains of thought; and it might well be the task of theology to reexamine that crushing chain of empirical relationships until it can find place for an answer to the question how religion is possible—and possible, moreover, in uncurtailed form.[10]

The influence here of Schleiermacher as well as of Luther is obvious. And in an essay published a few years later, "How Schleiermacher Rediscovered Religion" (1903), Otto also insisted in the same fashion upon the uniqueness and independence of the religious consciousness that Schleiermacher had so appealingly depicted.[11] Recognizing clearly that the rising prestige of the natural sciences offered a serious challenge to the independence of religion, Otto soon turned his attention to the conflict between the two. In 1904 he published a study of *Naturalism and Religion* (*Naturalistische und religiöse Weltansicht*), which Sir J. Arthur Thomson translated into English in 1907, as an important contribution to the subject. The claims of religious faith are defended here largely through the medium of a spirited attack upon naturalism itself. A careful analysis of scientific thought at the turn of the century convinced Otto that scientific naturalism left the more significant and meaningful aspects of life and human personality entirely unaccounted for. The roots of religion he found in depths of spiritual experience that completely escape the grasp of natural science.[12]

This early attempt to validate religious faith increased Otto's interest in the Friesian idealism which Leonard Nelson was just then reviving at Göttingen. In the philosophy of Fries he discovered a convincing logical and systematic development of the position color-

10. *Die Anschauung vom heiligen Geiste*, pp. 48, 96.
11. See *Religious Essays*, Essay VIII.
12. *Naturalism and Religion*, pp. 43-65, 295-350.

fully suggested but left in romantic ambiguity in Schleiermacher's *Addresses on Religion.*[13] For a time, therefore, he gave himself enthusiastically to the Neo-Friesian movement inaugurated by Nelson. But gradually the broad historical and psychological analysis of religious experience which he undertook in his later studies forced Otto to modify the Friesian idealism adopted so unreservedly in his early *Philosophy of Religion.* He came to see that Fries, while presenting effectively the rational and moral foundation of religion, had missed the uniquely religious element therein. Influenced by the theory of Ernst Troeltsch, Otto accordingly in *The Idea of the Holy* substitutes for the rational Apriori upon which Fries had based religious faith an autonomous religious Apriori.

The concept of religious autonomy, as formulated in *The Idea of the Holy* and developed in Otto's later studies, constitutes an original and enduring contribution to modern theology. Here Schleiermacher's notion of piety, Ritschl's independent religious value-judgment, and Troeltsch's religious Apriori, are synthesized in striking fashion to provide an interpretation of religion more discerning and comprehensive than that of any of Otto's predecessors. Only in terms of this principle of religious autonomy, moreover, can the underlying unity and originality of Otto's mature position be appreciated. The psychological, axiological and epistemological elements that he distinguishes in the religious consciousness are separate but essential aspects of an a priori religious category of meaning and value. In the *sensus numinis,* as he so graphically portrays it, this autonomous religious interpretation and valuation finds immediate emotional expression. In the category of the *holy,* it is given a more developed but mediate axiological formulation; in religious myth or *ideogram* a conceptual but necessarily symbolic epistemological statement.

When related to contemporary theological tendencies in Germany, Great Britain and the United States, the large significance of Otto's interpretation of religion becomes apparent. His concept of religious autonomy not only distinguishes his thought effectively from the Barthian theology, despite the many apparent similarities between the two, but likewise reveals unmistakably the superiority of Otto's position. Indeed, it is quite evident that the followers of Barth, when

13. See *The Philosophy of Religion,* pp. 15, 23.

identifying the presence of God in the crises of life and the Word of God in the Bible, are covertly introducing as their criterion just such an independent religious category of meaning and value as that defined by Otto. Until this fact is recognized, their "theocentric theology" will be left with no defense against the vagaries of religious fanaticism.

Otto's concrete and definitive formulation of the autonomy of religion also has a much needed contribution to make to the "new supernaturalism" that has gradually taken shape in the writings of Reinhold and Richard Niebuhr, John Oman, B. H. Streeter, and Charles A. Bennett. These men all build in some sense upon an autonomous religious consciousness of meaning and value, yet none have defined and validated this religious autonomy with Otto's precision and comprehensiveness. The influences now at work in British and American theology will thus almost certainly lead to greater appreciation of Otto's interpretation of religion and also perhaps to further clarification and development of his cardinal insights.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Individual and His Society. The Psychodynamics of Primitive Social Organization. By Abram Kardiner. With a Foreword and two Ethnological Reports by Ralph Linton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. xxvi + 503 pp. $3.50.

The aim of this substantial book is to introduce a method of investigating the psychodynamics of human societies. It represents a type of exploration much needed in the social sciences today. Dr. Kardiner believes that Freud developed "the most powerful analytic instruments yet devised" not only for individual but also for social psychology. But Freud combined his analytic method with a phylogenetic viewpoint which was "heavily tinctured with Haeckelian evolutionary biology; this was a part of the scientific atmosphere of the late nineteenth century and continued for a long time to influence psychoanalytic theory." With such an orientation Freud, Reik, and Roheim could only view different societies and their cultures as representing various stages in the evolution of a universal human nature. Their theories of instinct, of recapitulation, and of primal origins constrained them to a very limited use of the data of comparative anthropology and its suggestions as to the manifold influence of social institutions upon human behavior. Hence "psychoanalytic sociology . . . found itself supporting the errors of the evolutionary school of thought in sociology with a psychological 'proof.'" But as Dr. Kardiner says:

> The phylogenetic orientation of Freud has long since been discarded by the other social sciences as false and misleading. A new orientation based on the study of cultures as functioning units finds its best expression in Malinowski, Ruth Benedict, and Ralph Linton. From the psychoanalytic side such a revised orientation came from the introduction of the methods of historical materialism into psychoanalytic sociology. This was most effectively done by Erich Fromm and Wilhelm Reich. This orientation has been strongly endorsed by others, notably K. Horney and F. Alexander (p. 404).

In these terms Dr. Kardiner describes the setting of his present methodological enterprise within the context of recent social science and psychology.

The Individual and His Society is a book divided into three parts.

Part I, entitled "Methodological," introduces the basic orientations and working concepts aimed to fuse analysis of individual experience and of cultural phenomena into a science of social psychodynamics. A long chapter gives some indication of how these concepts and orientations derive from psychoanalytic work in our own culture. Two further chapters then present the problem of applying such viewpoints and concepts to other societies and cultures. The treatment includes brief accounts of their application to Trobriand, Zuni, Kwakiutl, Chuckchee and Eskimo cultures. Dr. Kardiner acknowledges his indebtedness to Drs. Ruth Benedict, Ruth Bunzel, and Cora DuBois for their reports and discussion of these cultures in his seminars at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. In 1937 Dr. Ralph Linton joined the seminar and acted as informant on certain further cultures of which he had had firsthand experience. This role he carries over into Part II of the present book, entitled "Descriptive," which contains two accounts by Dr. Linton of "Marquesan Culture" and of "The Tanala of Madagascar." Dr. Kardiner follows each of these accounts with a separate chapter of analysis according to his proposed method. In Part III of the book, called "Theoretical," he adds two final chapters on psychological principles, the first of which critically "reviews the history of psychoanalytic social psychology," while the last recapitulates and defends the principles and technique here offered for a more fruitful union of psychology and sociology.

Dr. Kardiner's fundamental thesis is that different "primary institutions" create different personality structures, and that the latter in turn create different "secondary institutions." "The primary institutions are those which create the basic and inescapable problems of adaptation. The secondary institutions are creations of the result of the primary institutions on basic personality structure" (p. 345). "Among the primary institutions are family organization, in-group formation, basic disciplines, feeding, weaning, institutionalized care or neglect of children, anal training, and sexual taboos including aim, object, or both, subsistence techniques, etc. Among the secondary institutions are taboo systems, religion, ritual, folktales, and techniques of thinking" (p. 471). By *basic personality structure* Dr. Kardiner means "the effective adaptive tools of the individual which are common to every individual in the society" (p. 237). It refers to the common range of potentialities which a culture creates, within which

all individual character differences are contained as variations. "The basic personality structure stands midway between primary and secondary institutions." Indeed, it is the dynamic ground of their integration in the social psychology here proposed. Features of both sets of institutions are grown into the thought processes, attitude toward objects, security system, and "super-ego" formation, which pertain to the basic personality structure in any given culture.

Within the theoretical framework thus outlined the psychoanalytic character of Dr. Kardiner's method should be noted together with certain qualifications and limitations which he explicitly states. The resources developed by psychoanalysis in the treatment of neuroses offer a fine instrument for a general exploration of such phenomena as repressions, dependencies, identifications, anxieties, frustrations, and hostilities. It is largely under these aspects that Dr. Kardiner views the effects of primary institutions upon personality structure and its basic adaptations which constitute a secondary set of institutions. Such a procedure presupposes a continuity between neurotic and normal motivations of which it is often difficult to convince the layman. Dr. Kardiner's presentation of his position is pretty effective in this respect, and one is the more prepared to receive what a method can disclose when its one-sidedness is so frankly admitted as it here is in the following words from the end of the Author's Preface.

> Psychoanalytic technique is at the present time capable of evaluating personality only from the line of sight established by repression and frustration; it does not yet have reliable criteria for pursuing the joyful and creative aspects of personality. This is a limitation of the method and not, as may appear, a conception of the human personality (p. xxiv).

Another respect in which Dr. Kardiner's method follows psychoanalytic lines is in the emphasis laid, when considering primary institutions, upon their effect on the child and the formation of his early constellations. Yet such effects are not viewed as sufficient causes but rather as the "groundwork of subsequent integrations." Consistent stress is put, not upon isolated units of childhood experience and discipline, but rather upon the more pervasive adaptations then made *and* their continuation and modification by institutional arrangements later encountered. Dr. Kardiner's whole tendency is to emphasize, over against both phylogenetic and ontogenetic fatalism, the large opportunities for manifold adaptation and institutional control af-

forded by the relative plasticity of man's common biological endowment.

The qualifications and limitations of method so definitely recognized by the author should be remembered in judging of his conclusions. It is necessary to remember also that his whole book aims, by exposition and illustration, to introduce a method rather than to establish conclusions concerning specific cultures, which will depend for their correctness on more data and further comparisons. "Twenty or thirty cultures studied in the manner here delineated will offer safe ground," the author believes, "for generalizations based on reliable comparisons." Meanwhile, those who value scientific reliability will keep all these indicated reservations in mind before even so plausible a conclusion, for example, as the following:

> From (Marquesan) culture (*i.e.*, from the present study of it), in contrast to our own, romantic love appears as a "hysteroid" phenomenon, the accentuation of which must be related to the overemphasis of the protective aspects of parenthood, and strong sexual aim and object taboos. . . . But a good deal more comparative study of the sociological sources of romantic love is necessary (p. 207).

The reader must have inferred, from what has been said, that fundamental questions of psychological theory are involved in this essay. Dr. Kardiner apologizes for the amount of space devoted to the discussion of such questions, but, in the opinion of this reviewer, special merit attaches to these sections, such as Chapter IX. Here will be found some extremely good observations on the nature of psychological constructs, a very pertinent comment on the topological methods of Lewin and Brown, as well as the longer critical review of the history of psychoanalytic social psychology, which forms the main body of the chapter. Dr. Kardiner's fundamental criticism of Freud's theory is that it has "a distinct biological bias from the evolutionary standpoint to the disparagement of what we now call a sociological orientation." Freud undertakes to trace the destinies of instincts, under the influence of large phylogenetically determined repressions to the neglect and distortion of "the modalities of ego organization" as affected by many particular social arrangements. The Oedipus complex, according to Freud, is a universal pattern that "creates social organization" instead of being itself, as Dr. Kardiner aims to show, "the expression of a definite series of primary institutions."

> The capacity for repression is phylogenetic. . . . The circumstances under which this dynamism of repression is brought into play depends on sociological factors, *i.e.*, upon cultural institutions (p. 407).
>
> It is partly the task of this book to show that the introduction of the actual institutional realities as a prime factor in mobilizing repressive forces in the individual leads to different interpretation of facts so accurately noted by Freud (p. 134, note).

The "super-ego," Dr. Kardiner notes, is not a compartment of the mind, but a mental function in connection with the social environment. "The stability of a culture which demands important impulse renunciations does not depend on a compartment of the mind called the super-ego, but upon those forces in the society which keep the super-ego in line." Dr. Kardiner, by the way, uses the term Ego to designate the total personality as subjectively perceived, while the "ego," "super-ego," and even the "id" of the Freudian scheme are each functional variables in this totality. He approves Fromm's view "that ego and super- ego are not natural phenomena but depend for their existence and character on the life-practices." The particularly careful scrutiny which Dr. Kardiner from his point of view gives to specific conditions shaping attitudes of dependency, authority, and discipline is a notable feature of the present book. But the same point of view is also brought to bear very effectively, in the course of discussion, on a host of other topics, such as aggression, identification, ingratiation, prestige, projection, and many more.

The present reviewer has learned much about these topics from this interesting book. He can not bring to their discussion the experience which another analyst might. But several observations which would occur to anyone concerned with the social sciences may be briefly mentioned. Dr. Kardiner says that the problem of the origin of "primary institutions" is beyond the scope of psychology without the aid of history. Does not the same hold true for "secondary institutions" as well? To be sure, if Dr. Kardiner's thesis is correct "that primary institutions create certain constellations, then secondary institutions in society must satisfy the needs and tensions created by the primary or fixed ones" (p. 476). But it does not follow that those psychological constellations are the sufficient cause of the secondary institutions, which obviously draw for their formation upon all sorts of historical material. A basic food anxiety in a culture, like that of

the Marquesans, may indeed be a dynamic ground for a cannibalistic ritual of feeding the god, without being its sufficient cause or explanation. Probably Dr. Kardiner would grant this, and also that the differentiation of "primary" and "secondary institutions" presents difficulties which he has not discussed any too thoroughly. Furthermore, the author is clearly aware that his method implies an element of psycho-biological unity in man throughout the diversity of cultures, but he provides no precise criterion for this as it affects his specific problems. To say "the conclusions that Freud reached were derived from the study of individuals in our culture, and hence were not necessarily valid for human nature generally" is a pertinent criticism. And it is obvious that the different orientation toward comparative anthropology here proposed is designed to remedy this. But it is less clear within what limits this has been or indeed can be accomplished.

These difficulties are not mentioned by way of opposing the general directions of this book. On the contrary, the best way of reducing them would seem to be by pursuing the project further. The extension of this method's implications for the study and interpretation of religion is of particular interest to the present reviewer. Dr. Kardiner discusses religious data quite frequently in this book, but fragmentarily and chiefly as symptoms of other conditions. Though in this field, too, he is critical of earlier Freudian formulations, nevertheless the illusory nature of religion seems to be largely taken for granted. Yet it may be questioned whether the implications of his method have been as consistently carried through in this matter as they might be. Religion as a "secondary institution," in Dr. Kardiner's scheme, is a complex derivative of other institutions, and the psychological constellations that these create in the basic personality structure. Its noetic properties and values, therefore, may be expected to vary considerably according to the nature of its cultural determinants. If the institutions of a culture are such as to favor scientific habits of mind, the element of illusion in the religion of that culture—granted that it may be fed from other sources—has at least a chance to diminish. Among the components of basic personality structure Dr. Kardiner includes "techniques of thinking," and he implies throughout that these are influenced by social arrangements. And yet, on the first page of the text, one is confronted by the statement that "a psychology which elects to study the cognitive and apperceptive functions of man does not make contact at any point with sociology. The only psy-

chology directly linked with sociology is one whose chief interest is the affective or emotional life of man." Students of epistemology will take note of this not unfamiliar dichotomy so inconsistently restricting the author's point of view.

Dr. Kardiner is happily and effectively critical, however, of a certain type of crude generalization to be found in psychoanalytic literature, such as the derivation of animism from narcissism and of all belief in demons from the observation of parental intercourse by the child (Roheim) (pp. 106, 391). And besides these criticisms, he contributes, it seems to the present reviewer, some very valuable positive directives for the study of the emotive aspects of religion. Among these are the identification by searching means of the specific anxieties in a culture, arising from both natural and social sources, as clues to functions undertaken by its religion. Secondly, "the character of the disciplines imposed on the child" furnishes a main ground for the effectiveness and meaning of "the technique used to solicit aid from the deity." The elaboration of this familiar enough idea with fresh and varied evidences leads finally to a third important point. "The religious practice or ritual is a product not of the primary institution directly, but of the constellation produced by it in the individual. . . . The actual practices in the religion are comprehensible only in terms of the constellation in the basic personality structure created by these early disciplines" (p. 469). This interposition of the individual and his reactions between the two sets of institutions is indeed an item of considerable consequence in the interpretation of religion. Emphasis on the individual in the theory of religion has sometimes been introduced to celebrate a mystery, but in the present case the aim is to provide a more adequate continuous structure for intelligible interpretation. The individual has a nature which partakes of his society and vice versa.

The interdependence of the individual and his society has long been a living and central theme of western moral and social philosophy. The study of it from a viewpoint combining Freudian psychology and functional anthropology offers great promise of increased insight. And this is the more true, when as in the present case, the matter is approached in an empirical spirit and with the desire to achieve, as nearly as possible, a procedure amenable to experimental control.

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Religion in Primitive Society. By Wilson D. Wallis. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1939. ix + 388 pp. $5.00.

In *Religion in Primitive Society* Professor Wallis has adopted the presentation of *The Golden Bough*. He has provided more generalization and running comment than the classic, but, in the same way, his examples of religious belief and practice are chosen from a wide variety of geographical locations and historic periods. The range of these examples is remarkably broad, including not only the peoples generally recognized as "primitive," identified sometimes by tribal names and sometimes by culture area designations, but also better known religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. This by no means exhausts the list, for Assyrians, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, and Saxons are likewise quoted, and there is occasional mention of contemporary cults. Both the text and the long bibliography show that Professor Wallis, who is primarily an anthropologist, is familiar with the specialized references of that field and equally familiar with the literature and philosophy which form so large a part of our cultural heritage.

The total effect of this richness of quotation and citation is to blur over, almost to erase, the distinction between primitive and other societies posited by the title. This is, indeed, the major contribution of the volume. The material has been arranged about general topics emphasized by comparative religionists: *Sacred Places, Sacred Animals, Sacred Persons, The Gods, Offering and Sacrifice, Prayer, The Life after Death,* etc. In such an arrangement are to be found none of the features employed by scholars who stress the distinctive "primitiveness" of certain religions existing beyond the influence of relatively recent, high cultures of Asia and Europe. No special attention is expended upon shamans or shamanism; the first mention of animism is upon page 133, and the concept is nowhere exclusively expounded; magic is treated incidentally with other topics, rather than isolated and held up as peculiar. Dealt with in such fashion, the primitive merges almost imperceptibly into the civilized.

The organization of the book implies a unit of human behavior, religion, a unit apparent in all human societies and presumably, therefore, supplying some basic human need.

Professor Wallis explicitly states that the "religious attitude . . .

characterizes all cultures and every stage of history" (p. 1), and he develops this view throughout the book, gradually revealing that religion "abundantly reflects the culture medium" (p. 300). Neither of these views, the universality of religion nor the importance of culture to religious content, are exactly new. They have both been treated before, notably by Friess and Schneider in *Religion in Various Cultures*. The present volume adds to them only a rather limited use of the anthropological concept of the culture area. Yet the observations themselves are sound as well as stimulating, and their reiteration is of value.

In conjunction with observations of this sort, it is rather surprising to find throughout the book a distinction between "preliterate" and "historic" societies. Knowledge of writing, with the consequent accumulation of fact and, under the best conditions, of idea adds so materially to the wealth of a culture that its importance can hardly be exaggerated. The standard, however, which classes the cultures of Mexico (p. 303), with their high degree of literacy and their mathematical sophistication, as preliterate is a standard which confuses literacy with historicity. The "historic societies" are apparently those whose written history is known to us today. European culture has profited greatly from its literary knowledge of its own antecedents and from written accounts of other peoples. That these historical documents effected, in any direct manner, the cultures which they recorded, however, is doubtful. The distinction between preliterate and literate societies may well be exceedingly fruitful, but literacy and historicity are not strictly comparable, and to draw a distinction between them can yield little to the study of cultural dynamics.

In tearing his examples of religion out of their cultural content, and in piling item upon item irrespective of historical and cultural setting, Professor Wallis runs counter to the marked modern tendency to regard cultures as functioning wholes and to insist that single traits have meaning only within the whole. This method, however, allows a re-examination of certain definitions and concepts which appear in discussions of religion. For instance, the chapter on prayer cites the logic behind the assumption that praying involves an animistic being capable of hearing and responding to supplication. Despite this "logic," the chapter ends by pointing out that the "Mediterranean cultures seem to be the only ones in which the development of anthropomor-

phism is correlated with the development of prayer" (p. 146). Turning to the oft repeated contention that religion and ethics are closely bound together, a suggestion is made to the effect that the influence of religion on conduct "is often degrading rather than elevating" (p. 196). One wishes that such examination of widely accepted assumptions had been carried further.

Throughout, Professor Wallis demonstrates his awareness of the problems which puzzle students of religion: the rise of new cults; the relations between religion and economics, religion and organized social living, religion and war. But he fails to bring the full force of his material to bear upon them.

At the base of religion Professor Wallis discerns the emotion of fear or awe. "When no fear enters, there is no religion" (p. 323). With Hume and others, he calls the fundamental of religion an emotional response to the extraordinary and sees a growing naturalism, or naturalistic interpretation of phenomena, reduce the realm of the supernatural and, consequently, of religion. Reaction to the unknown he finds to be common to all animal life, giving cases in which the beasts themselves are startled and terrified by the unusual. The same attitude expresses itself through the elaborate ramifications of religion: gods are "foci of the holy" (p. 86); ritual is "the standardized and socially approved technique for dealing with the incalculable element in life's critical situations" (p. 147); and ancestor worship is a misnomer for a cult of the dead based, in turn, on fear of the ghost. These interpretations are thoroughly consistent with the original premise.

The adequacy with which this hypothesis describes or explains the total field of religion has been frequently discussed, and other factors have been pointed out. These other factors, seen by some scholars to be involved in the body of religious belief and behavior, are completely pertinent to the religions of preliterate societies. However, they do not concern Professor Wallis, who carries through to a plea designed to dispel the fear connected with that imponderable, death, and closes his volume:

> What is man that he should rival God in length of days? Let him have his life and, having lived it, his death. Death is the birthright of all things that live, the reward and penalty of life itself. Birth gives us an opportunity to

play our roles as human nature; death, an opportunity to play our roles as nature.

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L'Homme et le Sacré: Mythes et Religions. By ROGER CAILLOIS. Paris: Librairie Ernest Leroux, 1939. xi + 148 pp. Fr. 18.

M. Caillois' theory of the sacred, as presented in *L'Homme et le Sacré,* is dependent upon M. Durkheim in his emphasis on the importance of society and the social impulse in the creation of the supernatural. Beyond that, however, it might almost be described as a metaphysics of the sacred. M. Caillois asserts, first, that the sacred is defined in terms of the profane, and vice versa. The profane he defines as that which is regular, the force of conservation, the unchanging. The sacred, on the other hand, is the vital force, the source of life and of change. Both are dangerous to each other. The whole of religious life within a society consists of the keeping of the balance of nature implicit in the opposition and mutual dependence between sacred and profane. The order of society follows the order of nature. Therefore, taboos and magic rituals consist of keeping apart in man's life the products of those things which are apart and different in the life of nature: e.g., the food eaten by different totem animals as well as the animals themselves among the Australian tribes; that which has its birth in the summer season from the products of winter among the Arctic peoples; those things possessing male or female qualities (*yang* or *yin*) among the Chinese. Therefore, further, sacrifice is a matter of giving up something of value in the realm of the profane in order to gain, by a mechanical working of the balances in the order of nature, something of even greater value in the realm of the sacred. This explanation of sacrifice may be characterized as a *do ut das* which ignores the recipient and giver in a complete trust in the working out of the all embracing law of the universe.

Since M. Caillois considers ritual separation as a following of the order of the universe, he holds the laws of totemism and exogamy to be part of the social exchange necessary between opposing groups. That is, in totemistic groups, the totem cherished by one phratry is given as food to the other, the women forbidden to one phratry are

the destined wives of another. He holds the existence of society to be based upon such an exchange. One phratry produces food and women for the other, and so is linked in both opposition and service to the other tribe. M. Caillois finds exogamy explicable in terms of women *owed* to the opposing phratry, rather than in terms of women forbidden to those of their own blood; that is, positively, and in terms of a command, rather than negatively, and in terms of a prohibition. While M. Caillois indicates that this approach is not his own contribution, it is an interesting one, and worthy of consideration in the further study of this most teasing of all problems in the realm of primitive religion.

Since the day to day relations between sacred and profane consist in maintaining in society that order which exists in the universe, M. Caillois is faced with the problem of explaining the break in ordinary social usage, in taboo, the reversal of all daily ritual and prescription which occurs on the occasion of the feast. This M. Caillois does by postulating that the feast is the time of the renewal of life, when man, by imitating mythical times, the time of the rule of Chaos and the creation of the world, draws on the deep sources of being for the rejuvenating of a world that is wearing out. M. Caillois holds the feast to be primarily the *new year's* feast, the time of the change from one season to another. The license which is necessary at the New Year is the reversal of the typical order and brings man again to the beginning of things, the truly new, untouched time in which life and vigor originates. M. Caillois holds that the initiation feast comes within this category. It is, indeed, the initiation feast which is the source of his understanding of the time of myths, since M. Caillois holds that the belief in the chaos and state of bliss which existed in the time of myths is a reflection of man's memory of his individual infancy: man sentimentalizes his infancy and believes it to have been at once without restraint, chaotic and blissful. Further, the time of myths is, according to *L'Homme et le Sacré,* a reflection of the time before the initiation ceremonies, when the young man is not yet subject to taboos concerning either food or women. As a matter of fact, this last assumption seems based on a false interpretation of the evidence: to the best of this reviewer's knowledge, the uninitiated youth is subject to different and frequently less stringent taboos than the initiated man, but rules of taboo apply to the youth, and also,

certainly, to the women, who, in some cases, never receive any form of initiation.

M. Caillois' theory is an interesting one, containing many suggestions which may prove fruitful to further investigation. It is, however, an entirely self-consistent theory. And this, in itself, renders it suspect to this reviewer. It must be remembered, in the study of primitive religions, that we are dealing with the mind and impulses of primitive man. And primitive man never heard of Occam's razor; it is very doubtful that primitive man attempts to explain things in one self-consistent metaphysics. Malinowski criticizes Frazer's definition of magic, insisting that it makes primitive man a philosopher; the approach here reviewed makes of primitive man a metaphysician of most exquisite economy. And while it is possible to question the assertion that primitive man is never a philosopher, it is impossible to believe that, within the false premises which must be granted to him, he has the clarity and rationality which characterizes the best school of French philosophy.

E. Louise Mally

New York City

Civilization in East and West. By H. N. Spalding. London: The Oxford University Press, 1939. xi + 334 pp. $4.25.

This is a most difficult book to review. Even a brief critical consideration of its account of a vast wealth of details of human civilization and of the ideas involved in them would fill a volume larger than itself. Yet, for a proper judgment of it, such an examination would be required, because the manner in which the author has arranged his material and the kind of interpretation he has given to much of it, depend on a general philosophical, or, as he might say, religious attitude. Evident throughout to the close observer, that attitude comes to open expression in the later chapters. Mr. Spalding is quite obviously well informed in the fields of knowledge involved in his wide subject. Though the compactness of its style makes the reading of the book slow, it contains much fine writing and is on the whole even inspiring.

The fairest way to give a general idea of the book is to enumerate the chapter headings. 1, "The Biological State," is a brief consideration of the social aspects of primitive human life and the rise of

egoistic individuality. II, "The Materialist State," surveys the various types of dictatorships and nationalisms in history which have aimed primarily and predominantly at mundane aggrandisement. III, "The Moral State," treats of (1) China and (2) the Nordics, as governed pre-eminently by a merely humanistic morality. IV, "The Moral-Spiritual State," is represented in the life and thought of (1) Israel, (2) Islam, and (3) Catholicism, in which morality is related to a transcendent deity and the type of society is really a Theocracy. V, "The Spiritual State," has the subdivisions, (1) Hinduism, (2) Buddhism, and (3) Holy Russia. Mr. Spalding's account of Hinduism is *advaitist*. He presents Buddhism in the main from a similar standpoint. Further, he even describes the fundamental attitudes of Holy Russia as akin to Hindu *advaitism*, actually introducing Hindu terms (in brackets) to suggest identities of meanings in Holy Russian thought and what he, in general, calls by the ambiguous term Vedantism. The general view expounded by Chapter V provides the main basis for much of the criticism throughout the book and gives the dominant note for the remaining chapters, VI, "The Prophets of the Kingdom," and VII, "The Coming of the Kingdom."

Though undoubtedly Mr. Spalding regards his work as a co-ordinated whole in which the parts are interdependent, in my opinion, three constituents of it should be considered separately. There is, first, his forceful and timely criticism of "the Materialist State" which is represented today especially by Germany and Russia. The highest aim of such a State is "material supremacy." He gives ample illustration of the failure and inadequacy of egoistic states in history and concludes: "The Sovereign Nation State is today as out of date as the City State once was." He shows how dictatorships "have been repeatedly tried and always found wanting," and that "the Materialist State (unless in Japan) has never been able to maintain itself in the past: it has always, sooner or later, issued in morality." In opposition to the "competitive scramble for wealth and power between man and man, class and class, nation and nation, Church and Church, East and West," Mr. Spalding advocates the attitude which treats "others as organic to the society to which we ourselves belong"; other nations as objects of "understanding, admiration and good will," not of aggression nor as primarily for trade; "other religions as sharers in one revelation." Thus, the second constituent of the volume is the advo-

cacy of the idea of, and work for, a universal civilization which shall take into itself the varied complementary contributions of different races and national cultures. This view is not novel, and others, including the present writer, have expounded such a conception. It is in the elaboration of this idea, by a detailed consideration of historical movements, forms of thought, and great personalities, that the one real value of Mr. Spalding's book lies. He contends that only in the light of the practical and proved ideals of the moral and spiritual civilizations, as put forward by the world's greatest teachers, "can a more stable and a happier world be built up and civilization not merely recover after today's war in Europe, but be raised to a higher and nobler plane."

The excellence with which the author has developed these constructive ideas makes it all the more regrettable that he has tied his exposition up with the third constituent of his book, an advocacy, more impassioned than enlightening, of what we may call a Hindu *advaitism.* Caught in a sort of mystic enthusiasm for the Whole, he fails to see that he involves himself either in radical inconsistency or in "throwing out the baby with the bath water." Either the evils against which he rightly inveighs are part of the Whole, and so to be mystically accepted with the goods; or they are to be considered in some unintelligible way as unreal, *maya,* due to *avidya,* and then with them are also to be included all those other "appearances" constituting the goods in human civilization. Mr. Spalding's terminology itself suggests that he has not faced the implications of this *advaitism:* the titles of his last two chapters refer to "the Kingdom" implying civilization as something social, involving selves with their experiences in relation with one another, and not a Universal One. It is futile to ignore the fact that, however sublime the author may consider the mystic state of unification (he would rather say, identification) with the Whole (That art thou), when it comes to the ideals and policies of civilization, expression in rational concepts and reference to actual real values are essential. The author appears to have been "carried away" by a type of philosophical exposition the ultimate difficulties of which he does not give evidence of having appreciated.

Mr. Spalding's treatment of the thought of India may itself be seriously criticized. He ignores completely the objections to *advaitism* raised even in India itself. With his virtual identification of *advaitism*

and *Vedantism*, the way he brings together on page 215, Sankara, Ramanuja and Madhva is likely to mislead those not adequately informed concerning Indian philosophy. There is much in the recently published Volume III of Dr. Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy* to suggest that the widespread attitudes and thought of Indian life have been actually theistic, and are closer to the position of Mr. Spalding's Chapter IV than he seems to recognize. Though an examination of details is not possible here, one example may be given of the author's vague and rhetorical statements in the later chapters, as compared with the first four chapters. Thus, on page 211 he writes: "for whereas Greek art shows the gods as men—even as superb men—Indian art, especially sculpture, shows them as gods"; and to support his *advaitist* conception of Holy Russian attitudes, he continues on pages 243-244, "just as Indian sculpture shows gods that are not men but gods, so the ikon shows the forms not of earth but of Heaven, visible not to the earthly but to the spiritual eye." That is just a flagrant attempt to produce a certain kind of impression. Passing over what Dion Chrysostom wrote as to the spiritual significance of Greek sculpture, and any reference to the actual character of Russian ikons, it must be indicated that actually in Indian art (sculpture, metal work, and painting), the representation of the gods is fundamentally anthropomorphic or theriomorphic, whatever the nature of the symbolic elaboration. For example, a great number of arms is sometimes to provide hands for holding the many symbolic objects of the deity; or, together with many legs, is to suggest the movement of the dance.

Notwithstanding his *advaitist* effusions, the author, even in his final chapter, with reference to important contemporary problems inevitably lapses to the positions of his Chapters III and IV. Thus he writes that the root contemporary problem is "political conversion" (p. 317), and that the only basis for political brotherhood is the moral virtues. The chief means to bring about this political reformation is education, which above all must culminate in the study of (remembering his *advaitism*, he adds, "at this stage") "a Personal or Moral God, the God Who has 'shown man what is good,' and requires of him that he shall 'do justly, and love mercy, and walk humbly with Him.'" Most readers are likely to be profoundly impressed by what they may describe as the author's "high idealism," but they will prob-

ably be overwhelmed if not confused by the combination of such a multiplicity of historical facts so interspersed with his not infrequently repetitive comments. There may be some who, like the present writer, will regret that he has to such an extent vitiated the whole by reliance on a questionable metaphysical doctrine and its allied form of mysticism. The author should be definitely condemned in that he expounds that doctrine and presents that mysticism without any indications of objections against them or any attempt to reply to such.

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Platonismus und Prophetismus. Die antike und die biblische Geisteswelt in strukturvergleichender Betrachtung. By JOHANNES HESSEN. München: Ernst Reinhardt, 1939. 240 pp. RM 4.80 and 6.50.

Mr. Hessen's book is divided into two principal parts: Part I, inscribed "Platonism and Prophetism," and Part II, "Platonism and Prophetism in Synthesis and Antithesis."

Part I (pp. 15-131) is concerned mainly with detailed presentations of the Platonic and Aristotelian systems and, on the other hand, of the tenets of the psalms and of the ancient Jewish prophets, especially of Amos, Ezekiel, Isaiah, and Jeremiah. This is always done with regard to the topics "Idea of God," "Idea of World," and "Idea of Man." The presentations of these two "mental worlds" are preceded by an "ontological" and an "anthropological" foundation of what Mr. Hessen calls "Platonism" and "Prophetism" respectively, considered as two different "mental attitudes" of man.

Part II (pp. 135-234) shows how these constituents of occidental civilization have been, and still are, operating by mutual attraction as well as repulsion. The various chapters marking the way of that historical development deal with St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, Luther, the later Catholic theology, the struggle for and against idealism, the so-called dialectic theology (Kierkegaard and his followers), and, finally, with phenomenology and existence-philosophy as representatives of those two "attitudes" within recent German philosophy. Pages 235-240 contain a summarizing epilogue corresponding to the introductory prologue (pp. 9-11). In almost all the sections of this book extensive quotations from the writings in ques-

tion are given by the author, who thus offers a remarkable and helpful opportunity of getting immediate impressions of all the personalities dealt with.

As he mentions in a short preface, Mr. Hessen had been troubled by his problem for more than twenty-five years. The problem itself, however, is much older. Its age is at least seventeen hundred years. It arose at the end of the second and in the first half of the third century A.D., when the chiefs of the catechist school in Alexandria set to work to interest the educated and intellectual classes in Christianity. "Pistis," operating in an emotional way only, did not suffice there. For this purpose one had to proceed from "pistis" to "gnosis." But for an undertaking like that, those men were convinced, philosophy was indispensable, although they only intended to borrow philosophy's outward appearance, while harmony with Christian faith had to be the test of truth (Clement, *Strom.* II, 4). "He who wants to reach gnosis without philosophy, dialectics, and natural science is like a man striving to reap grapes without cultivating the vine," says Clement in his *Stromateis* I, 9. Thus a first system of Christian theology could be founded by Origen, the successor of Clement. But already in the times of Pantaenus, Clement, and Origen quite another sort of men appeared who had no intention to "reap grapes" at all. Most deeply imbued with their new faith, they did not care a straw about any further arguments and even apprehended a weakening, an adulteration and undermining of real faith by any contact with Greek philosophy. That is to say: the Clement-type had to face the Tertullian-type. The Clement-type won, and the Tertullian-type lost the battle, and they have kept on winning and losing again and again in these seventeen hundred years. But the beaten Tertullian-type has not given up even today. In the beginning of this long history, Tertullian inveighed against the Greek philosophers as the "patriarchs of the heretics" (*De anima*, 3) "whose truth is only a feigned one whilst the Christ possesses it" (*De carne Christi*, 5), for "since Christ we do not need any further curiosity, nor any research since the Gospel" (*De praescript.*, 7). And likewise in our day, at the end of this period, a follower of Kierkegaard and his so-called dialectic theology has declared that there is urgent need of "accepting the biblical idea of God seriously, and of liberating this idea and, consequently, all our understanding of life from Greek philosophy in which it has been

enmeshed for these thousands of years" (E. Brunner, *Gott und Mensch*, Tübingen, 1930, p. 1). You see, it is quite the same slogan: *pistis contra gnosis*, faith *contra* theology, antithesis *contra* synthesis of religion and philosophy.

Mr. Hessen's position is particularly difficult: he is a mixture of both of these types. He is obliged to wage a continuous struggle within himself. With Faust he may complain: "Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in meiner Brust!" He quite evidently sympathizes with the defeated party. On the other hand, he understands that one cannot get through, after all, without philosophy. What is he to do? His attempt to solve the problem consists in his saying that this synthesis, being unavoidable, must be made over and over again, and in every period anew by its own means, and that one must take care not to mix with the "worth-world" of the Bible any strange elements troubling and hindering it. "Our historic conscience has become very sensitive. So it feels the actual historic synthesis as problematic." And therefore, if Christianity shall keep on living, "a good deal of the Greek element in it must disappear." With this conclusion and demand Mr. Hessen ends his book.

This appeal, however, to our historic conscience would better have been omitted. Our historic conscience is very sensitive, indeed, and that is not always considered by Mr. Hessen himself.

He places, e.g., the ancient Jewish prophets above all; in his eyes they are the pinnacle of all religion, and whatever appeared after those marvellous men is nothing but "Christian-Moslemian afterpains." (These are not Mr. Hessen's own words, but he quotes them in an important passage without any contradiction.) And, really, in the first half of the book, in the sections about "Prophetism," which are, by the way, the most beautiful ones of the whole book, he deals only with the Israelitic prophets without mentioning Christianity at all—and then, from the beginning of the second part, suddenly Prophetism is Christianity and Christianity is Prophetism, as if that were self-evident, and as if nothing had happened from Isaiah and Deutero-Isaiah to Augustine.

But also, when the other side of the barricades is concerned, historic conscience is vulnerable by lack of conscientiousness. One of the most fundamental things in Plato's philosophy is his tri-alism as to the ultimate constituents of the world: the ideas, the demiurge, and mat-

ter—each of the three has "aseity." Mr. Hessen, however, insists on identifying Plato's god with the idea of good. (It is only a consequence of this mistake that, in his description of Plato's doctrine, the chapter about the relation between god and world is wanting!) In order to suppress his contradiction of Plato's own words in the *Timaeus*, Mr. Hessen goes as far as to say that the *Timaeus* is a "popular writing (sic!) adapted to the belief of the people," and to assert that one would miss Plato's real opinion by taking literally what he has written in the *Timaeus* on God and on World (p. 34). Our sensitive historic conscience refuses to agree with a violence like that, needless to say. We willingly admit, on the other hand, that the Aristotelian teachings are presented much better. Here the outstanding part is the discussion as to whether Aristotle had the idea of "creatio mundi a deo ex nihilo" or not. We have enjoyed very much the extensive quotations from the work by Frank Luger (*Die Unsterblichkeitsfrage bei Johannes Duns Scotus. Ein Beitrag zur Rückbildung des Aristotelismus in der Scholastik*. Wien, 1933.) which is a sharp and brilliant disabling and rebuff of Franz Brentano's and E. Rolfes' odd opinions on this question. Luger's explanation of what he calls "Aristotle-disease" is, by the way, one of the most delightful passages in Mr. Hessen's book.

There are, however, other defects of beauty in this work. That it is sometimes not quite satisfactory even from a merely professional standpoint, must be mentioned. (Notions like "occurrence" and "change," or "timelessness" and "eternity," e.g., are obviously confounded over and over again.) But—which is worse—Mr. Hessen's use of his leading terms is misleading, and not only as to "Prophetism." When he says "Platonism," he means not only Aristotelism as well—which may pass—but very often philosophy in general. That is by no means legitimate. At any rate, however, he identifies Platonism with Greek philosophy on the whole, trying to justify this abuse with the argument that Platonism is "the purest manifestation of the philosophic genius of the Hellenes." This is contestable enough and alarms, indeed, our sensitive historic conscience. We should like to point out that it was Nietzsche who first uttered a very serious suspicion that "probably the grandest part of Greek thinking and of its expression in words is lost to us," and in the same writing, *Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen* (1873), he exclaims:

It is a true calamity that we have so little left of those earlier philosophic masters [*sc.*, before Plato]. Because of that loss, we unintentionally measure them in wrong proportions and become influenced against them by the mere contingency that Plato and Aristotle have never been in want of valuers and copyists.

So the philosophic genius of the Hellenes—granting that we might let pass a hypostatizing like that, somewhat poetical and, at any rate, extremely "platonistic"—certainly has its broadest and most prolix manifestation in Platonism. But one may doubt very much whether this has been its purest manifestation.

This arbitrary application of the two principal terms is obviously supposed to be justified by that "ontological and anthropological foundation" in the beginning. But this is by far the least satisfactory part of the book, and if we had to take it all seriously men like Kant or Hobbes or Schopenhauer would not be allowed to be called philosophers any longer. More historic consciousness, more solid and serious psychology, and less "ontology," would have been very helpful for the author's attempt to solve his problem.

Platonism and Prophetism is an attractive superscription, a title really excellent. But in this case it turns out, after all, to be excellent only from the view of a headline-maker.

Felix M. L. Cleve

New York City

A Companion to the Bible. Edited by T. W. Manson. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. xii + 515 pp. $5.00.

The title of this book adequately describes its contents, a series of essays by British scholars as subjects of major concern to students of the Bible. It is a substitute neither for a thorough analysis of literary problems nor for a full treatment of the history lying behind the literature, but includes a brief statement of both and adds supplementary matter of interest and importance. In addition to chapters on introduction to the Old and New Testaments, on the history and religion of Israel, the life of Jesus, and the history and doctrine of the Apostolic Age, there are discussions of the Biblical languages, geography and archeology, angelology, Biblical ethics, the worship of the Temple and the synagogue, the beginnings of Christian life, its organization and liturgy, and convenient appendices on chronology,

weights, measures and money. The advantage of this manner of presentation is that it permits specialized handling of individual topics, but it fails to secure evenness of quality or a unified point of view.

Speaking generally, the essays on the Old Testament are greatly superior to those on the New. Professor Mullo-Weir's brief discussion of Hebrew and Aramaic is admirable in describing not only the historical development, connection and distribution of these languages, but also in enabling the English reader to understand the effectiveness and disabilities of their idioms for various kinds of literary style. Canon Phythian-Adams's unusually lucid and lively account of Palestinian geography makes clear the importance of the country's physical formation as a factor in its history. Dr. Jack's chapter on archeology deals with both the material products of culture and the complicated ethnic problems of ancient oriental history which no longer lie only on the periphery of the Biblical student's interest. In this connection Hooke draws attention to recent documentary discoveries at Ras Shamra and elsewhere, and points out their significance for a new estimate of Canaanite religion as a background for the religion of the Hebrews. Rowley's introduction to the literature of the Old Testament is a compact statement of contemporary critical opinion. Oesterley's essay on the apocrypha and pseudepigrapha is much less satisfactory, and his treatment of angelology and demonology in early Judaism lacks depth and breadth of historical perspective.

The two most important contributions to Old Testament study are T. H. Robinson's sketch of Israelite history and Wheeler Robinson's of the religious development in the Old Testament. The former is a masterly summary of his larger work and invites comparison with Wellhausen's classic *brevis* as an illustration of the advance of knowledge in this field during the last generation. The most obvious gains have come from archeological research, but hardly less important have been the critical task of fitting Israelite history into the larger pattern of international relations in the Near East, and the increasing interest in social and economic factors. The latter has been especially fruitful for an understanding (a) of the transition from the nomadic to agricultural life in the age of patriarchs and "judges," (b) of the effects of too rapid urbanization and centralization in the early monarchy, and (c) of the position of the prophets and social and economic

forces of which they were both the most notable products and the severest critics.

The change in historical perspective during the last twenty years is even more apparent in Wheeler Robinson's essay on the religion of the Old Testament. For the early period our knowledge of the religious life of Canaan has been enormously increased by archeological material from Palestine itself. On the other hand, the critical uncertainty which surrounds the literary tradition prompts much greater caution than formerly in reconstructing the religion which the Hebrews brought with them. Yahweh appears to have been a Midianite mountain god of thunder, lightning, and storm, but the legislation and cultus with which he is associated is a composite of agricultural and nomadic elements, and it is far from certain that the latter was the dominant feature of a religious reform introduced into Canaan by the Hebrews.

The first step in the development of Hebrew religious genius was taken when the story of the deliverance of the southern tribes from th Egyptian bondage was transformed into a national epos in which the rescued tribes appeared as a people deliberately chosen by Yahweh and favored by him in all their subsequent history. The prophets were the guardians and interpreters of this covenant of election. In uncompromising opposition to the laxity and luxury of Canaanite religion which reflected normally the material and cultural progress of Palestine, they emphasized the simple but stern demands of an earlier Yahweh and the severer standards of nomadic existence. Religion became moral rather than ceremonial—a process completed by Jeremiah—and in the Exile didactic replaced sacrificial forms. After the return the Torah took its place beside the Temple, while the Wisdom Literature broadened the view of ethical responsibility and its religious significance. Wisdom which was shared by God and man was raised to a status of more than a personification, if less than a person, and a combination of Greek and Jewish ideas was effected which was to prove no less fruitful for Christian than for Jewish theology. In the Greek period apocalyptic writers advocated a doctrine of immortality and systematized Israel's hopes for a glorious future, while the precursors of the Rabbis brought the expanded Jewish ethic into casuistic relation with the Law.

It is obvious that a marked Pauline bias has influenced this reconstruction. It is useful to be reminded how "censored" a version of Palestinian religion the Old Testament presents, but the new facts and varied estimates are not fully accounted for in this too rigid scheme. The emphasis on Yahweh's personal initiative in choosing Israel was not decisive in the earliest notions of Israel's election, and the idea of protection and guidance by the tribal or national god was familiar to Oriental religious mentality. Novelty set in when conscience challenged national success, and the horizon of a national theology was evidenced by appeals to principles which could only be lodged in the Being of God Himself. If God backed universal right against national wrong (Amos and Hosea), and could use Israel's enemies to punish them by defeat and misfortune, then his control must be super-national (Isaiah), and the reconciliation of even painful vicissitudes with his will and purpose a religious obligation (2nd Isaiah). The emphasis on God's initiative broadened in the course of this experience but must not be read back into the beginnings. "History," as Wheeler Robinson says, "in manner and content is indeed the ultimate sacrament of Israel," but it was a sacrament the form and matter of which required a long period of development. I suspect that, in post-exilic Judaism, the notion of Wisdom was an equally "sacramental" idea and, along with the apocalyptic visions, overshadowed the religious appreciation of the past until the beginnings of the Rabbinic movement.

In contrast with the fresh and stimulating treatment of Old Testament questions, the essays on the New Testament are pedestrian and slight. A satisfactory treatment of the Gentile environment is most conspicuous by its absence, which seriously impairs the value of the whole book as a guide to Biblical study. Hellenistic religion, to borrow Nock's phrase, is dismissed in two pages on Asiatic cults at the end of Calder's summary of the geography and ethnology of Asia Minor. Manson's presentation of the literary problems opens with the current assumption that preaching led the way to historical writing among the early Christians, and that the Passion narrative formed a "gospel before the gospels." Q is thought to have been a collection of Jesus's sayings made in Antioch for missionary purposes, and translated there from Aramaic into Greek. The usual view of the relations between the Synoptic Gospels is stated, but no clear picture of the problem is

given. The author suggests that the Fourth Gospel is a combination by "John the Elder" of materials drawn from Mark and Luke and "an independent tradition of Palestinian Jewish-Christian origin" which may go back to the son of Zebedee. The rest of the literature is handled with equal conventionality. The same may be said for Dodd's chapters on the life of Jesus and the Apostolic Age. The author's characteristic combination of scepticism and conservatism in critical matters—the result of his impact with *formgeschichtliche Kritik*—and his Barthian view of New Testament eschatology are not likely to assist the elementary student in gaining a clear and theologically unbiased view of the main issues.

Among the miscellaneous essays, Calder's summary of the geography and ethnology of Asia Minor is the most important. Lofthouse's remarks on Biblical ethics and Manson's on the doctrinal authority of the Bible are apologetic in aim. Snaith has contributed a useful study of the Priesthood and the Temple, and Rabinowitz a convenient survey of the origins of rabbinic Judaism and the significance of the Synagogue. Dodd's essays are complemented by a description of church organization and liturgy by the Bishop of Truro.

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Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance. By ERWIN PANOFSKY. New York, Oxford University Press, 1939. xxxiii + 262 pp., 92 pl. $3.50.

Among the historical studies published during the last decades, those sponsored by the late Professor A. Warburg and by the Warburg Institute in Hamburg (now in London) represent a group of its own. They are particularly dedicated to the survival of classical antiquity in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and emphasize the passage of certain ideas and motifs from one field of cultural expression to the other, thus overcoming traditional borderlines and uniting history of art, of thought, of political ideas, etc., in a unique study of intellectual history. In the field of the history of art, Professor Panofsky is one of the outstanding representatives of this method. His previous volumes (*Duerer's "Melencolia I,"* published together with Dr. Saxl in 1923, *"Idea,"* 1924, *Hercules am Scheidewege*, 1930) are well known not only to the specialists, but also to all students

interested in the general history of ideas. The present volume gives some new brilliant examples as well as a theoretical exposition of his method. It contains the six Mary Flexner Lectures, delivered at Bryn Mawr in 1937, some of which had been already published in scattered articles.

The former part of the introductory chapter (pp. 3-17) deals with the general problem of the interpretative method. Panofsky starts from the distinction between form and subject matter, or meaning, within the given work of art itself. He defines the form as the configuration of colors, lines and volumes constituting the visible object, and then distinguishes different degrees or strata of meaning: (1) primary or natural meanings which include the factual meaning (i.e., the identification of a certain configuration as a certain object or event) and expressional meaning (i.e., its psychological significance); (2) secondary or conventional meaning (i.e., the social or traditional significance of a certain gesture); (3) intrinsic meaning or content (i.e., the underlying historical background). To these three groups of meaning correspond three degrees of interpretation: Pre-iconographical description, iconographical analysis in the narrower sense, and iconographical interpretation in a deeper sense. This last interpretation is the method followed by the author himself. The distinction of several strata in the object of art and in its respective interpretation is certainly of great importance for a future aesthetical theory, but the concrete scheme which Panofsky proposes may be subjected to some modifications. The factor which he calls intrinsic meaning certainly serves to insert the work of art in a historical context, but it cannot account for the specific character of a work of art as opposed to any other object, nor for the differences in character and artistic quality between the individual works of art. On the other hand, he almost eliminates the factor of form, perhaps in reaction against the over-emphasis given to it by former historians. Moreover, the terms form and meaning, or content, are somewhat confusing. They are based on the distinction made by Woelfflin (which Panofsky rejects), and opposed to the distinction made by Kant and Cassirer which he implicitly follows, and which would require the term form rather for that which he calls meaning. For the correspondence between the objective strata and the respective acts of interpretation is not limited to the works of art, but applies to all natural objects as well, as results

from Panofsky's own exposition, and its premise seems to be an interdependence of the knowing subject and the known object in the Kantian sense. The latter part of the introduction (pp. 18-31) attempts to define the difference between medieval and renaissance art in their relation to classical subjects. The classical influence was not interrupted during the Middle Ages, but "classical motifs were not used for the representation of classical themes, while, conversely, classical themes were not expressed by classical motifs." On the contrary, "it was the privilege of the Renaissance proper to reintegrate classical themes with classical motifs."

The second chapter, "The Early History of Man in Two Cycles of Paintings by Piero di Cosimo" (pp. 33-67), analyzes a group of paintings of the Florentine painter Piero di Cosimo (1461-1521) and shows how he tries, through some mythological themes (Vulcan, Prometheus, Bacchus, etc.) to describe the early history of man, according not to the mythological conception of the golden age, but to the evolutionistic theory of primitivism as developed by the Epicureans and transmitted through ancient authors such as Lucretius and Vitruvius.

The third chapter, "Father Time" (pp. 69-93), traces the history of the artistic representations of Time from classical antiquity. Classical antiquity knew only two such types, defined respectively as Kairos (Opportunity) and Aion (Eternity). Independent of it was the type of Saturnus who, however, had been identified already in antiquity with Time because of his Greek name (Kronos, Chronos). The later type of Father Time originated through a fusion of the older types of Opportunity and Saturnus which appears first in the illustrations to Petrarch's *Trionfi*. The later development of this type is especially illustrated in some pictures of Bronzino where Father Time is represented as the "Revealer of Truth."

The fourth chapter, "Blind Cupid" (pp. 95-128), again starts from the ancient art, emphasizing the fact that Amor was never represented as blind, although there are some hints at his blindness in classical literature. Panofsky gives a survey of the history of love conceptions during the Middle Ages, and distinguishes between two main currents: the idealistic which was, at least indirectly, influenced by Plato's spiritual interpretation of love, and that of the moralizing mythographers, who had a rather negative concept of love. It is from this latter

tradition that the type of Blind Cupid came into medieval art and was retained in the Renaissance as well. Under the influence of Neoplatonic ideas, however, Cupid was sometimes again represented without his characteristic bandage, and most suggestive is a picture by Cranach where Cupid is shown removing the bandage from his eyes while he stands with his feet on a big volume entitled *Platonis Opera*.

The fifth chapter, "The Neoplatonic Movement in Florence and Northern Italy" (pp. 129-169), starts with an outline of the Neoplatonic system as transmitted to the Renaissance by the Florentine Academy. Panofsky distinguishes five degrees in this system of the universe: God, the Cosmic Mind, the Cosmic Soul, the Realm of Nature, and the Realm of Matter. Emphasizing the particular place of the human soul in the universe, he discusses the theory of the parts of the soul which are essentially defined as Mind, Reason, and the Lower forces. Man's goal is beatitude which can be reached, at least temporarily, even during the earthly life through the contemplative and active life. Particular emphasis is given to Ficino's doctrine of love and to the distinction between divine and vulgar love which had a large influence on Renaissance literature and art. Panofsky then analyses a few Renaissance paintings which reflect this influence. There is a design of Baccio Bandinelli which represents the battle between Reason and Lust, with the Mind as judge. Another more famous example is Titian's Sacred and Profane Love, which is explained by the Neoplatonic concept of the Twin Venuses. The conception of love is again interpreted in two other paintings of Titian: the Allegory of the Marquis d'Avalos, which reflects the traditional group of Venus and Mars; and the Education of Cupid, where the Blind and the Clearsighted Cupid correspond to the double love in the Neoplatonic sense, while the three women are either Venus with two nymphs, or rather the three Graces representing Beauty, Love and Chastity. A few objections can be made to the outline of the system of Florentine Platonism. The scheme of five degrees as given by Panofsky corresponds rather to Plotinus than to Ficino, who in his *Theologia Platonica* gives quite a different one. Moreover, the Mind for Ficino is not "cosmic," but represents the angels. The degree of the Soul includes not only the World soul, but all souls together, and has nothing to do with the celestial world. So the Realm of Nature in Plotinus' sense has nothing to do with the sublunary world, but corre-

sponds to the lower forces of the soul, while the Realm of Matter, or rather, that of the Body includes the whole corporeal world. The identification of Hell with the realm of Matter, although suggested by a passage from Pico, is not the usual conception, and an explicit interpretation of Hell is found in the last book of Ficino's *Theologia.* Such other points as the parts of the soul and the doctrine of love, however, are well explained, and the application to the respective pictures is very convincing, especially in the case of Bandinelli and of Titian's Sacred and Profane Love.

The last chapter, "The Neoplatonic Movement and Michelangelo" (pp. 171-230), starts with a brilliant analysis of Michelangelo's style as opposed to that of the High Renaissance, the Manneristic period and the Baroque. While the Neoplatonic element in Michelangelo's sonnets has been frequently treated before, Panofsky tries also to trace it in his artistic works as well. The tomb of Pope Julius II was originally conceived as an ascension in the sense of the Neoplatonic philosophy. Rachel and Lea are symbols of the contemplative and active life, Moses and St. Paul representatives of contemplative ascension, and these four figures thus act "as intermediaries between the terrestrial and the translunary world." The Slaves personify the human soul as enslaved by matter, and the Victory groups, the human soul in its state of freedom attained by reason. Also the Medici tomb in its original conception expresses similar ideas. The four River-Gods stand for the realm of sheer matter, the Times of Day for the Realm of Nature, while the figures of Lorenzo and Giuliano represent the contemplative and active life which lead to ultimate beatitude. Panofsky then analyzes a group of drawings by Michelangelo. The Ganymede is a symbol for the ecstasy of Platonic love, the Tityus for the tortures of sensual passion, the Phaethon characterizes the presumptuous attitude of the lover, the Children's Bacchanal perhaps expresses the purely vegetative life. The Dream shows the human mind called back to virtue from the vices. The Saettatori, in which the arrows are lacking, may be a symbol for the natural desire in which the creatures are directed toward their aim by a power unkown to them, as expressed in a passage by Pico (a similar consideration is found in Ficino's *Theologia Platonica,* Book XIV).

It is impossible to give a complete idea of the wealth of details contained in these studies which make of its reading a real pleasure

(I should like to mention, at least, the passages on the use of blindness and nudity in medieval art, and on the development of the tomb since the Egyptian art). The amount of materials utilized by the author is amazing, and comprehends not only the better known works of art, but also medieval illuminated manuscripts and early illustrated books, as well as a large number of ancient and medieval literary sources. The numerous notes and the rich bibliography are useful for the specialist. Printing, paper, and reproductions are excellent.

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Die Stufenfolge des mystischen Erlebnisses bei William Law (1686-1761). By KONRAD MINKNER. Munchen: Verlag Ernst Reinhardt, 1939. 163 pp. RM 4.80.

This study of William Law is valuable in that it provides a considerable addition to the knowledge of contemporary scholars about a phase and mode of thought not well understood, or at least not widely accepted, in the modern world. There have been other valuable studies of mysticism in recent years, but this study of Law has at least one distinguishing quality, namely, that of dealing with a man whose point of view was almost as little understood and appreciated in his own age as studies on such subjects in general are in ours. Law's battles with Hoadly, Mandeville and Tindal are well known as having done little to add supporters to his cause. His influence upon the Wesleys and John Byron has been recognized, but the Wesleys deserted his mystical point of view, and Byron was neither a strong nor an important disciple. Law was out of tune with the empirical, deistic, naturalistic temper of his age and because of this, he never received due credit for the philosophical quality of his writings. His fame has been largely that of a brilliant critic and a devoted leader of a small group which took his *Serious Call* to heart and tried to live accordingly. This study by Minkner is an attempt to deal with the philosophical aspect of his work and does more to chart some unified course in Law's heterogeneous writings than anything which has preceded it. The reviewer attempts here simply to give some idea of the general direction of Law's thought as presented by Minkner.

Law's mysticism has been conventionally attributed to Boehme,

from whom he gathered so much after 1733. Minkner attempts to show that Law's mysticism antedated his study of Boehme. He divides Law's intellectual career into two periods, the first of which was largely under the influence of Malebranche, and the second characterized by his study of and borrowing from Boehme. Minkner's attribution to Malebranche of a strong influence over Law is the most unique contribution of his book. This is particularly important since Law regarded Malebranche, along with Descartes and Locke, as the philosophers to whom he was most opposed. Minkner's case is based upon internal evidence, the resemblance of ideas in the two men, and, while there are recognized loopholes in such a procedure, Minkner does a good job, at least an appealing one, in establishing a connection between them.

According to Minkner the major principles which Law borrowed from Malebranche are three in number. They are: (1) the essential difference between spirit and matter; (2) the indubitable certainty of clear and distinct ideas; and (3) the necessary existence of all things *in* God. The idea of God implied here, namely, a being who is independent of the creative process (and defended by the traditional ontological argument), complete and perfect in his own essence, is one which Law assimilates from Malebranche at the same time that he criticizes Malebranche and conceives himself to be differing from him. According to Minkner, the point of cleavage arises in that, for Malebranche, the doctrine of the necessary perfection of God becomes modified because through the act of creation God changes part of himself to a less perfect order, whereas for Law, God remains forever perfect, and the creation of the world neither adds nor detracts from his essential nature.

While Law acquired some of his basic ideas from Malebranche, the development of his system had to wait for the new impetus supplied by Boehme. If Law were to argue that God was forever perfect despite the creative process of the world, he was obliged to offer an explanation for the world other than Malebranche's occasionalism. This was supplied him by Boehme's two-fold conception of nature, a principle which made a definite distinction between infinite and finite nature. For Boehme's own system this was important, for, among other things, it made possible a solution of the problem of evil. It was

equally helpful to Law, for it afforded a bridge between God and the world. He argued that the temporal world was not the product of a divine act but the outgrowth, or perhaps better, the overflow, of the eternal.

This overflow for Law was essentially a deteriorating process, comparable to the theological fall of Adam. He held it could not be understood on a purely rational basis; the mystic alone could penetrate the veil of experience to acquire this knowledge and understanding. The story of the universal fall, for Law, is something like this: the fires of love and hate were originally united in eternal nature. A separation took place when the angels (sub-deities), who were free to act of their own will, became devils. The present world (temporal nature) is a result of this fall of the angels and is hence full of disorder and impurity.

Yet Law was not to conceive of the world as totally lost. It was, as a matter of fact, partly divine, in the sense that the fall of the angels was a part of the divine plan. There reside in all nature the seeds of regeneration, a process which can be effected only through a redeemer and through resurrection. The divine spark in man which makes his ultimate ascent possible was evidence to Law of the unending love of God, a love which provided that even evil had a chance for redemption.

The mystic experience, understood in these terms, was not a purely aesthetic union but was also a definitely moral one. Union with the divine was regarded not so much as a retreat from the world as a fulfillment of the spiritual potentialities still resident in it. Minkner sees in this position an evasion of pantheism by Law, since God does not become nature but participates only partially and imperfectly in it.

Minkner deals in this volume, not only with Law's background and his philosophical position, but also with the essential nature of his mysticism as a theory of knowledge and its application to Christianity, issues with which it is impossible to deal here. It must be said, however, that Law was much more Christian in his mysticism than Boehme. He was not only a high churchman but a thorough believer in the trinity as defended by the mystics' beatific vision. Minkner's study is an important modern interpretation of Law's whole point of view.

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Religious Trends in English Poetry. By Hoxie Neale Fairchild. Vol. I, *1700-1740: Protestantism and the Cult of Sentiment.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. xvi + 612 pp. $5.00.

This handsome book is the first installment of a study (four volumes yet to come) which Professor Fairchild plans to extend to the twentieth century. In preparation for it he read with care the works of 128 poets, most of them unknown to the professed student of the period, extracted and digested them, and arranged them in groups, with critical comment and general conclusions—a Herculean task carried through with wit and the appearance of ease. The general thesis of the study, clearly set forth in the final chapter of this volume, is "that the romanticism of the 1780-1830 period is simply Protestant Christianity in a more or less delightfully phosphorescent state of decay." We are shown here how Calvinism begat sentimentalism; in what remains we shall be shown how sentimentalism begat romanticism.

No one could admire the vigor and comprehensiveness of Professor Fairchild's mind more than I, who seem never to be able to formulate generalizations at all. But after reading every word of the six hundred pages, I have mild misgivings as to the method. "I am not aware," he says, "that so many eighteenth-century poets of so brief a period have previously been studied." That is all to the good: it adds to our respect for the conclusions when we know that they are based on a broader selection of evidence than has hitherto been examined. But was it necessary, or even wise, to hang the 128 poets all in a row and invite *us* to inspect each individually, even when the "picture" is a blank canvas? Why mention the Earl of Halifax at all, if the conclusion is that his lines "contain not the faintest glimmer of religious feeling?" Would it not be better to emulate the high-spirited restraint of a Saintsbury, after his first-hand perusal of the seven thousand closely printed pages of the *Rhetores Graeci?* Granting that Mr. Fairchild writes with such gracefulness and humor as to be generally entertaining, would not the effect be just as impressive, and much more economically obtained, if the list of poets were given in an appendix, and only the best portions of the evidence were admitted to the study?

When Mr. Fairchild says that romanticism is Protestant Christianity in a state of decay, I hope that he is defining closely and means

the theology, or the credal position, of romanticism. But I sometimes cannot escape the feeling that he uses the term both narrowly and broadly; narrowly to denote the real, though sometimes unexpressed, creed of an author, and broadly to cover all his works. "*Delightfully phosphorescent* state of decay," one thinks, must have reference to literature, not to dogma. Now I can understand how the religion of Wordsworth, as abstracted from his poetry, may fairly be characterized as the decay of an earlier religious faith (I should hesitate to say "*simply* the decay"), but I do not see much utility in a critical theory which asks me to consider Wordsworth's *poetry* as the decay of anything. It is so obviously *sui generis*, unique, so vigorously novel, so largely unaccounted for when you have catalogued its doctrine. To me "romanticism" seems to be simply a word, a name covering practically everything that is characteristic in the civilization of a great period. But this complex cannot be discussed or even understood unless it is broken down: hence the value of analyzing it by some such formula as Mr. Fairchild's. So long as we understand that the complex (the complete writings of Wordsworth, Scott, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley; the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars; the Industrial Revolution, bread riots, and Peterloo massacres) is the reality, and the formula an unreal but useful abstraction, there is no harm in talking as other people do. But it looks to me as though Mr. Fairchild, like the New Humanists, does think of romanticism as a real and sinister organism, born into the world at the time of the Reformation and concealing itself under various attractive shapes ever since. And he does not write carelessly when he says that it is *simply* Protestant Christianity in a state of decay, for that view is enforced over and over throughout the book. I do not quite see on what principles he concludes that the system is so tightly closed. The figure he invites us to consider is the course of a stream. Is the Mississippi at Vicksburg simply the Missouri?

It is difficult to judge the ultimate importance to literary criticism of Mr. Fairchild's study, because in this installment his material allows him to discuss so few poets of importance. There is only one great figure: Pope; in the second rank only such figures as Addison, Dyer, Gay, Parnell, Philips, Prior, Swift, and Thomson. My own feeling is that for literary criticism—at least during this period—the approach from the side of religion is curiously oblique and nugatory.

It yields most in the case of Pope himself (Mr. Fairchild's discussion of the nature of Pope's Catholicism is a model of understanding and candor), and is not without value in the case of Thomson. Otherwise it seems to present little that, say, one could appropriate for an undergraduate lecture.

The great value of the work is as a history of the development of thought, specifically of religious thought. Mr. Fairchild is a man of deep religious convictions and experience; he is learned both on the side of literature and of religion; and his Anglo-Catholic position gives a firmness and consistency to his judgments which will be valued even by those who must fit them into some other frame of reference. I have hinted that I think the method unnecessarily laborious, and that the doctrine of linear development in a vacuum seems to me too realist and simple, but I do not see how one can escape Mr. Fairchild's patiently developed thesis that, granted the doctrines of the Reformation ("the assertion of the right of private judgment in the interpretation of the Scriptures, the rejection of mediatorial agencies between the individual worshipper and his God, the revolt against authority" etc.), there was bound somewhere sooner or later to develop the kind of creed which he calls sentimentalism: "a tender-minded form of deism—a religion in itself, quite independent of Christianity and essentially hostile to the traditional faith." My doxy being the same as Mr. Fairchild's, I am of course pleased to see this called the *decay* of Protestantism. But there will be many who will consider it the bright consummate flower.

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Social Ferment in Vermont, 1791-1850. By DAVID M. LUDLUM. (Columbia Studies in American Culture, No. 5.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. x + 305 pp. $3.50.

This Princeton University doctoral dissertation is the interesting story of the ideas and principles about which the early settlers of Vermont felt deeply. During its first sixty years of statehood, Vermont's social development was accompanied by much emotionalism. Even the rationalism of Ethan Allen, Green Mountain military hero and philosopher, was more fervid than intellectual. Early in the nineteenth century, the Allen variety of infidelity was displaced by evangelical

enthusiasm. The infidels were converted. "A number of bold enemies have been cut down and bowed to Almighty grace," reported a Connecticut evangelist in the language of the day (p. 43). "For ten years following the spiritual outpourings of 1801 the churches of Vermont enjoyed recurrent visitations of the Holy Spirit" says Dr. Ludlum (p. 47), but with the coming of the War of 1812, political feeling ran high and revivals became scarce and converts few. The excitement of war replaced religious emotionalism.

A new revival began in 1817 and "until the beginning of the Panic of 1837 the spiritual life of the region was in an almost continual state of excitement; the atmosphere became charged with a religious intensity. . . . It was the period of organization among Protestant sects when innumerable societies 'to do good' and countless institutions to advance the Christian cause came into being" (p. 51). One of these causes was temperance. By 1850 "a state-wide prohibition law was in effect and was backed by a sentiment which grew stronger as each year passed, making Vermont a paragon of sobriety" (p. 63).

Another movement of a less permanent character had to do with Masonry. It had been an issue in America during the French Revolution and flared up again in 1826 with the death of an obscure stonemason, William Morgan. "The American people assumed that he had been murdered by a band of vengeful Masons" (p. 88). The wave of indignation which followed this vicious escapade of a few irresponsible Masons swept through the Northeastern States and

> waxed strong in country districts where the revivalists had won so many converts, and proved relatively weak in the cities, where a more sophisticated, less emotional attitude prevailed. Western New York State acted like the center of a great high-pressure area, blowing strong winds of social and political discord to neighboring areas. Vermont, tied to the New Yorkers by blood and by geographical propinquity, was particularly receptive to new currents. Here the forces aroused by the antimasonic storm captured the government for four successive years; here was cast the 1832 electoral vote for a candidate whose chief platform plank proclaimed opposition to Masonry; and here an acrimonious dispute between Masons and Antimasons prevented the election of a governor for a whole year. More important and certainly most lasting rancors were engendered in social life—in business, family, and religious circles. Many a lifelong friendship and many an established organization were sundered during the height of the controversy. Church covenants were broken and true spirituality vanished. The subcenters of antimasonic feeling generated by the western New York

agitation were slow to dissolve and left a heritage of social discord long after the more ephemeral political movement had spent itself (p. 89).

These Vermonters took their quarrels very seriously. For example, in 1830 at a funeral in Danville, "the relatives who were Masons and their sympathizers occupied one room, and their opponents another in the same house; while at the burial, the Masons stood on one side of the grave and the Antimasons on the other, not a word being exchanged between the two parties even by brother and sister" (p. 112).

After a decade of this, antimasonry died and a new and better cause was at hand, slavery. "The Green Mountain Republic was the first of the American states to banish all forms of human servitude from its borders," says Dr. Ludlum (p. 134), but since there were no slaves in the state this can scarcely be regarded as a noble sacrifice for a good cause.

Of all the northeastern states Vermont was less suited for the employment of slave labor than any other political unit. An area of small farms, little capital, and hard winters, it could fit none but freemen into its economy. There arose, therefore, no vested interest to come to the defense of the "peculiar institution" when subjected to attack by abolitionists after 1830. No ties of commercial interest, geographical propinquity, or of blood generated pro-slavery feeling. As a prominent New Hampshire reform leader observed: "It has no sea-port for the importation of slavery, or the export of its own republicanism" (pp. 135-136).

Nevertheless, "the commercial towns on the lines of trade and communication were slow to embrace organized antislavery" (p. 146), and "the professedly respectable portion of the population looked at abolitionists in a similar light as their descendants now regard communists" (p. 148). "By 1846 all the Vermont churches had swung into line by officially condemning the institution of Negro slavery as practiced in the South" (p. 166). The Civil War was to become the great moral crusade in the history of Vermont.

Other social movements nearer at home also aroused Vermonters. Numerous Working Men's societies were organized in 1830 and 1831, which were interested mainly in the abolition of imprisonment for debt and a more general and liberal system of education. The Free Enquirers of Woodstock and other towns, "in addition to opposing existing tendencies toward aristocracy and caste, exhibited a strong

anticlericalism" (p. 202). Prison reform was badly needed, as well as changes in the penal law, which a century ago was still brutal. The prevalent crime of counterfeiting was punishable in part by cutting off the right ear, branding with the letter C by means of a hot iron, and confiscating the property of the culprit. Corporal punishment was general for many minor violations. The state prison at Windsor was apparently described accurately as a pesthole. "In Middlebury for the six months ending June 1, 1831, no less than ninety-four men and women were incarcerated, twenty-five for sums of less than five dollars. It was estimated that over four thousand Vermont citizens annually suffered commitment to jails for debt" (p. 212). In addition to debtors, the prisons also housed the insane, paupers, deaf and dumb, and blind, whose families could not or would not supply a home for them. Insanity was quite prevalent. "A committee of the General Assembly in 1836 estimated the insane population at three hundred, two-thirds of the number being town paupers or destitute" (pp. 216-217).

The pauper of 1800 was often "a man without a town," because it was the custom to "warn out of town" any new settlers who might become public charges. The poor were often hired out to a contractor and the inhumanities of this situation led to the establishing of "poor farms." In 1849-1850 three thousand six hundred paupers received public charity. Over one-third of these were Irish railroad laborers and French Canadian seasonal workers (pp. 220-222).

New religious leaders appeared in Vermont in this period. One of these was a former English army officer named Dorril, who claimed to be a prophet of God and set up his own religio-political organization in Guilford. Communism of property existed, but no democracy, for Dorril insisted on complete obedience to his divinely inspired commands. "He enforced a strict vegetarianism on his followers, and even refused to allow them to don clothes which had been produced at the expense of life. Leather shoes were taboo, woolen foot coverings being the mode" (p. 239).

A group of "Pilgrims" under the leadership of one Bullard settled in South Woodstock about 1817 and reverted to "first principles." ". . . he ordered his disciples to discard the ornaments of civilization and to clothe themselves in bear skins and leather girdles." Fortunately for Woodstock, they moved west (p. 243).

A better-known Vermont prophet of this period was John Humphrey Noyes, whose "Perfectionists" were driven out of Vermont by the High Sheriff of Putney when they were suspected of sexual promiscuity.

Both Joseph Smith and Brigham Young of Mormon fame were born in Vermont but were not appreciated in their native state, although a considerable number of ex-Vermonters were converted to the Church of the Latter Day Saints (p. 250).

One William Miller of Poultney became noted in the early forties for his conviction that the millennium was just around the corner. The Baptists and Methodists were particularly susceptible to "Millerism," and thousands were disappointed when the predicted awful day of March 21, 1843 passed with no unusual occurrences. The aftermath of the excitement resulted in "spiritual lethargy among the deluded" and "frequent outbursts of fanaticism among incurable Adventists" (p. 259).

This story of Vermont's emotional life is not always flattering, but the emotions bring results, and Dr. Ludlum's summary is an imposing list of achievements.

> . . . the Puritan Counter-Reformation which had routed the forces of infidelity and freethinking, reinstated the precepts of Christian living and warmed the impulse to "disinterested benevolence." . . . The scourge of intemperance had been stayed and habits of sobriety inculcated. The privileged position of Masonry had been attacked and its political aspirations permanently allayed. Sympathy was being extended to the lowly slave and a mighty movement to end American Negro slavery was in progress. The underprivileged, too, had received public solicitude. The penal system had been revised; prison conditions ameliorated; imprisonment for debt abolished; and capital punishment suspended. The unfortunates—the insane, the poor, and the sick—now were objects of beneficence. In the opinion of many, most important of all was the common-school revival, the beginnings of a tax-supported, state-supervised, nonsectarian school system. On the periphery of these movements and currents were offshoots of religious fanaticism and whirlpools of social experimentation which accomplished little of permanence but exhibited a courageous spirit in attacking the pressing problems of the period. Six decades had brought important change to Vermont. The enlargement of the happiness of the race had been real (pp. 272-273).

The book is marred by inaccuracies in dates and in quotations. For example, Ethan Allen's *Oracles* was not published in 1785 (p. 27),

and Timothy Dwight did not lay down his pen in 1807 (p. 24). But these are minor errors in a book which is clearly a significant contribution to American social history.

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Man in Revolt, A Christian Anthropology. By Emil Brunner. Translated by Olive Wyon. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. 564 pp. $6.00.

In recent years the doctrine of man has become a most important dividing line in theology. There is a reciprocal relationship between this doctrine and the nature of the theological enterprise as a whole. The question as to whether theology should be based on empirical data, reason, revelation, or any combination of them, turns upon what view one takes concerning the limitations or capacities of man which govern his relationship with God. But if it is, therefore, true that one's attitude toward man determines his theology, it is equally true that one's conception of God (including the *ersatz* commodities of naturalism and humanism) determines his convictions concerning the status, needs and significance of human life.

Professor Brunner's book has already taken an important position in the literature on the subject, which includes, among recent works, Berdyaev's *The Destiny of Man*, Maritain's *True Humanism*, and Niebuhr's Gifford Lectures. It must be seen, however, in the context of his previous writings. As a matter of method the author confines himself to a consideration of man's predicament; except in the Epilogue, he refers only in passing to the redemption which offers a solution. Yet his view of empirical human nature is determined at every point by his doctrine of revelation and his Christology. Consequently some readers will probably feel that the most decisive questions have been begged; but it should be remembered that doctrines which Professor Brunner takes for granted in the present volume have been amply expounded and defended elsewhere, especially in *The Mediator* and *The Divine Imperative*.

Man in Revolt (German title: *Der Mensch im Widerspruch*) is much longer than it need have been. The author seems to feel compelled to reiterate his central thesis not only in each new chapter, but virtually in each subdivision. From the point of view of time and money, this

puts the book out of reach of many students who might otherwise have been interested. Despite an *apologia* in the Preface, the argument would have lost nothing and gained much through condensation.

The central problem for Christian anthropology is how to affirm human responsibility and divine determination simultaneously. In a notable controversy, Barth accused Brunner of weakening the doctrine of the *sola gratia*. (See *Natur und Gnade*, by Brunner; and *Nein!*, by Barth). The present volume constitutes an extended reply; where Barth sunders the *humanum* of natural (sinful) man from the *imago Dei* and from relatedness with God, Brunner holds that, even in the midst of unbelief and sin, man is still responsible precisely because he is still related to God as created in His image.

At the outset, however, some will ask why a writer today bothers with such categories as the *imago Dei* at all. Brunner's answer is that every attempt to understand the traits which distinguish men from animals must either interpret humanity "from above downwards" or deny its distinctive capacities. Specifically, if one starts with responsibility, then reason, culture, creativity, and religion, which are peculiar to man, as well as the organic and physico-chemical factors which are not, can be understood. But there is no possibility of starting with constituents which are naturalistically determined, and of then moving upward, by increasing complexity of function, to responsibility. Idealism starts from "above"; but by regarding essential human nature as spirit, and as therefore eternal and divine, it cannot give a proper account of man's creatureliness and his body. Christian anthropology takes its departure from Jesus Christ as "what man ought to be," as the disclosure and restoration of the "original" nature which man received as created in the image of God. Though the categories by which it interprets all empirical human existence transcend history, they are not derived from a system of timeless truths. On the contrary, in Jesus Christ the supra-historical has entered history in a unique event. Thus Brunner's justification for using the Creation and the Fall as supra-historical categories might be expressed in some such form as this: "Start with belief in the goodness of God, as every Christian does; look at the actual sinfulness of man; and it will then be impossible to avoid these categories." If this were put forward as an argument to convince a non-Christian, it would of course be circular. Actually, however, the author seeks to justify his procedure only as a

proper method for Christian theology; in this he succeeds admirably.

The same principle governs his attitude toward empirical and rational theology. In a word, he holds that experience and reason can be understood from the point of view of revelation; and that when this is done there is no conflict. Conflict arises when either the empirical or the rationalistic point of view attempts to become self-sufficient for understanding man's existence; their claims are false because personal existence is given by God, not possessed independently, whereas both empiricism and rationalism try to understand man "in terms of himself."

Take the case of empiricism. Natural science is not really without presuppositions, but that is no reproach. It can, in a limited fashion, apply the same methods of objective-causal research to man which have proven so successful in the study of nature. But in order to claim that its method is exhaustive for the interpretation of man, it must reduce his distinctive capacities to sub-personal terms and issue a deterministic denial of responsibility.

The foregoing considerations are contained in the three introductory chapters, and the first half of the fourth. In the latter half of the fourth chapter, Brunner turns from polemics to a positive statement of "The Word of God as the Source of Being." He argues that the original content of human existence can only be understood as deriving from the love of God; and that the love of God can only be understood in terms of the Trinity. He introduces the subject here because human responsibility should be an answer to the call, the election, of divine love. One can agree with all this without assenting to his view of the Trinity. He writes: "*In Himself*, quite apart from the existence of any creatures, apart from the existence of man, (God) is the One who loves . . ." (p. 75). And elsewhere he contends that God can be conceived as personal only because He comprises personal relations within Himself (p. 219). His purpose in the latter passage is to show that personal Being in God is different from man's personal existence because the former is unconditioned. Yet surely all that the author desires can be conserved without paying the price of conceiving of God in abstraction from His creative activity. Doubtless Brunner has in mind the peril of regarding God and the world as correlative. But inasmuch as the creation does exist, it is difficult to see the virtue of a doctrine which is designed to show that God is loving apart from

His creation. It is equally difficult to believe that the divine love which seeks nothing in return, if it be manifest in creation, cannot be genuine unless it also somehow subsists independently of it.

The fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters are the heart of the book. They expound the doctrine that man is created in the image of God, that he sinfully rebels against his God-given origin and destiny, and that his present (empirico-historical) condition is one of conflict between his original nature and his own wilfulness. The three hundred pages which then follow work out the applications of this doctrine in connection with special problems.

Brunner unqualifiedly renounces the traditional picture of an historical Adam, not just because science has destroyed it, but because it concealed the real content of the Christian doctrine. If anyone suspects that this is merely an attempt to put the best possible face on an acceptance of the inescapable, he should carefully weigh the author's strictly theological criticisms of the traditional view. The immediate effect of the destruction of that view was to leave evolutionary theories in command of the field. Man's "true" nature came to be regarded as a goal in process of realization (Schleiermacher). The "creation in the image of God" of which Brunner wishes to speak has to do, not with the empirical beginnings of the race or the individual, but with the capacities which distinguish man from the rest of creation, and the creatureliness which distinguishes him from God.

He sets his own view over against three alternatives. Irenaeus, who established the pattern of the traditional doctrine, distinguished between the *imago* and the *similitudo*, regarding the latter as a special gift of supernatural communion with God; it could be destroyed and still leave the former intact. Luther renounced this two-story edifice, perceiving that human nature must be understood as a unity, and that through sin man has lost not something supernatural, but his God-given nature. But in order to account for man's persisting rationality, the Reformers had to introduce the dubious conception of a "relic" of the *imago;* this was unsatisfactory because it suggests that there is a sphere of human existence not affected by sin, and because it does not take into account the fact that precisely in his sin man gives evidence of his origin. The third view Brunner wishes to avoid is that of Karl Barth, which has already been mentioned.

When the author refers to creation and original sin, he is talking about all men, not about Adam, B.C. 4004. In contrast to all other creatures, man has been endowed by God with capacities for self-knowledge and self-determination on the basis of being known and determined. The *content* of human existence is being in the love of God; the *form* is responsibility for answering divine determination, the "call" of love. In contrast with idealism, Christian faith sees responsibility not as self-originated, but as a gift. Even Kant, who certainly stressed responsibility, grounded it in the autonomous, intelligible ego, and thus sundered it from the limiting conditions which result from the fact that the ego has a physical body and stands over against God and the human community.

In practice everyone knows that something is wrong with human nature, even though he may deny it in theory. The most disparate explanations are provided, however. There are theories which explain the conflict as due to a dualism of mind or spirit vs. body or sense. These relieve the "real" self, which is spirit, of responsibility, and make body the source of evil. On the other hand, moralistic theories, which preserve responsibility by seeing evil as originating in voluntary decision, at the same time hold that the self can choose either good or evil, and consequently fail to account for why it ever chooses evil.

The Christian position is that man remains responsible, but that he is inevitably sinful. Brunner's chief objection to the traditional anthropology is that it was not able to hold these two factors, responsibility and necessity, together. It assigned them to two different persons. Adam was responsible for the first sin; now, as a result, I "must" sin. Then, in attempting to re-establish unity between these two factors, Augustine attributed the transmission of sin to physical inheritance, which really has nothing to do with sin as responsible act.

Modern theology has been no more successful in overcoming the hiatus. Schleiermacher reformulated the idea of fateful necessity by regarding sin as due to the "sense-nature," which hinders each new stage of development. Sin thus becomes a kind of atavism, a natural impediment to evolutionary progress, instead of personal decision. Ritschl, on the other hand, reformulated the idea of responsibility; although his idea of the "kingdom of sin" as an evil environment comprised a good account of temptation, it fell short of acknowledging any *necessity* within the self for succumbing. Thus Ritschl's theory

remained "a form of Pelagianism, intensified by social psychology" (p. 125).

Finally, Kant recognized that evil acts point back to an origin in a "tendency to evil," for which no temporal beginning can be discovered (because every beginning presupposes the tendency). But then, for the sake of the principle of autonomy, Kant renounced his own best insight and held that evil could be overcome through one's own efforts.

How does Brunner himself deal with the paradox: "Man must sin, yet he remains responsible"? The statement is an absurdity for those who assume that responsibility requires that man should be able to originate his own meaning and destiny, and be able to dispose of them independently of God. Hartmann, starting with this sort of autonomy as basic, showed more insight than most thinkers when he demanded atheism as its corollary. For the Christian, however, true freedom and dependence on God are the same thing. But how did true freedom ever come to be "lost"? Originally man was endowed with spirit and reason in order that he might be master over the world. The world is man's; its center, however, is not man, but God. It was the very grandeur of man's capacities which made it possible for him to listen to the Satanic promise that he could be "like God." Sin has its ground in the spirit, because only a spiritual being could rebel and wilfully try to determine for himself an existence and a destiny which God has given to him and determined for him.

This explains why man could sin, not why he does. How then is Brunner any better off than the moralist who says that man can choose good or evil, but fails to explain why man ever chooses evil? The difference lies in the fact that the moralist sees man as possessing this freedom between alternatives now, in his empirico-historical existence. Brunner is speaking of a "Fall" which, like creation, is a supra-historical category. It is not a factor within man's historical existence; it is a presupposition of the interpretation of that existence.

As a result of this "rebellion," the content of man's existence is changed, though the structure of the *imago* (responsibility) remains. Man's whole nature is changed by the fact that it now centers in self-will instead of in God. This does not mean that there is no longer any good in man at all; it does not abrogate moral distinctions; but it does mean that all science, art, philosophy and virtue are poisoned at

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the source. The fact that man, who has lost the original content of his existence, "must" sin, however, does not mean that man made an initial bad decision from which sinful action necessarily follows like a conclusion from its premise or an effect from its cause. Indeed, the main thing wrong with the traditional doctrine was that it made "being a sinner" because Adam was, analogous to "being blue-eyed" because one's father was. Sin is always act; only so can one remain responsible for it. And the concept "Original Sin" is simply a summary way of expressing the fact that man is in a condition where the content of his existence, being self-will, is continually expressing itself in "turning away from God." Hence, although there are degrees of ethical good and evil, all action flows from a condition in which there are no degrees.

Professor Brunner's attitude toward moralism as a point nearest to and yet most in conflict with Christian faith, has been expounded in other works; here it is again employed with vigor. The structure of the *imago* remains. That is, even sinful man is responsible; he cannot renounce responsibility except through a responsible decision. Even when he just "lets himself go," he bears the marks of being endowed differently from animals, because for them there is no possibility of deliberately relinquishing the power of self-determination. For fallen man, however, the meaning of responsibility is not a gift but a command. Instead of living in the love of God and neighbor, he "ought" to do so. The moral law and the bad conscience which attends it signify both that there is something wrong in the relations between man and God, and that man nevertheless cannot entirely escape a responsible relationship to God. Sin is emancipation from God; law is the way God still preserves for man a vestige of humanity. Legalism is the mark of the natural man's understanding of God, of all non-Christian religion, and of perversions of Christianity itself. Even where love for God and man is envisaged, it is always seen as capable of fulfilment through human effort; the final motive remains self-responsibility. Only Christianity can do justice to the fact that obligation is the sign of a breach which human effort cannot surmount; only it can provide that trust wherein love, as divine grace, fulfills the law by abrogating it. Apart from Christian revelation, therefore, the God known through the law is the "angry" God. Here Brunner is putting forward no speculation about a schizophrenic Deity in whom wrath

and love are in dialectical tension. God is pure love; but sinful man encounters this love as something with which he is at enmity.

Professor John Baillie, in *Our Knowledge of God* (pp. 31 ff.), has criticized Brunner's distinction between the structure and content of the *imago*, but these criticisms have more force against Brunner's monograph *Natur und Gnade* than against the present volume. Baillie writes that Brunner's position implies a knowledge of God which is not in any sense a saving knowledge. To this Brunner might reply, "The will of God, in so far as it is understood as 'law,' is always misunderstood . . . , although no one comes to the knowledge of the will of God except through the knowledge of the law" (p. 157). In other words, legalistic knowledge, as a "pedagogue," may be instrumental to salvation. Baillie suggests further, however, that Brunner's absolute distinction wrongly sunders rationality (structure) from goodness (content), thereby ignoring the fact that sin corrupts reason as well as desire and will. So far as the present volume is concerned, it must be said that Brunner makes responsibility, not rationality, the core of the *imago*. Moreover, he continually stresses the fact that sin corrupts reason; indeed, the only apostasy which he considers worse than the arrogance of autonomous reason is that self-righteousness which regards salvation as possible through good works. Finally, Brunner acknowledges that man can destroy even that "formal" freedom which distinguishes his thought, action, and spiritual life from animal existence. The physical and psychological effects of vice may annihilate these capacities; an intoxicated man, because he is not responsible, cannot be dealt with as "human" while he is in that condition (p. 269). Nevertheless, Professor Baillie is right in contending that there is something artificial about speaking of human existence as having the same form but a wholly different content. It is sufficient to say that the same capacities which mark man as created in the image of God make it possible for him to sin; and that all historical human decision makes this possibility a continual, a humanly inescapable, actuality. But its inescapability is not extrinsic to the character of our decision, like a fate of which we are the innocent victims; it is intrinsic, and therefore our responsibility. Moreover, Brunner does not say that there is nothing we can do about it; by a "decision," faith, we can accept the forgiveness and redemption whereby God makes our wills His. But that in which we put our trust is a gift, not some

human accomplishment which can be brought off if we just try hard enough.

The most eloquent passages in the book deal with the manner in which the very grandeur of man's capacities and achievements become a source of chaos. Accumulation of technical knowledge tends to drive out aesthetic intimacy with nature. Critical acumen tends toward nihilistic skepticism. Mechanical triumphs enslave. Intellectualism makes man an enemy of simplicity, and gives rise to despairing flights into primitivism (Klages, D. H. Lawrence). Movements for individual liberty end in atomism, and movements for social discipline end in oppression. The greatest tormentors of all are the "conscientious," rigorous people, ahead of whom the publicans and harlots enter the Kingdom, because the latter may at least have humility. Finally, "religion" is the way in which man, who cannot escape God, tries to get off as easily as possible.

We cannot here follow out the way in which the author traces the disruptions caused by sin as they affect the unity of personality, community, sexual relations, the relations between soul and body, and the position of man in history and in the cosmos. Nor can we examine his effort to show how faith, in every instance, can restore that which has been lost.

Two passages demand special comment, however. In the first (pp. 241 ff.), the author reverts to a theme prominent in other writings: rational thought, he tells us, is monologue; it recognizes nothing as coming from outside itself, and it is therefore unable to distinguish between the irrational and the supra-rational. When it tries to surmount its intrinsic limitations, and claim to be the final court of appeal, reason comes into conflict with Christian faith. Of course even the Word of God must be received and understood as meaning, through thought; but not as that which has been produced by our own thinking. There the circle of monologue has been broken through. Our reason is the vessel, but not the source; where it receives, it is called "faith."

At first sight, this looks as though Brunner's conception of "rationalism" were equivalent only to those forms of idealism which claim that the mind constructs what it knows. But it may have a wider application. There are forms of modern realism which would urgently claim that, in our knowledge of nature and of other human minds,

there is a "given" which exists independently of our knowing; but they would deny that the reality of God is thus "given"; they would hold that in this case our idea is merely a construct. In accordance with his view of the effects of sin, Brunner tends to assume that reason will prevailingly be employed as an instrument in the quest for human self-sufficiency, and will thus be incapacitated for receiving revelation. But those who regard the author as unqualifiedly obscurantist should note that he leaves room for the conversion of reason. Reason and freedom are inextricably connected in their "restoration" as well as in their abuse.

Finally there is a passage (pp. 261 ff.) where Brunner is discussing the fashion in which our original freedom is limited.

> The freedom which is grounded in dependence upon God (is) freedom of the will, freedom of choice. This freedom . . . points to an imperfection in the Primitive State in contrast to the perfection of the End. The freedom peculiar to the Primitive State was . . . the freedom of the *non-peccare posse;* the freedom which belongs to the final state . . . is the freedom of the *non-posse peccare;* it shares in the divine freedom itself. . . . The freedom of the origin is genuinely creaturely (p. 264).

Here the author either contradicts or obscures one of the main presuppositions of his book, namely, the goodness of creation. He has urged that, against idealism, Christianity never regards finitude or creatureliness, in themselves, as sources of evil. He has a right to stress the difference between a freedom which can be abused and a freedom which cannot; but the former cannot be called "imperfect" and inferior, because it is creaturely instead of sharing in the divine freedom, without injuring the author's whole argument. The above passage, when thought out consistently, would lead to the position that the historical process is much better off for having sin, and consequently redemption, in it. *O felix culpa.* But surely it is possible to give full weight to the value of redemption without putting sin in an instrumental relationship to it. In short, Brunner here seems to have fallen prey to the blandishments of a finished theodicy, such as one finds in pantheism, the theory of a finite God, and—in a less explicit but clearly discernible fashion—in the doctrine of double predestination (which the author rejects). Because throughout the rest of the book he refuses to succumb to this temptation, the passage in question must be regarded either as a slip or as worded in such a

fashion that the reader is bound to misinterpret it. Incidentally, Augustine's distinction, which Brunner adopts, cannot be entirely divorced from Augustine's privative theory of evil, which Brunner renounces.

Because throughout the volume the author is continually dealing with great streams of thought, he cannot always qualify his generalizations so as to cover important exceptions. It is not true that idealism necessarily ignores the distinction between Creator and creature, and regards corporeality as the sole source of evil. It is not true that naturalism invariably regards man as merely a complex animal, whose culture and creativity are entirely explicable in terms of subpersonal categories. Nor is it true that for all non-Christian humanism "culture becomes an idol, the spirit becomes abstract and impersonal, desire becomes spiritless and lawless" (p. 275). To such protests Professor Brunner would probably reply that where there are exceptions to his generalizations, it is usually because the position in question has not been thought through to its ultimate conclusions. Be that as it may, the two most illuminating aspects of his work, apart from his positive exposition of the Christian position, have to do with naturalism and idealism. In the one case he succeeds in showing how the progress of scientific thought has increased instead of eliminated the need for a theological anthropology. In the other, he clearly differentiates between the Platonic and the Biblical elements which have become fused and confused within the Christian tradition; this is done with especial effectiveness in the chapter on eternal life (Chapter xx).

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Religion for Free Minds. By Julius Seelye Bixler. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939. 247 pp. $2.50.

It is probably no misrepresentation to say that the theologians, as a group, have felt and appreciated more immediately and more deeply than the philosophers, as a group, the events of post-War Europe and the actual human significance of the cult of the irrational. In fact, the introduction into America of the cult of the irrational in theological circles by those who had visited Europe and witnessed its problems

and studied its intellectual efforts at solving them often seemed artificial to Americans. In American life the old patterns of thought and conduct had maintained themselves, and only a few left-wing prophets were shouting in what had not yet become a wilderness. The rifts in our land have, to be sure, begun to appear, but we are, generally speaking, even yet in a mood to "defend" this or that in our national life, for we have, even now, not tasted the bitterness of that chaos which has made the cult of unreason the apparent answer to the difficulties of man in Europe. We are, therefore, witnessing a curious situation. Having vicariously lived through the more immediate breakdown in European life and religion, the American theologian may snap out of it and seek to offer to America a positive program of construction even before the full force of the destructiveness of unreason is unleashed on American soil—if it is. Such seems to me to be the case of Professor Bixler, made evident in his book *Religion for Free Minds*. If this analysis is correct, the situation may be of benefit to America. With the emotional strain partly behind them, some of America's theologians may be able to work more sanely and creatively if, or when, more drastic dislocations descend upon the land. Negatively, however, some of the force and positiveness of Professor Bixler's book may be lost; for the average reader who has not felt the force of unreason may simply place the book in the framework of American life, American religion and American Liberalism and give it no further thought.

Liberalism, according to William James, lacks speed and passion, and this Mr. Bixler concedes. Authoritarianism, however, lacks clarity and rationality. Liberalism, it is true, has permitted itself to be maneuvered into a position of one-sided emotional and easy-going optimism. In so far as this is true, liberalism cannot be defended. It must be reconstructed. In the work of reconstruction Mr. Bixler has recourse to the now familiar concepts of dualism and process. Briefly, his argument is as follows: Liberalism must not only admit but must advertise the fact that it has in it a dualism of nature and reason. To those in liberalism who have emphasized nature—i.e., impulse, feeling, the will-to-believe and achieve—the claims of reason must be adequately presented, for, without reason, nature, and hence man, is blind. To those who have superficially resorted to an appeal to reason

the claims of nature must be asserted, for reason alone is empty. The dualism, however, is not absolute and may be overcome within the concept of process. Process is, however, not evolutionary in the sense of automatic and unilinear development. It is rhythmic, and rhythm involves the ancient concept of alternation—it is dialectical. Alternation, Mr. Bixler asserts with considerable assurance, can be understood—is "reasonable."

Mr. Bixler tries to defend his position by admitting first that the condition of man's life is nature with its physical character and its biological drives. But he goes on to proclaim the reality of reason and the fact that it cannot be neglected, and, moreover, that it is related to nature in the ultimate unity of the process. The works of James, Santayana, Dewey, and Royce are reviewed to show that the American development of thought is much more reasonable than the dialectical movement in German theology which completely separates reasoning and natural man from religious man. Then the limitations of American thought are set forth. James, who emphasized the will to believe, could not escape reason and the rational good. The same is true on another level of Dewey. Santayana abandoned the unity of the process and its rationality, while Royce was ultimately unable to make his position clear with reference to the relation of process to fact and value.

The influence of American philosophy upon Mr. Bixler, however, exceeds but little the influence of Husserl, Scheler, and Hartmann, and perhaps even more, though not so explicitly, that of Heidegger.

Though Mr. Bixler has been charged with an over-emphasis upon abstract ideal values, yet he has always been at pains to deal fairly with the world of fact and the problems of existence. He has never allowed himself to underestimate the fact of evil in nature or in the world's process itself, and he has therefore been one of the most interesting, honest, and helpful spokesmen for both liberalism and theology in general. He has sought to do full justice to ideal value and existence, and to goodness and power, perfection and incompleteness, as they relate to the idea of God.

The solution of these problems remains unsatisfactory, and Mr. Bixler must be aware of it. Suffice it to illustrate with the problem of ideal value and existence as related to the problem of God. It is not

always clear in this work whether Mr. Bixler means God directly or not when he refers to value. Sometimes he seems to; other times he does not. In any event it is clear that value is the clue to understanding God—even his existence. In answer to the oftmade charge that "our awareness of value is of a *what* and not of a *that*, and therefore sheds no light on existence at all, we may urge in reply that our knowledge of values is of two sorts, knowledge about and knowledge of acquaintance." Knowledge about, he grants, gives no clue to existence, but if

> we have knowledge of acquaintance we make the value our own, and this illustrates the fact that it is an existent thing. . . . Knowledge of God thus begins in acquaintance with a value which itself requires active participation in value. We look for God in the value which requires a moral response and then build our theory on this moral experience.

But surely this recourse again to a dual character of knowledge does not solve the problem. How do we know that knowledge of God does not only begin but also ends in acquaintance with value, and moreover the acquaintance with value may still be only the acquaintance with ideal value. He who believes he is doing the "will of the Father" may merely be following his own inclinations or realizing his own best ideals. Acquaintanceship remains with moral experience and not with God, and only the theologian's assurance makes it divine. Mr. Bixler does not intend, apparently, to reduce God to ideal value. But, though he says at one point that God is the source of value and though he indicates in the passage above that our experience of value is the beginning (or the source?) of a knowledge of God, he nowhere outlines an empirical approach to God. Repeatedly he says of the position of the religious liberal: There is a rational good, and man can attain it. He does not distinguish and say there is a divine good and man can know it and experience it.

Since an instrumental approach to value is unlikely to exert its claim on Mr. Bixler, it appears that he must retreat to his idealistic point of view or plunge farther in the direction of a dualism of value and existence (and here his insights have always been most fruitful). The alternative would be to develop an approach by way of faith, but that might lead him to the irrationalism he is so eager to overcome. Yet it might lead him to some new form of religious empiricism which

seems implicit in much of Mr. Bixler's thinking, though for the most part submerged by his idealistic value approach.

In the light of the above remarks it is not unkind to say that any consideration of the educational program that Mr. Bixler has outlined for liberalism must be deferred, and the program regarded as premature. It is extremely refreshing, however, to witness the enthusiastic effort to reconstruct the education of liberalism from the ground up. Such an effort ought successfully to elicit co-operation, if Mr. Bixler is in earnest in putting his shoulder to that particular wheel.

Though Mr. Bixler's work is not epoch-making, and though its conclusions are too premature and fragile to serve as the foundation of a new movement, it ought to shake liberals out of their theological doldrums, for, in general, it points in a direction that is open to much fruitful exploration. His insistence upon the rational good and the possibility of its attainment, and his conviction that the task is good though the liberal fails, will gain him the just favor of the liberals and idealists. His abandonment of divine guarantees will gain him the equally just favor of the humanists. His genuine and profound treatment of the dualism of fact and value, good and evil, will retain for him the respect of all. Finally, and parenthetically, Mr. Bixler is to be complimented for further eliminating vestigial ideas and terminology from theological discussion.

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CRITICAL COMMENTS

A REPLY TO MR. DUKER

In his review of my book *Perish the Jew!* (REVIEW OF RELIGION, March, 1940), Mr. Duker counts among its shortcomings "the tendency on the part of the author to rely on his memory and not to check on facts," and he cites instances of inaccuracies of both fact and perspective. His citations are so misleading that, in fairness to all concerned, I ought to be given a hearing.

Says Mr. Duker:

1. "*It is obviously impossible that Nazi legislation should ferret out one-third blooded Jews.*" Why is it impossible, I ask, when that is exactly what Nazi legislation did do to the third generation of mixed-marriage Jews? Obviously, your reviewer has missed the metaphor.

2. "*It is inaccurate to say that the Nazis gave the number of less than a million Jews as an excuse for the subjugation of 80,000,000 of their own racial comrades, when the number of Jews previous to the Hitler regime amounted to about a half a million.*" Why is the number of "less than a million" Jews in the greater Germany, which includes Austria and Czechoslovakia, inaccurate because in a previous Germany that did not include Austria and Czechoslovakia there were only about a half a million Jews? Or, is it not clear that when one speaks of 80,000,000 "racial comrades," it is Greater Germany that he has in mind, and not pre-Hitler Germany?

3. "*The Jews have not lived in Russia for a number of centuries.*" Haven't they? Then how about the Jewish community in the city of Kiev which antedated Russia's conversion to the Byzantian Church? My authorities for that are all the accredited Jewish historians, including Professor Dubnow. What authority is there to the contrary?

4. "*It is an evidence of wrong historical perspective,*" says Mr. Duker further, "*to select Jehudah Halevi as an anti-assimilationist. Assimilation or anti-assimilation are modern terms or phenomena.*" With this statement I thoroughly agree, only I have never selected Jehudah Halevi as an anti-assimilationist, and I cannot understand the purpose of the innuendo. Halevi is brought in solely in connection with my discussion of the survival theories, and not even by a stretch of imagination could he be linked, in my chapter wherein he is mentioned, to the assimilation panacea.

This last thrust at my sense of perspective, as well as his flat charge that I have overlooked the potent force of messianism in Jewish life, although I actually might have overstressed that force, leads me to believe that Mr. Duker either took unwarranted liberties with some of the salient chapters in my book or that he took them altogether on faith. I am entitled then to turn Mr. Duker's own words upon himself: "*These may be petty details; but when the reader encounters them too frequently, he is bound to doubt the quality of the Review.*"

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BOOK NOTES

Some Sayings of the Buddha According to the Pali Canon, translated by F. L. Woodward, with an Introduction by Sir Francis Younghusband. Oxford University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. First published in 1925. Reissued in 1939 as Volume cdlxxxiii of "The World's Classics."

Almost exactly twenty-five hundred years after the birth of Gotama, selections from his reputed sayings have been included for the first time in "The World's Classics" series. As a companion volume to *The Koran* and *The Analects of Confucius* in the same series. *Some Sayings of the Buddha,* translated by F. L. Woodward and originally published in 1925, has been reissued. The translator has selected short passages from the Pali canon and arranged them topically in sections: "The Early Order," "The Path of Holiness," "The Stability of Societies," etc. Particularly delightful are the quotations in a section entitled "In Time of Sickness," reflecting the loving pastoral care with which the Master tended his disciples, and others describing the practice of group silence in the early Brotherhood. But the brevity of most of the selections makes it difficult for the reader to grasp the *continuity* of the Buddha's thought, or the logical and psychological astuteness of his Socratic question-method. Whereas the reported words of Confucius and Mohammed have been handed down only in scattered fragments and hence do not suffer from being read in excerpts, the sequence of the Buddha's thought, like that of Plato, is available today in connected *Dialogues,* and must be studied in its logical continuity if one wish to understand his fundamental thesis.

The unity and incisiveness of the Buddha's thinking, as revealed in the complete *Dialogues,* distinguishes it markedly from the stereotyped fomulae attributed to him by the Hinayana monks who compiled the Pali canon centuries after his death.

When Mr. Woodward made his pioneer selection and translation in 1925, "higher criticism" of Buddhist documents had scarcely begun; his original preface referred to the difficulty of distinguishing between Gotama's own words and later formulae. But in the fourteen years since that time, although there is still no consensus of scholars as to what Gotama really taught, the labors of Mrs. Rhys Davids and the Pali Text Society have made possible a closer approximation to what was probably the Buddha's original gospel. Hence it is disappointing in a newly issued book to find precedence several times given to the formula at the expense of the gospel. For example, the fullest explanation of the Causal Law has been taken from a highly stereotyped, negative formulation, and no passages illustrate adequately the positive use of the Law-of-Cause-and-Effect as a means to self-mastery and inner growth (through analyzing the causes

and the results of good and bad states of mind, and thus learning to control them).

The Introduction by Sir Francis Younghusband begins with an imaginative reconstruction of Gotama's indebtedness to the "spiritual climate" of the India of his time. Stressing the positive nature of the Buddha's good news, his ceaseless activity, and the charm of his personality, it provides an excellent starting-point for students. (Its historical data, however, need to be checked: in particular, a reference to the *Bhagavad Gita* as "written centuries before then"). Especially valuable is Sir Francis' explanation of Nirvana in positive terms, comparing it with the state of being absorbed in contemplation of beauty.

In spite of the qualifications noted above, this new volume of "The World's Classics" will be welcome and useful as a readily-available introduction to Buddhist literature, and should stimulate an increasing number of students to dig for themselves into the Buddha's *Dialogues* and *Further Dialogues* in full.

TERESINA ROWELL

What Is Hinduism? By D. S. SARMA. Madras, G. S. Press, 1939. 136 pp. 3*s*. 6 *d*.

Especially designed for students in Indian colleges, this textbook contains "a short account of what is common to all of the leading faiths that make up Hinduism in their different aspects of ritual, ethics, systems of discipline and schools of philosophy." And while it is of necessity elementary and selective in character, it is a well analyzed, clear and constructive presentation of Hinduism. To be commended is the author's presentation of religion in a sober, dignified way, appealing to the best impulses of Indian students in behalf of their religion, suggesting the deeper implications of Hinduism for present-day India. In the interesting chapter on rituals, Mr. Sarma lays special emphasis upon their function in bringing men to "a realization of God." Ethical theory has its basis in *varṇāśrama*, not in caste, taking into account as it does "both the unity and the variety of human beings" determined by varying degrees of character and culture. He speaks of the great social injustice which has kept a large part of the Hindu population at arms length as a fifth caste, and which he says can no longer be tolerated. His exposition of the five distinctive marks of the religious spirit in India, purity, self-control, detachment, truth, and non-violence, is excellent. And in describing the various higher disciplines he points out the universal Hindu aim, not as morality, but as the higher levels of consciousness. In the chapter on philosophies, the author puts unusual limits upon himself; but he re-emphasizes the fact that Hindu philosophy is not mere speculation or guess work, but rather organized doctrine based upon "mystic experience." For the author Hinduism is the oldest religion in the world and synthetic in character. It is now passing through its sixth

renaissance. In this phase it has no political backing and contains within its fold unrest among certain classes, due to the petrifaction of the ancient social order and the consequent social injustice and tyranny. The author appears to be a social reformer who, right up to the end, presses his appeal to his students to realize the best implications of religion in its Hindu form. The book serves to indicate also what an Indian educator considers to be the aspects of Hinduism most important to be impressed upon college students.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

Die Verwirklichung des Summum Bonum in der religiösen Erfahrung. By MOHAMMAD MAHMUD AHMAD. München: Ernst Reinhardt, 1939. 157 pp. RM 4.80.

The Editor of this volume, Friedrich Heiler, tells us in his preface that the author has been former professor of philosophy of the Mohammedan University of Aligarh, and that his book, a Marburg Doctoral Dissertation, was originally written in English under the title, *The Realization of Summum Bonum in the Religious Experience.*

This realization is described by the author as a condition of eternal and all-embracing Being, Life, Consciousness, Wisdom, Power, Goodness, aesthetic Well-being, Happiness and complete Unity (p. 16). Accordingly, the author's theology proves throughout to be highly anthropocentric and undialectic.

The search for realization of the Summum Bonum, then, is pushed through the entire history of religion, which the author regards from a few one-sided aspects. His main source for Hinduism is James Haughton Wood, *The Yoga System of Patanjalee.* In the field of Buddhism he is mainly dependent on Rhys Davids' investigations, and on M. B. Maw's *Buddhist Mysticism* (Thèse, Bordeaux 1924). For Judaism the author selects Philo's Mysticism, and for Christianity he refers only to St. John of the Cross, whom he calls the greatest psychologist in the history of mysticism. Islam consists for him of Sufism; he describes especially the self-extinction and intoxication of Ibn al-Farid.

Curiously enough, Zen Buddhism, which would have provided so much material just in the line of the author's point of view, has entirely escaped his attention.

The second, shorter part of the book tests the validity of mystical experience, and the main concern of the author is here to point out the analogy of religious mystical experiences with telepathic visions. He refers for comparison to all kinds of psycho-pathological phenomena, especially catalepsis and hysteria. The main difference between these symptoms and religious inspiration is that the latter seizes an objective reality, while the former remains in the subjective field and is merely an auto-deception of a sick mind. The author reaches the conclusion (p. 113) that every attempt to

explain inspiration in the terms of psycho-pathology is simply hopeless and condemned to futility. The era of medical theories about mysticism has come to an end.

FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG

The Omnipotent Light Revealed: The Luminous Tegument to Unite Mankind into One Loving Brotherhood. By LEVI I. KRAKOVSKY. Kabbalah Culture Society of America: Hollywood, California, 1939. 98 pp. + unpaged Index. $2.00.

Rabbi Krakovsky is a pupil of the famous Palestinian Kabbalist, Judah Halevi Ashlag. In this book, the influence of his teacher is noticeable particularly in his markedly ethical and social approach. For example, transmigration of the soul is transformed from the baldly individualistic doctrine which it is in other mystical movements to the far nobler concept presented thus:

> You and I suffer or are happy today, not alone for our own bad or good deeds, nor alone for the personal deeds of our own life; we suffer or are happy, also, for the good and bad actions of our contemporaries, our sires and the sires of our fellowman. Thus we suffer for our fellow-creatures, and thus the entire creation forms one great chain of brotherhood and universal fellowship. The virtues and vices, good and evil, of all, are visited upon every link and upon each member of the great chain of creation. By suffering for our contemporaries' vices and profiting by their virtues, there is in this world one universal solidarity in which each social member is co-responsible for every deed of every fellow creature, until that deed has been atoned for (p. 26).

Now, in this presentation, transmigration ceases to be the road to a private and personal Nirvana; salvation is neither by individual accomplishment, nor by foreordination, nor by the sudden access of Divine Grace; salvation for the individual comes about only in terms of salvation for the race. There is no conflict between social purpose and man's end; mysticism has been placed in a collectivistic context.

Beyond this insight, the book is a simple exposition of a few Kabbalistic doctrines. It makes no pretense at being complete. In fact, it seems designed to serve as an advertisement of an as yet unpublished complete compendium of the Kabbalah (cf. p. 43). Kabbalah is declared to be a science, its study "based on scientific fact. The human body is the laboratory of the Kabalistic wisdom" (p. 23). It will be interesting to see whether Krakovsky proves this point in his larger work; he does not do so here.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

Aaron Lopez and Judah Touro: A Refugee and a Son of a Refugee. By MORRIS A. GUTSTEIN. New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1939. xii + 118 pp. $1.50.

This little book gives short biographical accounts of Aaron Lopez, leading shipper of Newport before the American Revolution, and of Judah

Touro, noted philanthropist of New Orleans. For the most part, the facts compiled by Dr. Gutstein are well known to workers in the field of American Jewish history. The author also fails to give us his sources and leaves us wondering whether he made use of the business records of Lopez in possession of the *American Jewish Historical Society*. Despite these defects, the book has merit, particularly at this time, in reviving the memory of two leading Jews and of the part they played in American life. Like other important figures of the minority groups, Lopez and Touro are little known to the general reading public. The recital of their deeds in popular form may help to place early Jewish contributions to America in better perspective.

H. B. Grinstein

Rebuilding Palestine. By Ben M. Edidin. New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1939. xiii + 264 pp. $1.75.

Of textbooks, good and bad, about the Bible and Biblical Palestine there is no end. *Rebuilding Palestine*, however, is a pioneer attempt at a religious school textbook dealing with modern Palestine. Mr. Edidin, who served for several years as supervisor of schools in Tel-Aviv, has succeeded admirably.

This is not a travel-book of the Holy Land, but a presentation of the history, achievements and problems of a functioning and dynamic community. After treating of the background of the Zionist movement, it tells of modern Palestine, the conquest of the soil and the life in the co-operative colonies, the building of cities and the development of a modern Hebraic culture, the creation of industries and the role of the labor movement, the growth of self-governing institutions, and the Arab problem.

The arrangement of chapters might have been improved. One would have wished, also, for greater detail at times, for a more systematic treatment of the industrial and cultural development, references to which are scattered throughout the book, for a specific analysis of the absorptive capacities of the land, a critical evaluation of Great Britain's role in the recurring disturbances, and a clearer view of the relationship between the autonomous government and the mandatory power. However, for Jewish classes of high school age, youth clubs and adult study groups, the book fills a genuine need. Its usefulness is enhanced by a number of excellent photographs, a glossary, bibliography, discussion questions, and an adequate index.

Harold I. Saperstein

Istoria vechii literaturi creştine (Epoca dela 461 la 636/750). Partea III. [History of Ancient Christian Literature.] By Cicerone Iordăchescu. Iaşi: Tipografia Alexandru Ţerek, 1940. xvi + 132 pp. 120 Lei.

This is a handbook of Christian literature from the end of the Golden Age to the death of Isidore of Seville in the West and of St. John Damascene

in the East, with a short section on the writers of Syria. It is frankly a compilation prepared by a man who has long worked in the period and is intended to acquaint Romanian students with the outlines of the theological literature of an important period in Christian development. In addition to general outlines, the author gives a brief biography, list of works, and a brief characterization of the authors whom he discusses. It will serve its purpose admirably, and it is to be regretted that we do not have such material available so readily in English.

C. A. M.

Les Hérésies du moyen âge. By EMMANUEL AEGERTER. Paris: Librairie Ernest Leroux, 1939. xii + 154 pp. Fr. 15.

The little volume under review constitutes the second to be published in a series on "Mythes et religions," edited by P. L. Couchoud. Obviously, in the space of 150 pages it is impossible to give a systematic treatment of heresy in the Middle Ages, and the author wisely refrains from any such attempt. His aim is rather to provide for the lay reader a suggestive summary of those aspects of the heretical movement from the eleventh to the fifteenth century which seem to him to have most permanent significance. The work consists in "a discussion of principles rather than a catalogue of errors" (p. x).

Though recognizing the social implications of heresy, the author is more interested in its philosophical aspects. The three most careful chapters in the book are devoted to the discussion of the problems of transubstantiation, as presented by Berengar of Tours, and pantheism, as reflected in the teachings of Amaury de Bène, David de Dinant, and Siger de Brabant. For the rest, he has a chapter on the Cathari, whom he discusses as the type of anti-sacerdotal heretics; two brief chapters on little known and relatively unimportant groups of the "Illuminati," the Guillelmites of northern Italy and the Men of Intelligence of Brabant, to whom he seems to be attracted by the colorful extravagance of their lives and teachings; and one chapter on "Monasticism and Communism," in which he traces certain influences stemming from Joachim of Flora. From the discussion it becomes apparent that, in the view of the author, medieval heresy is woven of two threads, the one intellectual and on the whole negative in its emphasis, the other primarily social and positive in its program which looks forward to the establishment of an ideal society.

The book makes no pretense of adding to our knowledge of medieval heresy. It evidences no exhaustive study and analysis of the available sources, no new interpretation on the basis of facts already known. It is more than a little careless in matters of detail. In the necessity of being brief, the author has allowed himself sweeping generalizations that would be difficult to defend. The contribution of the volume lies rather in its urbanity and the suggestiveness with which the author places the heretical currents of the Middle Ages in the stream of thought and action which flows from

Plato to our own time. Unencumbered by a multiplicity of facts, his mind plays freely over his subject; and thereby he has produced a stimulating book.

AUSTIN P. EVANS

Three Famous Mystics: Saint-Martin, by ARTHUR EDWARD WAITE; *Jacob Boehme*, by W. P. SWAINSON; *Swedenborg*, by W. P. SWAINSON. Philadelphia: The David McKay Company, 1939. 192 pp. $1.50.

Two British authors, whose main religious interest lies in the occult, unite to produce a short popularization of three well-known, important names in the history of mystical speculation: Saint-Martin, Boehme, and Swedenborg. Claude de Saint-Martin is here treated by Waite as *le Philosophe Inconnu* of the French Enlightenment, as a link in the long chain of Christian thinkers which began with Dionysius the Areopagite. Jacob Boehme is dealt with by Swainson in an orthodox way, with enough of the traditional hero-worship to arouse suspicion of an uncritical use of materials and of misunderstanding of Boehme's basic problems. Emanuel Swedenborg, the mystical giant of the north, is considered by Swainson in a short and sometimes inadequate account. Yet, on the whole, popularisations of the mystics are welcome additions to the literature of a rich and significant religious tradition.

J. J. STOUDT

Der Mensch und die ewigen Hintergründe. By ERNST BARTHEL. Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1939. 69 pp. RM 2.20.

This little book is a striking illustration of how rooted old convictions can be in the midst of modern ferment. It is essentially an assertion of faith. And the faith is as old as German religious idealism, as Herder or Schleiermacher, in some of its emphases as old as Nicholas Cusanus or Meister Eckhart. There is to be found here a reaffirmation of Platonic Christianity, more precisely, the symbolical and mystical interpretation of leading Christian doctrines of the incarnation, the trinity, revelation, life after death, and others. In its latent asceticism, this Platonic Christianity rejects the dominant values, the current issues, the noisy conflicts of the world of today as vain and empty show. Barthel dwells on the "polarity," the cleavage and dualism, basic in all thought and existence, and finds the duty and the privilege of the spirit to live in the *Jenseits* rather than the *Diesseits*. Once or twice he lashes out against the works of National Socialism; but his religious and philosophical faith impresses upon him the conviction that so "the world" has ever been, given over to the forces of sin, and so it will continue to be. The part of wisdom is to seek the eternal backgrounds.

On the other hand, there is a doctrine of positive, secular ethics expounded, at the end of the treatise, that seems hardly consistent with the author's religious philosophy or his metaphysics. The ethics is based on the trinity of "happiness, kindness, and creative work," only the second of

which, as the author claims, has any specific relation to Christian principles. But anything less than all three makes life imperfect and results in the one-sidedness that has characterized most ethical theories, even the Christian. The reader is left to make his own reconciliation between this ethical affirmation of worldly existence and the religious, metaphysical denial of it in the earlier pages.

The modern theological interest in eschatology is reflected here, also, though chiefly in reference to Mr. Barthel's other works. Moreover, one perceives an important concern for a mystic cosmology, medieval in its outlines, which impells the author to reject as perverse the whole of modern physical theory and speculation.

Despite such difficult backgrounds, however, Mr. Barthel achieves clarity and relative precision in language and meaning. This man approaches "last things" in a spirit of simplicity, not to say naïveté, that is refreshing and thought-provoking. The reader can be in no doubt as to what the writer believes. This calm assertion of faith in man's spiritual nature and the spirit's eternal destiny seems to be a dispelling of long gathering clouds of doubt and scepticism that hang heavy over this generation. Here, one may say, is a man who knows what he believes. He is going to have no truck with this relativistic modern mind. Wrong or not, he has placed himself beyond the reach of transient storms. And perhaps, after all, he is right. The old faith *did* save men's souls, if not in the sense that they thought, then at least from absorption by the complexity of immediate and passing issues.

But because these pages are largely a restatement and repetition of an old faith, they lack something of the old convincingness. They leave a sense of inadequacy and perplexity. There is, too, a despairing note, even if a faint one. Many vexing problems that concern us most closely today are largely ignored; perhaps necessarily, since the older philosophy did not have them to cope with in the modern garb. The need for a new interpretation of this older faith in the light of present facts and values is not met. Mr. Barthel's answer is a return more than a progress. One might add that religious idealism, of the Platonic-Christian kind, to be deeply persuasive needs to be set forth by original men of genius. In other mouths it is too likely to sound irrelevant to experience, perhaps a little fantastic.

J. GLENN GRAY

Suffering, Human and Divine. By H. WHEELER ROBINSON. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. v + 230 pp. $2.00.

In a time when suffering, physical and mental, is the poignant experience of millions of people, when nations are crushed or threatened with catastrophic disaster, the age-long problem as to why there is suffering and evil in the world becomes acutely present. In its personal consequences and in its overwhelming magnitude it is the most baffling and distressing question which men have to face. In its religious aspects it raises sharply the issue, how can one believe in God who is wise and powerful and good?

This book, written by a distinguished Oxford scholar, is therefore a discussion highly relevant to an existing situation, which will well repay a careful reading. While the author's style is remarkably clear and graphic, he properly reminds the reader that the subject can never be made an easy one. One should not expect any quick or facile answer to the most profound of all questions. Whatever comprehension is gained must be used to indicate the way for further discovery.

A conspicuous merit of the book is that the writer faces frankly the facts; he does not attempt to "explain away" any of the difficulties. His approach is realistic. Nor does he claim to give a final solution. The contribution he makes is in pointing out what is the real nature of Christian faith in relation to this problem, with the illumination and support which it gives in the practical task of overcoming suffering.

A chapter is devoted to some of the historic explanations of suffering, as in Buddhism and in Stoicism; another to the various interpretations found in the Old Testament.

A vast amount of suffering is plainly due to man's own acts, if not individually then by the society of which the individual is a member and whose fortunes he shares. In his book, *The Mind in the Making*, Professor James Harvey Robinson wrote in the opening paragraph, "If some magical transformation could be produced in men's ways of looking at themselves and their fellows, no inconsiderable part of the evils which now afflict society would vanish away or remedy themselves automatically." If man admits any responsibility for his way of looking at himself and his fellows, it would not seem necessary to wait for some "magical transformation" to effect the change.

Suffering takes on a new aspect when it is encountered in devotion to a true and beneficent purpose. Here is the first significant element in Christian faith. The supreme illustration is in the life of Christ. Because of His devotion to the Kingdom which He came to inaugurate on earth as the purpose of God for men, He met death on the cross. And by that fidelity the instrument of death became the symbol of triumph. So all suffering can be transformed when it is met with a like fidelity. "So far as the sufferer shares the purpose of God, he becomes a creative fellow-worker with Him in the continuation of that redemptive work which was initiated on Calvary" (p. 193).

Suffering is lifted to a new plane when it is "interpreted from within the creative fellowship with God through Christ" (pp. xix and 192, 193). The faith that is held is in God who suffers—not in a Being to whom suffering cannot be ascribed. "It is the suffering of God Himself, revealed through Jesus Christ, which throws most light on the suffering of man, and bestows most strength on the sufferer" (p. 25). "We may be unable to solve the mystery of suffering intellectually, and yet we may *live* through it into the light" (p. 201).

R. C. K.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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CAVE OF EILEITHYIA, AT AMNISOS
(Illustration for "The Cult of the Cretan Caves" by Spyridon Marinatos)